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A central issue for development policy across
southern Africa is the governance of natural
resources such as land, water, forests, rangelands and
fisheries. Institutional arrangements for the
sustainable management of these resources are now
seen as critically important at all levels of
government, but also as necessarily involving agents
outside of government (communities, non-
governmental organisations and the private sector).
Governance of natural resource use in southern
Africa is rendered inherently complex by some key
features of current regimes of use:
ownership and control by different interest
groups is highly skewed
many resources are in short supply relative to
the populations which depend on them
many resources are held under regimes of
property rights urgently in need of democratic
reform
some resource regimes (for example, water
catchments and protected areas) are cross-
frontier in character
access and control are increasingly contested,
leading to tensions or conflicts between
competing interest groups or even national
states.
These issues, which are currently being addressed by
land reform and other policy initiatives in southern
Africa, were explored in a symposium held at the
University of the Western Cape in October 2000.
The proceedings of this symposium are published in
this volume. Central themes include:
the role of natural resources in livelihoods
the impact of  regimes of  property rights on
governance
the role of the state
modes of co-regulation and co-management
between stakeholders, including but not limited
to the state and user groups
the impact of decentralisation of government
co-ordinated and integrated action and decisions
within and between natural resource sectors
dispute resolution and conflict management
power, meaning, identities and competing
concepts, definitions and discourses of governance
and resource management.
The symposium was the first outcome of a joint
initiative by two constituent units of the School of
Government at the University of the Western Cape,
the Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) and
the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies
(PLAAS). This aims to bring together
multidisciplinary and wide-ranging analyses on
governance and natural resources. The work of the
CSAS and PLAAS on a number of different yet
thematically-related projects (for example, water
reform, land reform and community-based natural
resource management) could thus be brought
together, and diverse conceptual frameworks and
research approaches debated.
The other aim of the symposium was to allow for the
presentation of findings from ongoing research
arising out of productive and mutually beneficial
partnerships between southern African institutions
and a number of Norwegian partners. Within the
School of Government, both CSAS and PLAAS are
engaged in fruitful collaborative programmes with
the Norwegian College of Fisheries Science at the
University of Tromsø and the Chr. Michelsen
Institute (CMI) at Bergen. PLAAS and other staff of
the School are working closely with the University
of Bergen in a research programme on trust relations
and administrative authority in South Africa.
PLAAS and the Centre for International
Environment and Development Studies (Noragric)
at the Agricultural University of Norway are
working closely together in a programme focused on
human rights and governance in South Africa’s land
and agrarian reform. Another of PLAAS’s partners,
the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the
University of Zimbabwe, has collaborated closely
with CMI over a number of years, and a number of
CASS researchers presented papers at the symposium.
Introduction
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Symposium organisation
and the structure of these
proceedings
A total of 38 papers were presented at the
symposium, and a variety of resource sectors were
represented. The organisers of the symposium
decided to eschew an approach to the organisation of
panels in terms of resource sector in favour of one
attempting to focus on key themes in governance,
which were flagged in plenary sessions held at the
outset of each day’s proceedings and then carried
forward into the different panels. This approach was
used to ensure that ideas could be exchanged across
specific case-study contexts. The inclusion of more
international relations and development approaches
also led to a greater emphasis on the global context
within which the research on community-based
resource management takes place.
These proceedings are structured in a similar fashion,
and papers have been grouped around the following
themes:
1. Contesting ‘governance’.
2. Power and authority in co-management of the
commons.
3. Empowerment and redistribution.
4. Communities in protected areas: Whose
interests count?
5. Contradictory narratives of land, environment
and development.
6. Economic analysis of natural resource use.
7. Participatory approaches to natural resource
management.
Not all the papers which were presented at the
symposium could be included in these proceedings,
but they nevertheless demonstrate the wide-ranging
nature of the discussion and debates which took
place.
Emerging themes
One of the predominant themes of the conference,
which was introduced early on in the first plenary
session in a keynote address by Pauline Peters, was
the relationship between academic theories and
analysis of governance and the environment, on the
one hand, and the world of policy and practice, on
the other. As Peters put it in her paper:
It is the interface between ideas and actions
which interest me… particularly… the way in
which certain ideas or approaches make their
way into policy design and implementation,
often with no attention being paid to their
theoretical premises, and how quickly they
become accepted as conventional wisdoms.
Peters reminded us of the need for ‘grounding
governance’ when debating concepts and approaches
to natural resource management. This advice was
well-heeded by presenters and discussants, and
indeed one of the strengths of the conference was
that governance-related concepts and theories were
debated across disciplinary boundaries and resource-
specific research projects. Of course, the gap between
academic debate and the practice of natural resource
allocation, management and contestation will
remain in tension. Yet it was heartening to see so
many researchers devoting attention and energy to
thinking through ways to narrow the divide between
academic discussions and policy processes.
As a cursory glance at the contents of this volume
shows, there is nonetheless still a high concentration
of micro-studies in areas of resource management
such as water, forestry, and land reform. However,
we believe that the challenge for researchers in this
thematic field is to go beyond the empirical cases
studied, and then preferably in teams. It is still
important with an empirical approach to understand
the day-to-day micro-politics of resource management
and its influences on the environment. But our
studies of power, meaning and discourses in natural
resource management should not stop there. We
should also try to trace the lines of influence beyond
the cases studied to national and global political and
economic debates and struggles.
The international structuration of power is arguably
integral to understanding the broader contexts
within which national, regional and local policy
debates and dynamics take place. The valuable social
science contributions to understanding community
participation (or ‘stakeholder politics’, in the
language of political studies) can help to highlight
how and under what circumstances certain groups
are included or excluded, and under what conditions
their relational power is positively exercised or not,
both within states but also in specific ‘developing
regions’ such as southern Africa. However, as Peters
points out, this needs to be done within an analytical
context which is at least cautious about the meanings
of and relations between concepts such as
‘governance’ on the one hand, and ‘community-
based management’ on the other. Peters and others
in this volume critically examine the academic
transformation of the concept of governance into a
‘development-speak’ cliché, where it implies more
than ‘government’ but is often lacking in any
rigorous analytical content. The meaning of
community involvement in governance (as opposed
to management), and the relationship between the
two concepts, is the subject of over-generalisation
but also of contestation.
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Introduction
In this keynote address I wish to identify some
important ideas and conclusions arising out of recent
analyses of theory and practice on natural resource
management. I use these in a preliminary attempt to
argue that the centrality of power and meaning in
processes of ‘governing natural resources’ is not
sufficiently addressed in the currently favoured
approaches of ‘common property theory’.
My intention is to provide some food for thought as
we consider together the specific cases presented in
the symposium. I am personally committed to the
intersection of scholarship or theory-building with
practical action, including policy. Note that I say
‘intersection’ – I do not wish to conflate the academic
work of theory-building with the practical work of
applying theory to policy, but I also reject their total
separation as neither possible nor desirable. It is the
interface of ideas and action which interests me. I am
particularly interested in the way certain ideas or
approaches make their way into policy design and
implementation, often with no attention being paid
to their theoretical premises, and how quickly they
become accepted as conventional wisdoms. Equally
interesting is the question of why some ideas and
approaches developed by thinkers and researchers do
not make their way into policy debate. Today, I shall
discuss some notions that currently dominate the
realm of natural resource management so effectively
that they exclude others that might be more
appropriate guides.
The title ‘grounding governance’ points to my
attempt to alert us to the dangers of overly general or
abstract concepts and to question the appropriateness
of the premises and implications of some key
concepts and approaches in natural resource
management, such as community, participation,
local knowledge, or effective institutions. A related
danger is reductionism – the reduction of complex
and situationally specific interactions among people
and their environments to oversimplified models or
rules of behaviour. The proliferation of acronyms in
the field – NRM, CBNRM, CPR, IPR, NGO, CBO
– stands as a warning: beware the reduction of
multifarious relationships and conditions to a series
of capital letters! We have here one of the lessons of
introductory philosophy courses – the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness, which warns against
reification and abstraction of real, socially-specific
interactions. The warning is needed because we have
a tendency to blame social reality, especially real
people, for the shortcomings of our models (‘those
people are incapable of working together in
participatory ways to manage their resources’), or
we try to get the social realities to fit a model’s
expectations (‘these people need to be taught how to
participate in order to look after the forest/well/
river’). In short, and not to belabour the point too
much, my aim here is to push us to reflect on some of
our taken-for-granted concepts and practices, and to
examine the often unarticulated premises of leading
ideas and approaches, in order to refine our
understanding, broaden dialogue, and sharpen our
practice.
Recently, I read a comment by a southern African
policy researcher on the recent meeting in the US of
the International Association for the Study of
Common Property (IASCP). He said that, despite
efforts by the IASCP organisers, ‘the two worlds’ of
academics and practitioners ‘failed to achieve much
substantive interaction’, and that the conference was
dominated by an ‘academic industry’ that was not
meaningfully influenced by the practitioners’
experience. He summarised the situation as: ‘the
worlds of village project support and of academic
Grounding governance: power and
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paper-giving at international conferences are very far
apart’, and asked for ideas on how to avoid
replication of this split in the next IASCP meeting
expected to be held in Zimbabwe (University of the
Western Cape Community-Based Natural Resource
Management chat-room). I found myself in two
minds about his message.
On the one hand, I agree with the challenge to the
academic practice of paper-giving that too often
becomes mere theoretical duelling. To the extent
that one can convert these rituals into attempts to
exchange information and to open rather than to
discourage dialogue by challenging various ideas and
practices, so much the better. On the other hand, I
consider that the danger of assuming a total split
between academic theorising and practitioners’
actions is a much larger danger, and one I address
here. I can agree with the comment ‘the worlds of
village project support and of academic paper-giving
at international conferences are very far apart’ in so
far as these literal sites are physically removed from
one another. Nevertheless, I would argue that they
are nevertheless joined in unseen ways that can prove
detrimental to understanding and practice. I mean
that certain ideas, concepts and models produced in
academic studies and conferences often provide the
frameworks for how ‘village projects’ are formulated
and implemented. Yet many of these organising
frameworks are not appropriate: they hinder rather
than help informed practice and they often prove
impervious to studies showing how the many
practices glossed by the term ‘village project support’
may contradict the theories from which they derive.
It is precisely the links between theories and practice
that most need review yet that are unseen because of
the force of conventional wisdoms and taken for
granted concepts and approaches.
Genealogies of key terms
I am old enough and have been long enough
concerned with policy debates about land and other
resources in southern Africa to want to draw
attention to how new this concept of ‘governing’
resources is. Often we adapt so quickly to new
vocabulary that it becomes routinised – second
nature – before we quite grapple with its sources and
implications. Before coming to ‘governance’, let us
remember that ‘natural resource management’ is also
a relatively new domain in development policy and
an outcome of the entry of ‘environment’ into
development policy. Perhaps the single most
significant change in development policy debate over
the past 20 years is the meteoric rise of environment
as a key domain of concern. The emergence of
environmentalism as popular movement and a
growing dimension of research by scientists and
social scientists led to a rapid escalation of
environmental policy-making and administrative
actions in the US and, rather more slowly, in Europe
during the 1960s and ’70s. The 1980s saw a similar
move of environmental issues into development
policies in the so-called developing nations and,
belatedly, into the management of aid by multi-
lateral and bilateral donors.
At least for African countries, there are several major
differences in the role of environment in policy
compared with that in the US or Europe. First, and
crucially, the environment as a focus for policy was
driven little, if at all, by environmental organisations
in the countries themselves but much more by the
requirements of ‘conditionality’ on aid funds,
which, in turn, opened the door more widely to an
increased role of international environmental
organisations. (As in so many other respects, South
Africa may be an exception here.) Second, the push
towards centring policy on the environment
fundamentally displaced the critically important
domains of agricultural and rural development.
There were several unfortunate results: one was to
separate use of natural resources in agricultural and
other rural activities (such as pastoralism, forest-
based activities, or fishing) from environmental
policy and action; second, attention was shifted away
from people’s livelihoods towards resources
themselves; third, in the context of economic stress
and cuts imposed by structural adjustment, scarce
funds, personnel and administrative resources were
concentrated in new offices (or departments or
ministries) for environmental affairs, seriously
undermining the capacity of the civil service and
government officers to maintain routine activities
across the range of essential service sectors.
The main issues in the environmental agenda pushed
by donors and incorporated into the conditions set
on releasing aid funds were those of desertification,
deforestation, and the threats to certain habitats and
species. One outcome was an escalation in gloomy
accounts of the ‘degradation’ of African
environments. There is now a large body of critiques
of these overly apocalyptic narratives (Hoben 1996),
and specific challenges to interpretations of
degradation in rangelands (Scoones 1996), forests
(Fairhead & Leach 1996; Tiffen et al. 1994), and other
resources (McCann 1995). A second outcome of the
environmentalist agendas was the proclaimed need
to conserve or preserve environments against the
depredations of people. Not only did this eliminate
questions about existing human-environment
interactions, but the administrative shift away from
agricultural and rural development led to a failure to
link environmental protection with the use of
natural resources in agriculture and other rural
activities which, in most African countries, meant
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the majority of their populations. The absurdity of
this situation became a source of debate within the
donor aid groups as well as, to some extent, within
aid recipient countries. In 1994, for example, a
conference on US Agency for International
Development (USAID) natural resource management
and environmental policy was held in The Gambia
and brought together USAID professional staff in
the fields of agriculture, rural development, food
security, along with the new one of environment, as
well as a range of people working in development,
including researchers like myself. There was patent
anger at the conference among the many who felt
that there had been an environmental ‘take-over’
with the unwarranted displacement of focus and
funds for crucial areas of policy work in agriculture
and rural development to environmental issues, and
that the opposition between conservation and
people or conservation and development was totally
at variance with what was critical in Africa.
Similar debates were being conducted in many other
places and organisations so that one saw the growth
of efforts at linking conservation and development.
These included the idea of ‘buffer zones’ as transition
areas around parks and other conservation areas
where limited, regulated use could take place. In
most cases in southern Africa, such zones essentially
legitimised the patterns of use of people living near
and off the environmental resources being protected.
Another approach, also found in southern Africa,
was more radical in facilitating the commercial use of
environmental resources, particularly the megafauna
beloved of international tourists. These, such as the
Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources (Campfire) initiative in
Zimbabwe, posited the interlocking of the two goals
of conservation and development: improving
people’s benefits through, rather than at the cost of,
the protection of the environment made them better
stewards of a sustained use of resources.
Experience of the past decade has shown that this
attractive outcome is not a given, even with the
advantages of high-value environmental activities
such as game management, and that it is much harder
to achieve with most resources, including forests,
lakes and rivers. Moreover, there remains considerable
resistance towards the very notion that conservation
and development can be joined among biologists and
other scientists concerned about biodiversity loss
and other environmental threats (Alcorn 1997,
Borrini-Feyerabend 1997). Similarly, the attempts to
forge closer relationships between agriculture and
environment in policy design and implementation
are still tenuous. Thus, current efforts at land reform
and water policy reform in many countries in
southern Africa are going ahead with little reference
to each other and to the environmental issues that
cross-cut the two resources. There often remains
separation, for example, between departments of
agriculture or irrigation and those concerned with
the environment. Where there are areas of interface,
however, we find the term ‘natural resource
management’. Historians have shown that colonial
administrations in Africa invoked environmental
concerns during the 1930s and 1940s, so that we may
see those policy debates and actions as forerunners of
some of what we see in the contemporary period.
Yet I think the main use of the notion of natural
resource management and its being given such
salience in development policy work are particularly
the products of the rise of environmentalism. The
outcomes include discussions about what may
constitute sustainable development, the many
challenges in combining conservation and
development, and the critical questions of authority
over and responsibility for natural resources. This
brings me to the concept of ‘governance’.
At least for African studies, political scientists appear
to have introduced the concept of governance into
the debates raging during the 1980s about the
‘failures’ of African states – the preponderance of
‘weak’ states, their susceptibility to coups that
reproduced rather than replaced the patrimonial
structures and autocratic leaders, the inability of
states to capture peasantries, the pervasive
corruption, the ‘rent-seeking’ by state elites, and the
increasing breakdown of states into warring factions
who use sporadic butchery and patronage to punish
and reward. The term governance encompassed but
went far beyond the conventional sense of
government, incorporating not only state legislative
and administrative organisation, but the broader
panoply of orderly mechanisms in ‘civil society’
(another newly fashionable concept). These Africa-
specific debates were also parallelled and influenced
by the rise of neo-liberalism which joined critiques of
over-centralised states with a scepticism about
government’s role in managing economic matters
and a promotion of market solutions. Governance is
also an attractive notion to those drawing on more
populist traditions since it promises more space for
popular participation.
Governance has moved far beyond academic debates
to become a key focus of the programmes of all
major aid donors and, like environmental policy, it
has been made part of the conditionality imposed on
the transfer of aid funds. Given their similar history,
maybe it is not surprising that environment and
governance have been joined together to produce the
topic for this symposium: the governance of natural
resources. Although I am usually wary of faddish
inventions in ‘dev-speak’, such as ‘governance’, I
Grounding governance: power and meaning in natural resource management
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think its advantages over the concept ‘management’
are that authority over resources may be located at
any number of levels, and that the term can embody
notions of power and authority in a way that
‘management’ does not.
On the other hand, the analytical context within
which ‘governance’ normally resides leaves much to
be desired, and some concerted effort is needed to
dislodge the concept from the reigning paradigm’s
current stranglehold. I refer in particular to what is
called ‘common property theory’ that derives
largely from institutionalist approaches in political
science. The publication that has most directly
influenced the thinking and practice encapsulated in
the phrase ‘governance of natural resources’ is surely
Elinor Ostrom’s 1990 book Governing the commons.
The subsequent flow of publications by Ostrom and
her large group of collaborators and students has
elaborated but not changed the arguments of that
book which have had a determining influence on the
way common-pool resource management has been
formulated and incorporated into policy discourse. I
see three main problems with the current
understanding of ‘governance’. First is the reduction
of governance to a set of rules and/or to a set of
property rights. Secondly, the narrow focus on rules
tends to rely on functionalist logic, so replaying an
old lineage of thought that sees contestation or
conflict as deviance and as opposed to orderly
management. Thirdly, and paradoxically, governance
often becomes quite separated from the politics of
resource control where power and authority are not
secured with ‘clearly defined rules’ but struggled
over. I will discuss these problems with reference to
some of the rich and ever-growing literature on





The main source of influence on development policy
circles about ‘governance’ is undoubtedly from
institutional economics and political science. One
major threshold was the publication in 1968 of
Garret Hardin’s parable of ‘the tragedy of the
commons’. The debates generated then and since
among theoreticians in these disciplines have been
driven by disagreements about the relation between
individual rational self-interest and group interest, in
particular about the likelihood and conditions for
‘collective action’. The resource systems we now
refer to as common property regimes have become
fodder for these theoretical battles that have no
necessary connection with the resource systems
themselves but, as these theoretical debates about
institutional change were picked up by development
theorists and organisations, application of the
theories has greatly influenced the way resource
systems are understood and directed.
In a recent article, the prolific Elinor Ostrom selects
Mancur Olson’s 1965 publication The logic of
collective action as the key exemplar of the ‘zero
contribution thesis’ which, in Olson’s terms, is the
proposition that ‘unless the number of individuals in
a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or
some other special device to make individuals act in
their common interest, rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests’ (1965:2, cited in Ostrom 2000:137).
Ostrom argues that there is now a large literature
that contradicts this proposition as well as the policy
conclusion that is drawn from it, namely, that
collective action can occur only when ‘externally
enforced rules’ assure it. She summarises the
empirical evidence from ‘extensive fieldwork’ as
showing that ‘individuals in all walks of life and all
parts of the world voluntarily organize themselves so
as to gain the benefits of trade, to provide mutual
protection against risk, and to create and enforce
rules that protect natural resources’ (Ostrom
2000:138). These various processes are all glossed as
‘collective action’. She also cites findings from
experimental games played in laboratories that show
that the ‘standard model of rational individual
action’ or what she refers to as the ‘rational egoist’ is
not applicable to collective action situations. The
experiments overwhelmingly display the propensity
of players to find ways of co-operating to achieve
common ends.
Taking the management of common-pool resources
as typical of collective action problems, Ostrom goes
on to argue that empirical studies show that
successful management is characterised by certain
‘design principles’, which she first laid out in 1990 in
Governing the commons. These design principles, in
turn, allow a specification of the ‘configuration of
rules’ in common-pool resource institutions. This is
the part of Ostrom’s work, of course, which has had
most influence in the field of community-based
resource management, especially common property
regimes. It also reflects one of the central
propositions in institutional economics and political
science which has proved most problematic in their
influence over the field of ‘governing natural
resources’: namely, the definition of institutions as
sets of rules.
The major contribution of these ‘new institutionalist’
approaches in political science to debates about
common property regimes (and by extension to
other forms of governing resources) is to rescue
discussion from the tyranny of ‘rational egoist’
premises by centring on institutions. (Hereafter, I
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shall refer to these approaches as ‘neo-instutional/
ist’). Thus, Elinor Ostrom’s efforts to develop an
alternative theory of collective action to that typified
by Mancur Olson which is underwritten by the
assumption of the applicability of ‘the rational
egoist’ in all social life, and to draw on and encourage
field-based empirical research on people managing
resources have been extremely significant. Such a
turn in political science, according to Arun Agrawal,
has clearly demonstrated the limitations of earlier
neo-institutionalist analyses that posited ‘institutions
simply as mechanisms for efficiently allocating
resources’, and have given more space to ‘the
importance of politics’ (1998:59).
Both these points are shared by most other social
scientists addressing natural resource governance.
We can all agree that key to understanding systems of
natural resource use, including common property
systems, is an institutional analysis and one that
includes politics. Only then can we hope to
understand the actions of individual users. As I said
some years ago: ‘It is an error to suppose that an
individual calculus can explain a commons system –
rather, one has to understand the socially and
politically embedded commons to explain the
individual calculus’ (1987:178). There remains,
however, profound disagreement over how to
conceptualise ‘institution’ and therefore disagreement
over how to theorise, investigate, analyse, and
formulate policy for, natural resource management
systems. Thus, while agreeing with Agrawal on ‘the
importance of politics’, many researchers depart
from his premise in the following sentence where he
says that political scientists ‘show that institutions
are the outcomes of individual choices … made under
the constraints of existing rules, and that they are
attempts by social actors to consolidate asymmetric
power relations and [to] increase economic gain’
(1998:59).
The main points of disagreement are the reduction of
institutions to a set of rules, the reduction of agency
to individual choice, the privileging of property
rights, the assumption that conflict or contestation is
antipathetic to a functioning institution, an exclusive
focus on interests that ignores meaning, and the
failure to theorise power.
A large literature shows that defining institutions as
sets of rules devised over time to regulate human
behaviour, acting as constraints on individuals’ self-
interest in the provision of public goods, and
reducing the ‘transaction costs’ of monitoring
others’ behaviour, provides far too narrow a
compass for understanding social dynamics. These
critiques of the neo-institutionalist theories now
dominant in governance and natural resource
management (for example, Leach et al. 1997; Mehta
et al. 1999; Klooster 2000) are new and welcome in
these fields, but they also pick up on longer-
established critiques of methodological individualism
and economism (see, among many others,
Granovetter 1985; Kahn 1990; Friedland &
Robertson 1990; Dilley 1992; Berry 1993; Peters
1993; Stein & Wilson 1993; Halperin 1994; Haworth
1994; Leys 1996; Carrier 1997).
Some of the specific critiques emerging from the
research on resource management include the
following. The identification of ‘rules of the game’ as
common property institutions from studying a
particular form of resource management is often
spurious in that the actual practices and meanings
entailed in that management cannot be neatly excised
from a much broader set of social and political
relations. An exceptionally well-documented example
by Lansing (1991) is the set of irrigation systems in
Bali that had worked for generations, not through a
specialised common property institution, but
through the social and ritual relations centred on a
series of water temples. In an example from
Zimbabwe, Frances Cleaver was not able to
distinguish particular rules or a separate institution
that governed water use. Instead, people’s conviction
that everyone had a right to water led them to
flexible and negotiated practices that depended on
their existing social relations (1998).
Of course, specific organisations that focus on
natural resource management such as fisheries or
irrigation associations do exist. But, in a wide range
of situations, the practices of resource use are so
embedded in other social relations that deriving
institutional rules is selective at best and arbitrary at
worst. It seems that it is only when outsiders decide
that institutions need to be established or protected
that the multiple practices are reduced to a set of
principles or rules. Just as defining institutions as
rules has the effect of erasing the social and cultural
dynamics entailed in how institutions actually work,
the term ‘collective action’ operates in the same way.
Collective action appears to be used by neo-
institutionalist theorists to refer to any instance of
joint decision or outcome. Although it is used,
therefore, as a gloss for a very wide range of such
circumstances, it is defined very narrowly as rational
individuals deciding that the benefits of designing,
changing, and maintaining rules are higher than the
costs. The term ‘collective choice’ appears to be used
in the same way and the word ‘choice’ highlights the
notion of rational individuals freely choosing to act
in a way that promotes joint or collective action.
Several analytical and empirical objections can be
made. Political scientist, Daniel Klooster (2000), for
example, criticises Ostrom’s framework of ‘crafting
institutions’ for limiting the factors favouring
Grounding governance: power and meaning in natural resource management
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collective action to cost-benefit assessments that
incline rational actors to invest in rule change. Using
case material from Mexico, Klooster shows that
some of the cases of unsustained management of
common property fit Ostrom’s posited correlation
between lack of success in collective management
and the high costs and low benefits faced by
individuals. He goes on, however, to show that it
does not hold in many cases. He asks why so many
people in his field site continued to engage in
collective action (aimed at dislodging the local
‘forestry elite’) despite their high costs and low
benefits (because they continued to fail in their
challenges). He proposes that the main explanatory
issue was people’s sense of outrage at the unjust
actions of the forestry elite. He contrasted this moral
discourse and response with one of the premises of
Ostrom’s framework – ‘Enforcement increases the
confidence of individuals that they are not suckers’
(Ostrom 1990:95). This premise, which is common
in game theories, posits the concern of the rationally
self-interested individual to avoid being made a
‘sucker’, that is, being taken advantage of by others.
Klooster shows that this is not the motivation for the
Mexican peasants who acted out of a judgement
about the moral appropriateness of actions by
particular people in particular social and political
relations.
Moreover, the objection is not merely the empirical
one that there are other motivations than self-
interest at play in social interaction. That would be a
truism. The main objection is theoretical: that an
explanatory framework that reduces analysis of
institutional process and social interaction to the
cost-benefit assessments of strategising individuals is
insufficient for understanding how and why the
perceived ‘choices’ for action have been produced. It
is not enough, as does Ostrom herself, to challenge
the primacy in all social interaction of the ‘rational
egoist’, defined as an individual who always puts his/
her own immediate advantage first. In rebuttal to
this premise of Mancur Olson among others,
Ostrom argues that empirical, experimental, and
‘evolutionary’ theories suggest that ‘a mixture of
norm-users [i.e. those who value reciprocity,
fairness, and trustworthiness] and rational egoists
would emerge in settings where standard rational
choice theory assumes the presence of rational
egoists alone’ (2000:144). In practice, however, the
theories of collective action in common property
and natural resource domains still premise the
rational individual assessing whether or not to
engage in collective action and institutional
‘crafting’.
As David Mosse points out on the basis of his
research on tank irrigation in South India (1997:266,
his emphasis):
the focus [of the neo-institutionalists]… is on the
context-specific structure of incentives which
determines the collective provision of rules for
[resource] use and which motivate strategizing
individuals to commit themselves to follow
them (Ostrom 1990, 1992; Tang 1992).
But the model cannot tell us why that particular
structure of incentives exists or how it came about. I
made a similar point in a critique of the ‘rational
choice’ theory as used by Robert Bates: that
methodological individualism as in game theoretic
approaches can provide a situational logic that
illuminates the strategy of actors at one point in time
(what Mosse refers to as the structure of incentives),
but it cannot explain the social and cultural
dynamics which produce this logic (Peters 1993).
When this premise of individual strategising is linked
with the assumption that – in Mosse’s words –
‘institutions of tank management’ (or any other
resource use) ‘can be understood … as special
purpose organizational solutions to the problems of
efficient [management of] common property’, then
the critical point that such institutions are
‘embedded in cultural institutions [such as] caste and
religion’ and power plays among village groups
cannot be addressed (Mosse 1997:268). As Mosse’s
analysis shows, however, the operation of the
irrigation tanks in Tamil Nadu cannot be
understood properly without seeing how it is
inextricably part of local social and political relations
between different castes and also deeply influenced
by conventional ideas about ‘traditional tank
management’ held by state bureaucrats in Tamil
Nadu. In other words, social, cultural and political
relations at local level and at broader administrative
scales, as well as over time, have to be analysed to
understand the operation of the irrigation tanks.
Mosse’s concluding comments are apt for many of
the other studies I am drawing on here. He says that
‘institutional theory’ as applied by neo-instutionalists
to common property and resource management
takes:
little notice of the contests of power in resource
use and development … By focussing on a
narrow understanding of economic interest, the
institutional models … tend to render local,
historical, and social factors as, at best, of
secondary importance and, at worst, as
unanalysable random occurrences (1997:278).
The vast majority of studies, like those by Mosse,
challenge the neo-institutionalist premises, described
in the ‘design principles’, that effective management
of natural resources depends on there being clearly
bounded and relatively homogeneous groups, clear
rules of operation, collective decision-making, overt
monitoring systems, and clearly agreed and applied
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sanctions. Instead, the studies show, again and again,
that groups of users are highly heterogeneous,
resource system boundaries are often flexible and
difficult to define outside particular circumstances,
and there are often competing interpretations of
principles (‘rules’) governing claims and use. The
patterns of use tend to be described as flexible and
negotiable and are related to both highly variable
ecological conditions, and to their being embedded
in complex social and political relations (Leach et al.
1997; Mehta et al. 1999, Cousins 2000).
The dynamic picture emerging from these cases
shows processes that cannot be contained in a
framework that posits rationally self-interested
individuals, each assessing his or her relative costs
and benefits in the search for efficient institutional
rules. In this institutionalist framework, the
multitude of social differences, unequal power,
competing interpretations, and contested claims are
either assumed away by the premises of ‘collective-
choice arrangements’ (Ostrom’s design principle 3)
and ‘conflict-resolution mechanisms’ (principle 6),
or are squeezed into the concept of ‘heterogeneity’.
The assumption that ‘community’ is equivalent to ‘a
bounded ... corporate ... relatively homogeneous
entity’ (Mehta et al. 1999:15) is rejected by studies of
community participatory projects showing that
most local communities are socially differentiated
along a host of dimensions – wealth, rank, political
authority, class, caste, gender, age, race, ethnicity,
and so forth. Such differences deeply influence the
degree and type of participation possible for different
categories of persons. The current practice of
applying the term ‘stakeholder’ to entire communities
(whether villages, or other units) thus becomes
highly problematic. Techniques such as focus groups
or participatory appraisal are often unable to bypass
socio-economic and political differentiation and,
despite the best of intentions, may reflect only
highly partial views of ‘the community’ (Mosse
1997; cf. Fairhead 1993).
We should recall that community participation as an
approach and as a desired goal has re-emerged
periodically in development circles. The failures of
over-centralised, top-down or ‘blueprint’ projects in
the first development decades first turned attention
to the other end of the spectrum – grass-roots,
bottom-up development. The outcomes included
the community development projects of the 1950s
and 1960s, the integrated rural development projects
of the 1970s, and the many community-based
projects in all sectors over the years. Assessments of
the various community approaches have shown
that, too often, participation became a method for
governments to mobilise cheap labour and
involuntary contributions, supposed beneficiaries
were treated as recipients of projects rather than
architects of their own preferred activities,
participation meant the devolution of responsibilities
but not of rights, and the decentralisation of tasks
but not of resources. (See Hoben et al. 1998 for one
review of the promise and perils of participatory
approaches).
These problems of earlier generations of community
participatory approaches are being rediscovered in
the community-based natural resource projects. As
Peter Little concluded in his review of the link
between local participation and improved
conservation, ‘community is commonly misused to
invoke a false sense of “tradition”, homogeneity, and
consensus ... [whereas] most rural communities are
not free of conflict, nor are they homogeneous’
(1994:357). Indeed, the now extensive documentation
of community-based resource management provides
many examples where differences within groups
determine whose voice is heard, whose opinions are
translated into action, who benefits and who loses
(Park 1993, Mehta 1997, Ribot 1999b). Community-
based and participatory projects for managing
resources, therefore, often have channelled and
exacerbated inequalities based on gender (Carney &
Watts 1990, Schroeder 1999), rank and wealth
(Mosse 1997, Peters 1994), and socio-economic
differences of varying sorts (Peet & Watts 1996;
Ferguson & Derman 2000).
Researchers have shown that, lacking real
decentralisation of administrative and financial
authority and resources, all that gets decentralised to
local groups are the requirements for contributions
of labour or cash. Moreover, a clear conclusion
reached by many researchers working in several
world regions is that community and participatory
projects often serve to extend the reach of an
extractive state, political elites, and private business
interests in ways that undermine the ability of local
groups to manage their resources (Neumann 1997;
Schroeder 1997; Gatmaytang 1997; Colchester 1997;
Sivaramakrishnan 1996).
Several conclusions are drawn from such findings.
One is the centrality of power in questions of
decentralisation, participation, and community-
based natural resource management. Jesse Ribot, for
example, has provided an exhaustive analysis of so-
called participatory forestry projects in several
Sahelian countries, showing that duties but not
‘powers’ are decentralised and that, even when some
are extended to local groups, the lack of political
accountability of local leaders results in the benefits
reaching only a small section of the ‘community’
(Ribot 1998, 1999a, 2000). The implications for the
general problem of ensuring effective and equitable
Grounding governance: power and meaning in natural resource management
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‘community management’ and for the specific
problems arising from the social heterogeneity of
most local groups are that ‘locally accountable
representation could be a means for ... mediating ...
these ... differences’ and thus, ‘the accountability of
community authorities and representatives is a
critical matter for current approaches to rural
development and environmental management’
(1999b:6). A similar conclusion by Pearse and Stiefel
places the emphasis on political solutions, stressing
that effective participation requires ‘organized
efforts to increase control over resources and
regulative institutions in given social situations on
the parts of groups and movements of those hitherto
excluded from such control’ (cited by Little
1994:350). Similar conclusions have been reached for
Amazonian groups (Benavides 2000), for San in
southern Africa (Mazonde 2000), and for minority
groups in Malaysia (Dentan et al. 1997), among
others.
A less welcome conclusion emerging from some of
these studies is that there is no neat relation between
local control over resources and sustainable use.
Although one of the constant rationales for
promoting localised authority is that it guarantees
more effective and sustainable resource use,
empirical research suggests that it does not
necessarily do so. On the other hand, an equally
common story – though spread by a different set – is
that poverty drives people to unsustainable use. In
fact, one can find cases where claims are made that
local groups are able to manage resources more
sustainably (Sponsel 1995 on Amazonian groups),
and cases that show that even very poor people are
more likely to use resources on a sustainable level
than richer groups more interested in short-term
profits (Broad 1994 on the Philippines; Bryant &
Bailey 1997). There are also, however, cases that
show increased local authority over resources
leading to increased levels of exploitation, and even
destruction, of ecological resources: for example,
local groups in the Philippines cut down mangroves
and, after putting in some basic infrastructure
necessary for an aquaculture operation, sold it to an
entrepreneur (Vayda & Walters 1999:174). The
reasons for this variable picture, of course, are that
there is no single, simple relation between local
authority over resources and the sustainability of
use. This can only be determined in relation to a
whole host of other factors such as alternative uses,
assessments by different groups of ‘owners’ on how
best to use the resources, market situations, policies
in place, relative power vis-à-vis various outsiders,
and so forth. In addition, of course, there is the large
problem of how to define sustainable use and over
what time frame it is being assessed.
Whatever the relation between local forms of
governance and the sustainability of use, the message
of these studies is that resource use and
‘management’ requires close attention to social and
political relations. In addition to the emphasis placed
by such studies on the centrality of power plays over
resources, the significance of contestations over
meaning is equally clear. In the competition among
differently positioned persons over respective rights
and claims to use or manage resources, much of the
contestation occurs over definitions and
interpretations. Questions are posed such as: what
constitutes an acceptable claim to draw water in such
and such a well? Is the current shortfall in rainfall to
be determined a crisis sufficient to allow a widening
of access or perhaps a narrowing of access? This is the
fifth time B’s cattle have trampled the fence around
the well – shall we require him to pay compensation?
Should the visitor who has been staying in so-and-
so’s house contribute to the cost just incurred for a
new pump? Each of these and a multitude of other
issues entail cultural meanings and negotiations over
them that are not captured easily in a notion of clear
and accepted rules. One of the most obvious
shortcomings of the institutionalist approach in
common property theory is its total blindness to the
role of meaning in social life and social analysis.
Let me give some examples of how significant this
dimension of analysis is. Judith Carney (1988; cf.
Carney & Watts 1990) has shown that a critical
element in the struggles between men and women
over relative authority over fields and crops in a rice
project in The Gambia was the specific cultural
definitions given to the project fields. If these were
defined as maruo or compound fields, then husbands
retained authority, whereas if they were defined as
kamanyango or personal fields, then wives (as well as
some junior men) could claim authority over them.
Because this cultural struggle over definitions
remained invisible to project managers and donors,
the expected benefits of a rule change placing
women’s names as holders of the plots did not
materialise. The local men had managed to get those
fields defined as maruo and thus, even though
women’s names might appear on the books, the
authority continued to lie with their husbands.
David Mosse shows in his study of irrigation tanks in
Tamil Nadu that a project to establish a village-level
society to manage the tank ‘was framed in terms of
the development model of collective action for
utilitarian outcomes’ of effective management and
local organisation. However, within the village, the
‘public service’ element of collective action was
interpreted by the upper caste as an ‘appropriate
means to demonstrate leadership and social pre-
eminence’ and by the lower caste as yet another
avenue for their ‘subordination and dependence’
(1997:271). Thus, the very meaning of the collective
action was disputed.
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In my own earlier work on deep wells used for
livestock in Botswana, I showed that central to the
political and social debates about the relative
advantages and disadvantages of privately owned
wells were plays on meaning of key terms such as
‘syndicate’, and ‘kgotla’. Much of the social and
political manoeuvring over relative claims to scarce
water points and to grazing pastures took place
through competing interpretations given to key
concepts. I argued that ‘struggles over resources or
over power .. necessarily take place in terms of ..
meanings’ and suggested that ‘struggles over
resources’ are simultaneously ‘struggles over
meaning’ (1984; cf. 1994).
Some of the recent studies similarly show that many
of the contestations over resources now engaged in
many parts of the world turn on issues of social
identity and the cultural politics of place. The battles
over identity and place are as integrally involved in
how people use and manage their resources as are
their assessments of the material uses to which the
resources are put. These studies show that natural
resources are not merely assets to be managed on the
basis of assessed costs and benefits, but are the basis
for ways of life that are inextricably embedded in
particular histories, in specific networks of social
relations of power, and in matrices of meaning.
Donald Moore (1993) shows, for example, how
groups in eastern Zimbabwe draw on common
histories of belonging and of past patterns of
settlement and displacement by successive
governments in their efforts to establish their rights
over territory. A parallel story of movement,
settlement, and displacement is told for groups at an
earlier period of Tanzania’s history (Neumann
2000). Broad (1994) argues that a sense of belonging
to a place is one of the conditions that can explain
how even very poor people in the Philippines work
to sustain their resources and protect them against
the depredations of richer groups. In Botswana,
groups of San Bushmen (Basarwa) lobby the
government for allocation of land titles by invoking
group histories of using the same areas of land,
though at periodic intervals depending on season,
year and political events, over generations (Mazonde
2000).
In Mexico, Klooster (2000) describes speakers from
one of his research sites explaining their concern
with the proper use of their land as deriving from
their wish to leave it for their children in a similar
state as they had found it. They said: ‘We are just here
temporarily. We are not owners’ (2000:14). Klooster
points out that this does not at all fit the
conventional institutionalist premise that property
rights are key to proper use of resources and to
collective action. According to the property rights
theorists, such a sense of not being owners would be
assumed to lead to lack of care. But these speakers
were expressing a goal that not merely transcended
their self-interest, but that defined the proper
relationship between a person and place – a
culturally specific meaning.
Similar examples of the nexus of social identity,
place, resource use, and political process can be
found in all regions: South America (Colchester
1997; Benavides 2000; Chase Smith 1997; Poole
1997), South East Asia (Li 1997; Dentan et al. 1997;
Barber 1997; Peluso 1997), South India (Guha 1990;
Rangan 1996; Sivaramakrishnan 1996; Agrawal
1998).
Conclusion
The critiques I have briefly reviewed here lead to the
following conclusions. Currently dominant theories
or models of collective action and institutional
crafting for resource management (which I have
labelled ‘neo-institutionalist’) have fundamental
flaws in their premises and leading concepts. Thus,
the common conflation of norms, rules, and
behaviour (as in de Janvry et al. 1993) or the equation
of ‘institutions’ and ‘organisations’ common in
economics and in some institutional economics, or
the definition of institutions as rules, all result in an
impoverished conceptual toolkit for analysing social
dynamics surrounding resource use. Anthropology
and sociology, for example, have long stressed the
importance of distinguishing between ‘rule’ or
‘principle’, on the one hand, and ‘practice’ or ‘action’
on the other. One of the first lessons taught to an
anthropologist is not to confuse what people say
they ought to do (stated principles or norms) with
what they say they do (statements about practice)
and with what they are seen to do (practice or
‘behaviour’). More fundamentally, the central issues
for anthropologists (and sociologists) are meaning
and its relation to action by social actors who are
situated within specific social and political
relationships. In contrast, theories that privilege the
rational individual do not address these issues and, in
practice, premise asocial individuals.
Some recent recommendations for more appropriate
conceptual and theoretical frameworks for
understanding and guiding natural resource
management, therefore, promote long-accepted
vocabularies of social theory. These include seeing
institutions as ‘regularised patterns of behaviour
between individuals and groups in society’ rather
than either ‘community-level organisations’ or sets
of rules (Leach et al. 1997:5). A similar approach is to
see institutions as ‘practices’ that are structured in
particular social, cultural and political ways, and as
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entwined with power and knowledge (Mehta et al.
1999:6). These authors also state that ‘institutions
need to be seen not as mere rules of the game or rigid
organisations but rather as sites of social interaction,
negotiation and contestation comprising
heterogeneous actors having diverse goals (not all of
which are material or economic in nature)’ (Mehta et
al. 1999:35). A very similar position is expressed by
Klooster who concludes: ‘Common property theory
must address community as a site of contestations,
creation and maintenance – not only of rules – but
also of the social norms that motivate an individual’s
action in the commons’ (2000:17). Finally, Barber
concludes that the notion of a ‘community of
interest’ is inappropriate for most groups divided by
differences, and recommends that rather than look
to a community or stakeholder analysis, one needs
an understanding of ‘historical experience, imagined
futures, and … conceptualizations of social class [or
other divisions] theorized as dynamic social relations
surrounding access to resources’ (1997:15).
The place of contestation is placed centrally here
and, as I have discussed earlier, has emerged as central
in many of the detailed studies of resource use and
management. A concept that seems to capture the
wide range of social interactions, discursive
strategies, negotiated claims of rights and priorities
that typify situations of ‘governing natural
resources’ is less that of ‘institutional choice’ as
‘struggle’ (Klooster 2000:17). This concept has been
used by authors who have been writing about
resource struggles as simultaneously ‘struggles over
meaning’ (Peters 1984, 1987, 1994; Berry 1989;
Carney & Watts 1990; Moore 1993, 1998) as a way of
transcending the dichotomies of material and
cultural dimensions of social action, and of structure
and agency. Insofar as the critiques of collective
action and institutional choice approaches towards
natural resource management are concerned, it
seems to me that struggle implies competition
among differently-positioned people over the very
constitution of institutional form and practice
whereas ‘choice’ implies a selection of predetermined
options by rational and asocial individuals.
I argue, in sum, that the understanding and analysis
of ‘institutions’ of resource management be
broadened considerably beyond mere ‘rules’, and
that power and meaning be more centrally located in
theoretical frameworks for analysing the ‘governance
of natural resources’.
Let me add some caveats in conclusion. Insisting on
a more disaggregated and nuanced analytical
framework for institutions does not reject the notion
of ‘rule’ altogether. It is the conflation of
‘institution’ with ‘rules’ that is rejected. Similarly,
drawing on the many cases and analyses of forms and
processes of resource governance to indicate the
flexibility of resource boundaries, principles of
exclusion, judgements of infringements and sanctions
should not be interpreted as arguing that everything
everywhere is ambiguous and indeterminate. I have
argued elsewhere against an overemphasis on
ambiguity in relations over land in Africa and have
called for more attention to cases where claims do
stick and to analysing who benefits (or loses) from
ambiguity (Peters 1999).
In Africa, we are faced often with highly complex
situations: the layering of institutional arenas and
rights systems (for example, customary and
statutory, and sometimes various types of custom),
the pervasiveness of multi-use resource systems,
extensive and long-established movements of people
across resources, and overlapping and competing
modes of administration and authority (see Cousins
2000). The large literature reveals a wide range of
outcomes: for example, apparently endless litigation
in multiple arenas may act as a means of keeping
political contests open (Berry 1999), may prove
disruptive of social life (Kees van Donge 1993), or
may have variable effects (Lund 1998). In some cases,
too, new and/or intensifying use of, and claims over,
valuable resources increase conflict and, where some
people have preferential access to knowledge or to
institutional arenas, have led to appropriation and
dispossession. Thus, in some cases, greater
clarification and specification of rules of law are seen
to be ways of protecting vulnerable categories of
claimants and, in other cases, the need to maintain
mobility and flexibility of resource use (as in
pastoral, transhumant systems) requires care with
too-narrow definitions of rules of access. These more
specific needs can be addressed only by seeing
institutions of governance over natural resources to
be inextricably part of historically produced
political, socio-cultural systems. The analytical
framework, therefore, has to be fit to the task.
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This paper argues that the current focus on
partnerships in community based natural resource
management (CBNRM) masks the real issues facing
natural resource management – that is, of
recognising community resource rights so as to
ensure effective decision-making and managerial
responsibilities.
Globalisation has affected the development of
environmental agendas and programmes by pushing
southern African states, communities, non-
governmental organisations and other actors to
define environmental agendas and programmes on
the basis of internationally-defined objectives and
agendas. In the early 1980s there was a shift of focus
in environmental management from the state to civil
society as the key actor. Consequently, in the last 20
years states have moved significantly towards
devolving environmental authority to local-level
actors. In recent years, increasing emphasis has been
placed on recognising a multiplicity of actors and
thus on developing partnerships.
The author examines the extent to which
partnerships on their own can contribute to
successful CBNRM without adequately addressing
the issue of rights and entitlements of which the
unresolved question of devolution of property rights
to local actors in the communal areas is a critical
aspect. To do this, the paper briefly reviews the
history of CBNRM in the region, in particular, how
decentralisation and devolution are key to the
success of CBNRM. Further, given the centrality of
property rights to CBNRM, the current regional
trends with respect to rights over land and natural
resources are discussed. The concept, principles and
structure of partnerships are described, giving
examples where appropriate. In addition, the paper
considers who key stakeholders in partnerships are.
Partnerships are discussed within the context of
CBNRM since, in southern Africa, it is under
CBNRM that different forms of community-public-
private partnerships (CPPPs) are being promoted
and implemented. Given the centrality of CBNRM
to the discourse on CPPPs, the paper offers a brief
critique of CBNRM in the region. The nature of
CBNRM with respect to the different roles of the
communities, donors, government and the private
sector has a direct bearing on the type of partnerships
that communities ultimately enter into. The
implications of this for defining partnerships are
considered.
The key question is whether or not partnerships can
become a panacea for successful CBNRM without
adequate devolution of decision-making powers to
local actors. This question is particularly important
given that CBNRM itself is increasingly becoming a
contested resource management concept. There is
general resistance from the state and others to finding
a lasting solution to the governance issues.
Partnerships as global
agenda
The influence of globalisation on southern Africa,
and more specifically on CBNRM, is much more
profound than is readily apparent. The effects are
visible in the manner in which the CBNRM
discourse has been underpinned by global
environment and conservation policy. Such policies
have been strongly influenced by the donor
community with backing of government departments
and conservation agencies that are intent on
preserving their role. The global influence on
CBNRM contributes to continuing inequity in
resource distribution and decision-making power,
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and is partly responsible for resource degradation
(Mayoral-Phillips 2000:2).
In the context of young and weak democracies in
southern Africa, globalisation has been able to shape
macro-economic policy and decision making
without meaningful national democratic scrutiny.
For example, the many trade liberalisation policies
adopted by regional governments in the past 10 years
have not been publicly debated despite the profound
impact on the lives of the region’s population. The
ensuing process of globalisation has created a culture
of responsibility to an external constituency and of
involvement of external forces in national and
regional affairs. National issues of poverty,
unemployment, food insecurity, resource inequities,
and widening income gaps have all become
peripheral and subordinate to external interests.
Global institutions, for example, have demanded
that issues such as gender, public participation,
corruption, and multi-party democracy must be
addressed before funding is granted. Simultaneously
there has been a steady shift from the international
law position that external interference is only
justified under conditions of persistent human rights
abuses to one of almost unfettered international
interference. The global ideology is increasingly
seeking to influence adjustments to land-use
practices and production systems in the region to
align these with global trade regimes. In some
extreme cases the international community has gone
as far as to resist national efforts to change land
tenure regimes, as is evidenced for example in the
Zimbabwe Democracy Bill which requires that land
ownership be restored to the status quo prior to 1
January 2000. These evolving processes of
international authority have consequences for
natural resources management and economic
development that need to be understood and
addressed. As will be shown, this culture of
embracing external constituency influence has
undermined the CBNRM movement in southern
Africa.
One consequence of the global influence is the
unquestioning acceptance of the role of partnerships
in the management of natural resources. Of concern
to this paper is the move to a tripartite partnership
arrangement between communities, the private
sector and the state – CPPPs. Smart partnerships
have become the theme of the late 90s and the dawn
of the new century as countries seek to confront
developmental challenges. Partnerships with the
private sector are seen as critical for investment, job
creation, transfer of technology and skills, and
fostering social responsibility, and are in line with
the global trend towards privatisation.
The CBNRM movement is encouraging and
promoting partnerships in search of ‘win-win’
opportunities. Partnerships with communities are
being promoted and facilitated as a means of
mobilising local knowledge and greater participation
that leads to increased benefits and more equitable
income distribution. Underlying all these
interventions is a promise to alleviate the poverty
trap that many rural communities are mired in.
Governments are also promoting smart partnerships
with the private sector and communities as one
mechanism for enhancing leadership in development
and ensuring poverty reduction. Environmental
management has moved from attempts to replace
governments with civil society, and concerns about
government competing with the private sector, to a
realisation that all players have a role. It is this
realisation that has led to the growing interest in
partnership arrangements between communities and
the private sector or promotion of community
enterprises that have become the latest panacea to
past failures in local-level natural resource
management.
Partnerships have also been promoted by civil
society groups that are increasingly questioning the
monopoly of governments over various aspects of
natural resources management. Furthermore, civil
society is demanding a greater role in decision-
making processes and the actual management of
natural resources, including the accrual of
accompanying benefits. The struggles with respect
to devolution of power have been the single greatest
threat to CBNRM in southern Africa, yet,
paradoxically, the resolution of this issue may be its
strength. It is of concern therefore, that partnerships
are now promoted as a panacea for successful
CBNRM when the issues of devolution remain
unresolved.
CBNRM in Southern Africa
Historically, inappropriate development policies
have led to projects that have displaced local
communities and undermined their livelihoods, or
resulted in the sub-optimal use of resources. These
include the construction of large dams, infrastructure
development and resource management initiatives
that focus on a single resource. The displacement of
local communities and the undermining of their
livelihood systems can often result in human and
environmental insecurity. In recent years, however,
there has been a trend away from these large and top-
down projects to smaller, more flexible and
participatory programmes. This different approach
is intended to focus on strengthening the human
rights of local communities, enhancing their control
over their local resource base, recognising their
priorities, and supporting their participation in
higher level decision-making processes. Such
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programmes have emphasised local institution-
building, capacity development, experimentation
and research, and organisational innovation,
including, in many instances, support to CBNRM
programmes that promote productive, competitive,
equitable and sustainable resource use for local
benefit. However, they have been severely
constrained by the failure to adequately address
resource rights (Krugmann 1998:155). It is now
widely accepted that, to be successful, CBNRM
programmes have to be complemented by
appropriate national policies, political and
administrative decentralisation and devolution of
authority over natural resources management. This
must be complemented by the development of rights
that are able to support and guarantee such change.
The optimism about and interest in community-
based approaches to natural resource management
has led to the mushrooming of different CBNRM
models linked to specific resources. Shackleton and
Campbell (2000:1) provide a useful classification that
is in line with the theme of this paper. These are
imposed, assisted and organic models (see Figure 1).
In imposed models, the community empowerment
process is incomplete and power is located within
local-level government structures. As will be shown
later, this can be described as de-concentration of
central government power to lower-level state
institutions such as rural district councils in the case
of Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management for
Indigenous Resources (Campfire), or line ministries
in the case of Zambia’s Administrative Management
Design for Game Management Areas (Admade).
Many of these local government agencies are under-
financed and consequently use CBNRM initiatives as
a source of revenue generation. Under these models,
there is little community involvement in planning or
decision-making, and a large percentage of the
revenue is retained by the state agencies. As might be
expected, people on the ground are increasingly
questioning the purpose and value of these models
and in particular whether they are in their interest.
‘Imposed’ models of CBNRM tend to be those
driven by donor, NGO or government interests
(Fakir 1998:3). Indeed Leach et. al (1999:235) found
evidence that policies of donors not only play a role
in directly shaping local approaches to CBNRM, but
also influence macro-economic and governance
policies that affect local natural resource management.
With greater community participation, the ‘imposed’
models can graduate to ‘assisted’ or ‘organic’ models.
‘Assisted’ forms are those that build on the initial
efforts of the community. In these models, power
has shifted closer to the community often through
the establishment of village-based committees. The
assisted models tend to be successful where such
committees remain accountable at the local level.
The success of assisted models depends on the degree
of devolution and credible external support. Village
forest committees in Malawi and village natural
resource committees are cited as examples by
Shackleton and Campbell (2000:1). In these models,
the outside facilitator contributes significantly by
assisting the community to set the agenda for
CBNRM initiatives. Hence, the views of the
facilitator are likely to affect what the community
considers to be problems and potential solutions.
The danger with this is that, in general, the views of
facilitators tend to be informed by conceptual
models such as common property theory rather than
local history or practice (Turner 1999:649) or by
local values and priorities. Consequently, partnerships
may undermine community interests.
More recently the value of organic approaches has
been recognised. ‘Organic’ forms of CBNRM are
those where communities have ownership with
respect to ideas, implementation and generation of
benefits. However, there are very few CBNRM
models that can be considered truly ‘organic’ or truly
‘community-based’ where the real locus of power is
the community and decisions and power over
resources have been devolved to the community. In
the case of the Makuleke community in South
Africa, the community successfully reclaimed its
rights to land previously under its control (see Box 3
on page 36). However, the land retains its status as a
park and the community is forced into a
‘partnership’ with the park authority. The failure to
recognise the real rights of the community is glossed
over by the proponents of CBNRM who argue that,
given this ‘partnership’, there has been effective
devolution. This forced partnership is manifested as
conflict between the community and the South
African National Parks (SANP) when the community
tries to exercise its rights of ownership (See Mail &
Guardian, 21 January 2000). In this case it is clear that
‘partnership’ is a compromise for the community.
Ironically the Makuleke case study is cited as a model
of best practice although it represents an imposed
form of ‘partnership’ between the community and
SANP. Communities increasingly recognise that the
only way that they can get ‘rights’ is through some
form of partnership.
The novel feature of ‘organic models’ is that resource
management authority is devolved to local
communities. However, if this devolution is to make
local communities more responsive, then the
approach to local institutional arrangements needs
to take into account the complex interactions at the
local level between formal and informal institutions
and between local political systems and informal
networks of local governance. Failure to do this will
result in a failure to effectively promote such
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‘organic models’ of community resource
management. With the expansion of, and growing
interest in CBNRM initiatives, a major concern and
challenge is the resistance or inability to support the
evolution and success of organic models of CBNRM.
CBNRM policies are still evolving in many countries
in southern Africa. Experience in Zimbabwe and
Namibia offers examples where considerable
progress has been made, but also illustrates some
difficulties that must be overcome if CBNRM is to
become a meaningful option for both communities
and the environment, and if the development of
CPPP partnerships is going to be productive.
Firstly, like other natural resource management
initiatives, the evolution of CBNRM policy in
southern Africa has been issue-based. For instance,
Campfire in Zimbabwe has, by focusing on large
mammals, been able to capture public attention and,
therefore, attract funding as the basis for revenue
generation. While focusing on a single issue at a time
can prove effective in the short term, the temptation
to move from one issue to the next is real and also
neglects the complex interaction between the
different aspects of the environment.
Secondly, it is now evident that CBNRM needs to be
capable of addressing local values, needs and
interests. Failure to do so undermines the potential
of such initiatives. The Forestry Commission in
Zimbabwe, for example, has been experimenting
with co-management of forests in Gokwe South
District. In this case, the state forest authority sought
to mobilise protected forest area neighbours to co-
operate in the management of the forest in exchange
for economic benefits from the forest. The failure by
the Forestry Commission to demonstrate the
benefits of co-management in the form of local
development is cited as the main reason communities
did not support state conservation initiatives
(Mamimine 2000:15). Namibia has gone a step
further than Zimbabwe by introducing a conservancy
programme that seeks to empower communities and
not local government authorities to define the basis
for the conservancy. Despite the move towards
greater community participation, the state retains a
degree of control since it is the state that approves the
nominated committees and registers the conservancies
and, ultimately, has authority to disband them.
Thirdly, it is important that the multiplicity of
stakeholders be recognised, although their respective
roles need to be carefully addressed. The private
sector, NGOs and donors have been shown to play
significant roles in facilitating and defining the
CBRNM process. This issue is addressed later. The
degree to which a particular CBNRM initiative is
‘imposed’, ‘assisted’ or ‘organic’ often depends on
the specific role and motivation of this latter group of
stakeholders. While much of the success of many
Figure 1: CBNRM models in southern Africa
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CBNRM initiatives can be attributed to the
dedication of NGOs and investments by donors, the
quality of such inputs can easily result in numerous
conflicts and, at times, inadvertently undermine the
very interests of the beneficiary communities. Still,
Shackleton and Campbell (2000:2) found that, in
most countries in the region, NGOs and donors
have been instrumental in driving the CBNRM
agenda towards greater local control over natural
resources. Despite these efforts, transfer of rights to
local actors in most countries has been partial and
mainly designed to diffuse conflicts between the state
and rural communities. The main reason for this
appears to be a legacy of manipulating and
disempowering local institutions by successive
governments. Further, a lack of commitment by the
state to release power to local actors, despite
numerous policies advocating devolution, has seen a
trend towards centralisation. In addition, the issue
arises as to how we should conceptualise
communities. Generally, environmental management
including CBNRM treats communities as
homogenous and does not take difference into
account. It is important that this multiplicity of
interest as well as power struggles within
communities be recognised.
The diversity of CBNRM in the region has been
driven by many factors. In Botswana, Namibia,
Zambia and Zimbabwe it has been the conservation
sector through wildlife departments that has
provided the foundation for CBNRM. This has
resulted in programmes such as Campfire in
Zimbabwe, Admade in Zambia, and conservancies
in Namibia. In South Africa, the land reform process
(in particular land restitution) rather than
conservation has been the main motivation and
impetus for greater equity and more inclusive and
broad-based forms of natural resource management
(Shackleton & Campbell 2000:5). This process
resulted in the successful claim of 24 000ha of land in
the Kruger National Park by the Makuleke
community (see Box 3 on page 36).
Partnerships and CBNRM
In order to address the issue of whether partnerships
promote participation, we need to unpack the nature
of partnerships and its approach to stakeholders. The
use of the term ‘stakeholder’ can be problematic
since it implies that there are no conflicts between
the different actors. Given the fact that there are
always competing demands over access and control
of natural resources, disputes and conflict are
inevitable. Under such circumstances, effective and
fair conflict resolution mechanisms at the local and
national levels are essential. The provision of a
functional and respected legislative and judicial
system to protect the violation of rights is absolutely
critical. This is one of the cornerstones of a
functioning democracy. An effective government
requires an equally strong and empowered civil
society to monitor it and ensure that local
government structures do not become corrupt and
rent-seeking.
Different actors have different potentials to
contribute to policy setting based on their levels of
power in relation to each other and the resource base
as depicted in Figure 2. Any policy outcome is a
consequence of the different power interests pulling
in different and opposing directions. These power
relations are dynamic and actors can negotiate
differences in order to legitimise their interests and
influence a desired outcome. The process is not a
win-win one. There will be losers and winners. What
is important is that the process is empowering and
that participation generates adequate information
and greater democracy. Ultimately the losers and
winners are known and losers are stimulated and
supported to advocate more strongly for their issues.
The issue of partnerships cannot be successfully
addressed until clarity is achieved as to who the
relevant stakeholders in CBNRM are. It is clear that
CBNRM stakeholders are not limited only to the
state, NGOs, and communities. The private sector is
a key stakeholder that is often overlooked when
CBNRM issues are debated. It is possible to
distinguish between primary and secondary
stakeholders. Those with a primary interest in the
management and use of local natural resources and
directly dependent on them for their livelihoods can
be considered primary stakeholders. The others such
as the state and the private sector can be considered
secondary stakeholders. Such a classification does
not imply absence of both inter- and intra-
stakeholder conflicts.
Where there are high-value natural resources with a
potential for tourism and sport hunting, the private
sector provides the bulk of the investments and
consequently is the main generator of revenue.
Indeed the private sector is central to income
generation in many CBNRM initiatives. The
communities through their local representative
bodies can enter directly into a variety of agreements
loosely referred to as ‘partnerships’ with the private
sector. In some countries, it is either the local
government authority or wildlife departments that
can enter into agreements on behalf on the
communities.
The term ‘partnerships’ tends to be used very loosely
in the region and refers to a range of arrangements
between stakeholders. Partnerships can be either
based on a formal or informal agreement between
two or more of the key players to be engaged in
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natural resources management activities for the
mutual benefit of all, including the resource base.
Ideally a partnership should be more than simply an
exchange between persons such as in a lease
agreement where there is a landlord and tenant
relationship. In these circumstances, one party pays
for goods and services without joint decision making
or sharing a common vision or interest in the
resource base. In a partnership, there should be a
process of negotiation during which the roles and
ambitions of the parties are discussed and agreed
upon. Real partnerships are based on trust,
transparency, equity and mutual benefits.
Regrettably, one common approach is to use
participatory systems to create a trade-off with
communities – the community receives some benefit
for implementing conservation practices (Mohamed-
Katerere 2000:2). The contested nature of CBNRM
in the region can be partly attributed to the fact that
many of the arrangements involving one or more
parties are termed partnerships even if issues of
equality and roles and responsibilities have been
ignored. This leads to misplaced expectations and,
ultimately, conflicts.
Each partnership situation will have to address the
question of who the stakeholders are and what they
want. At times the term ‘stakeholder’ is used to refer
to all those who have a significant and specific stake
in the resource base, whether they are individuals or
communities (Borinni-Feyerabend 1996:8). Clarity
must be achieved about who constitutes a
community. A community may refer to a group of
people living in a particular locality and sharing a
common culture, values and traditions. Many
communities, particularly rural ones, are under
traditional leadership structures and rely on these
local-level institutions for rules and sanctions for the
management of natural resources and for mediation
in the event of conflicts and disputes over land and
land-based resources. Alternatively, it may simply be
used in order to refer to a group of people living
within a particular geographical locality and is not
limited by the variation within communities in
terms of priority, interests and value systems.
The notion of community is attractive to both
planners and resource managers because it offers a
manageable unit comprised of identifiable groups or
individual resource users (Madondo 2000:4).
However, romanticising such units can be risky
since the community is not homogeneous and is in
itself complex and dynamic. The community is
characterised by diverse and often competing
interests and power struggles that need to be
understood when planning. The local ‘elite’ can have
the capacity to link with state power and private
sector interests in a manner that can easily locate
accountability outside the community structures

































Figure 2: Power relations in natural resources management
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Globalisation has also affected how people relate to
each other and to their natural environment. There
is a growing sense of individualism that guarantees
certain freedoms and rights that, in themselves,
might undermine the ability to manage natural
resources. Campbell et. al (2000:7) acknowledge a
new era of social relations based on diminishing
community values and rising individualism.
Community co-operation such as work parties is in
decline.
In countries such as Botswana and Namibia, there is
legal provision for communities to define themselves,
while in Zimbabwe it is the rural district councils
that are the lowest legal entity through which
communities are defined.
In addition, it is important to consider under what
circumstances the private sector or an NGO maybe
identified as a stakeholder. The issue of whether
communities have priority rights over and above
these other stakeholders must be addressed.
Partnership arrangements need to address this
multiplicity of stakeholders and the variation within
such stakeholder groups. To achieve this, partnerships
must not only define entitlement rights and
responsibilities, but also governance rights.
To better understand the nature of partnerships, it is
useful to consider a range of possible partnership
arrangements that currently occur in the region
(Figure 3). In southern Africa there are three
common forms of partnerships. These are joint




The ‘joint ventures’ that are common in the region
do not always involve joint ownership of the
company, but are more commonly based on an
agreement where both parties have rights and
responsibilities to contribute and benefit from the
partnership enterprise. There are two forms of ‘joint
venture’ partnership around CBNRM in southern
Africa as follows:
a) The first is where the investor and the
community can enter into a joint venture with
the community holding an equity stake. This is
an advanced form of partnership and is less
common in the region. The Game Safaris case
study (Box 1 on page 35) is a good example of an
attempt to form a joint venture partnership
between a community and a private company.
However, this partnership failed due to a lack of
a common vision and poorly-defined roles.
b) The second and more commonly-cited example
of a joint venture partnership involves a lease
agreement. This may take two forms:
1. An investor develops the facility on
communal land under a formal agreement
with the community or an appointed
representative. Under this arrangement the
investor pays a lease fee or levy. The
Mahenye case study (Box 2 on page 35) is an
interesting example of a partnership
between a private company and the Rural
District Council (RDC), acting on behalf of
the community. The lease fees are shared
between the RDC and the community.
Neither the community nor the RDC has
any involvement in management of the
Figure 3: Types of partnerships in CBNRM
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business. This particular case study is
interesting in that it also involves an NGO
that has been supporting capacity building
of the community so that they can
implement CBNRM initiatives.
2. A community has control over a hunting
quota in its area. The community then leases
its area to a hunting operator who in return
pays a lease fee and trophy fees for each
animal that is hunted (Ashley & Jones,
forthcoming:23).
Where the partnership is imposed, communities are
more likely to enter into a partnership that is not in
their interests and hence not equitable. Assisted
forms of partnerships are those that often involve a
credible intermediary which tries to support
communities in taking advantage of opportunities
that they may not be aware of. Ultimately such an
intermediary will help to negotiate the best possible
partnership in line with the community’s vision and
expectations. This is the role that many NGOs seek
to play at both the regional and national levels. The
most successful forms of partnerships are those
described as organic. Here the community has a
sense of ownership of its resources, a clear vision and
often has an idea of the type of partner and
partnership it desires. (See Figure 3).
There are no hard and fast rules regarding where
individuals or organisations are on the partnership
continuum. However, it is important that they
know where on the continuum they are positioned
and why. More importantly, the position on the
continuum will define not only the type of
‘partnership’, but also the roles and responsibilities
of the stakeholders. Some partnerships are based on
cash donations, provision of skills, co-management
of resources, lease arrangements, and commercial
joint ventures. The type and nature of a partnership
varies issue by issue (resource, skills) and country by
country.
Co-management
The second category of partnership is based on the
co-management of resources such as forests and
national parks. In the case of co-management, the
parties, which can be a state agency on the one hand
and resource users on the other, develop a
partnership that specifies the rights and responsibilities
of all parties. There are many examples of co-
management in the region involving state agencies
and communities. A recent example in South Africa
involves the Makuleke community and the national
parks board (Box 3 on page 36). After successfully re-
claiming part of Kruger National Park as their land,
the community have entered into joint management
of their land with SANP. The land remains part of
the national park and representatives of the
community sit on a joint board that oversees the
management of the area.
Technical backstopping
The third form of partnership involves donor
contributions to support activities that promote
CBNRM programmes. These include grants to
intermediary organisations such as NGOs who in
turn provide technical backstopping to CBNRM
activities or act as intermediaries in negotiations
between parties interested in a partnership. Good
examples include Zimbabwe’s Campfire, Namibia’s
Living in Finite Resources (Life) and Botswana’s
Natural Resources Management Programme
(NRMP). In some instances, donors will directly
fund community-based organisations (CBOs) to
assist them in initiating various income-generating
activities. The risk with technical backstopping is
that it is often demand-driven, which may result in
‘imposed’ CBNRM initiatives.
Are partnerships a tool for
decentralisation?
Governance is about the ‘rules of the game’ in a given
system. Different actors in a given system can act and
try to use the rules in an attempt to achieve their
objectives and serve their own interests. Governance
is the socio-political interaction between those who
are governing and those being governed. In southern
Africa, a more informed civil society is increasingly
questioning the role of the state in natural resource
management and also demanding greater involvement
through devolution. The response of the state to civil
society demands for devolution of rights over
natural resources has mainly been through some
form of decentralisation.
Despite the dedicated efforts of NGOs and donors, it
is clear that the devolution process is incomplete and
yet these parties are also strong advocates for
‘partnerships’ with the private sector. Under such
circumstances, is it possible for the representative
local bodies to be in a position to negotiate and be
equal partners in such partnership arrangements?
Decentralisation is seen as a legitimate political and
economic means to achieve greater participation,
equity and accountability at the lower levels of
decision-making as well as more efficient natural
resource management. However, for the purpose of
natural resource management, decentralisation must
include a commitment to devolve rights over
productive natural resources to local actors (Agrawal
& Ribot, forthcoming:1). While meaningful
decentralisation is necessary for local-level resource
management, it is not enough for local actors to
demand devolution without accepting the
responsibility and accountability that go with it.
Community-public-private partnerships in CBNRM:  The real challenges?
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Although the state has responded to some of these
demands by pursuing a policy of decentralisation, in
many countries the jury has returned a verdict of
‘incomplete or ineffective decentralisation’.
According to Ribot (1999:27) decentralisation occurs
when central state assets and powers are devolved to
local government or private decision-making bodies.
He further distinguishes between ‘deconcentration’
and devolution. Deconcentration occurs when the
central state delegates its powers to local government
agencies in an effort to bring state services closer to
the people. Devolution of state powers and assets to
non-state bodies such as individuals, private groups
and NGOs is referred to as privatisation (Ribot
1999:27). The question with respect to CBNRM is
whether or not there exists real devolution of powers
such that there is power sharing in decision making
based on systems of accountability.
While decentralisation per se does not guarantee
effective development and sound environmental
management, its absence certainly undermines any
efforts at community participation and decision
making. In the southern African context, this must
include not only rights of entitlement, but also
governance rights. Community involvement in the
management of resources requires ‘real’ power
(ability to make decisions around key resources) and
rights; requisite competence; economic interest; and
the desire to assume such a responsibility and be held
accountable. In addition, communities should have
adequate representation in decision-making bodies
and control over the decisions made. To be effective,
devolution should be carried out in a responsible
manner such that those who assume power and
authority have requisite knowledge and capacity. At
the level of local government, institutions must have
legitimacy, accountability, and civil society groups
should be able to provide the necessary checks and
balances. These can be enhanced through the
creation of enforceable legal rights pertaining to
administrative fairness and justice. This would, for
example, include rights to information, the right to
be given reasons for decisions, and the right to
contest decisions.
In southern Africa, decentralisation has remained
predominantly a process of delegating certain central
functions of the state to local government agencies
and not empowering communities. For example, in
the case of Zimbabwe, decentralisation has been to
the local government level and not the community.
Namibia on the other hand, has gone much further
to devolve directly to ‘approved’ community
structures that must be approved and registered by
the government.
Given that past failures in CBNRM have been linked
to the non-participatory and centralised methods of
planning, decentralisation and empowerment are
now considered key to any new natural resource
management projects and initiatives. Development
NGOs, donors and academics are all calling for new
policy frameworks that embrace the principles of
empowerment and decentralisation. It is in this
context that the CBNRM movement is now
advocating for ‘partnerships’.
Translating decentralisation into successful resource
management models requires a new form of
institutionalism that is flexible and responsive to
local conditions and needs. To be successful, this new
institutionalism has to be backed by a commitment
to institutional capacity building for both local
communities and development agencies including
state institutions. In addition, communities need to
have justiciable legal rights that ensure that they are
brought in on the basis of equality and that their
interests are taken into account. One option is the
recognition of rights of ‘prior informed consent’.
This requires full acceptance of an activity by the
community concerned and implies the right to stop
the activity from proceeding or halt it if it has already
begun (IUCN 1997:90).
Consequently, redefining the role of governments is
essential as the new approach places less emphasis on
central planning and blueprints for development.
For governments to respond to the demands of this
new institutionalism, they must become more
efficient and accountable rather than weaker.
Unfortunately, there is an observable weakening of
regional governments through the imposition of
global initiatives such as structural adjustment
programmes (SAPs) that can threaten CBNRM
efforts.
Even if decentralisation and devolution are achieved,
CBNRM initiatives face a major challenge in dealing
with complex rural economies that are characterised
by power struggles and divergent interests. The
problems of equity and power are often due to
diverse and competing interests and incentives that
cannot be resolved simply by devolution or
decentralisation (Cousins 1995:491). One way of
diminishing these problems is by promoting new
institutional arrangements that combine desirable
elements of the traditional approaches with more
formal arrangements (Cousins 1995:491).
It would appear that partnerships alone cannot
realistically be expected to be a tool for
decentralisation. In many respects they can actually
undermine the intentions of decentralisation by
legitimising private sector access to natural resources
without guaranteeing ownership and access to real
benefits. CBNRM should be seen to facilitating a
different model that is not paternalistic.
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Property rights as a
constraint
In many respects, where property rights have been
conferred to individuals, such as owners of wild
resources on private land in southern Africa, this has
served as an incentive for the owner or owners to
manage the resources effectively. Ownership implies
having the powers over the disposition of the
resources in question (Murphree 1995:3; Agrawal &
Ribot, forthcoming:1). Ownership of resources is
credited with facilitating a flourishing wildlife and
tourism industry mainly on private land in southern
Africa (Murphree 1995:3).
The incentive provided to private landowners by
resource ownership has seen a phenomenal
conversion of commercial farmland from agro-
pastoral use to wildlife-based enterprises. In South
Africa, for instance, at least 7% of the total land area
is under private game parks (Patel 1998:9). The same
author also estimates that at least 50% of Namibia’s
land area is under commercial farming with full
ownership of wildlife resources. About 10 % of these
private commercial farms are dedicated to wildlife-
based enterprises. In Zambia about 5% of the land is
under private leasehold (Patel 1998:9).
It is the success of private landowners that has been
the motivation behind extending this model into the
communal areas in the form of various CBNRM
programmes. Unfortunately, there has not been a
comparable transition of rights in the communal
areas. The communal people do not have strong
property rights, that is the rights to own, use and
disposal of productive resources (Patel 1998:8). The
communal lands tend to be organisationally complex
entities where individual members have usufruct
rights over arable land and collective rights to the
commons such as grazing lands and woodlands.
Partly as a result of this incentive, it is the private
landowners that have been actively engaged in
shaping wildlife policy. Consequently, the reality is
that there are separate laws and policies dealing with
the management of wild resources on public, private
and communal lands. There is no unified wildlife
policy or legislation that governs the management of
wild resources as national assets. The dualistic
approach to the treatment of private versus
communal lands continues to undermine efforts to
broaden the benefits to the poor and to reduce the
income gap between communal and private
landowners. In many respects this has effectively
perpetuated the divide between the region’s original
peoples and the settler communities who came as a
result of colonialism.
The nature of land and resource distribution in the
region presents a major challenge to CBNRM in the
region. Given the long history of land and resource
expropriation, the temporal and spatial distribution
of the region’s communal areas has little economic,
ecological or social rationale. The colonial
authorities set aside the best land in terms of rainfall,
soils and proximity to infrastructure for the white-
owned settler commercial farms and protected areas;
the communal areas comprised the remaining
marginal lands. Hence, attempts at introducing
CBNRM programmes into these contested lands
have, and are likely to continue to meet,
insurmountable constraints. The communal lands
became a source of cheap labour for commercial
farms, industry and the mining sector. For the
indigenous population, the communal areas provide
nothing more than agricultural subsistence farming.
It is in these areas and under these conditions that
CBNRM is expected to perform and contribute to
the upliftment of the lives of at least two thirds of the
region’s people.
There is no denying that those who have
championed the cause of CBNRM have done so with
impeccable commitment and have been successful in
influencing policy. This has resulted in the
incremental implementation of different CBNRM
models in the region. However, we need to consider
whether CBNRM in the current context – where the
very condition, economically, legally and socially, of
the communal lands has not changed since the
colonial times – can be a viable option without
addressing entitlement issues. The communal people
remain mired in poverty with little or no powers
over the use and disposal of resources. Murphree
(1995:5) laments the fact that the communal people
remain marginalised in the post-colonial state.
Access to, and control over natural resources is an
element of the broader national political and
economic struggles. Those with the greatest
economic and political power will have the greatest
influence on policy direction and practice and tend
to be the ones to benefit the most in agrarian-based
economies that characterise the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) region.
It would appear that the nature of the property rights
struggle in southern Africa has not been fully
addressed by those that seek to promote CBNRM.
The challenge remains how to address the
constraints to effective CBNRM caused by the
absence of devolution of property rights to local
actors, and not to skirt around the issue by
continually tinkering with the form of CBNRM.
Under these conditions, CBNRM has been unable to
move beyond primary use regimes and to contribute
to the diversification of the rural economy. Given
that partnerships accept the division of rights to
natural resources, they are unlikely to offer greater
benefits or opportunities for communal residents.
The CBNRM movement has become a victim of its
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‘learning by doing’ approach or what has been
described as the concept of ‘process as policy’ (Jones
& Murphree 1998:10). The rationale for this
approach is that rather than wait for the policy
process to be perfect, implementation proceeds and
the lessons and information arising from it are used
to inform and refine policy. While this is laudable, it
means that key issues are not resolved. Where there
has been adequate devolution of powers, the process
can enable stakeholders to participate and influence
subsequent policy evolution. However, ‘process as
policy’ works well where both the institutional and
financial capacities exist. In the case of CBNRM in
southern Africa, these conditions have yet to be met.
Since decentralisation has been incomplete, many
actors are powerless to make decisions over valuable
resources or the benefits that flow from them. More
often than not, decentralisation policies in southern
Africa function as tools for controlling and
administering local actors.
Since many CBNRM initiatives are essentially
supply-driven through donor-funded projects, there
is a tendency by intermediary organisations to
promote approaches that do not necessarily
represent the interests of intended beneficiaries. This
trend is exacerbated by a general culture, already
referred to, of external constituency influence and
involvement of external forces in national and
regional affairs. Such influence of external forces has
witnessed an acceptance of market-based and trade-
driven mechanisms to drive economic development
so much that key phrases in development literature
are ‘entrepreneurship development’, ‘private sector
enterprise’ and ‘smart partnerships’. In line with
these global and regional trends, the CBNRM
movement has similarly adopted the concepts of
enterprise development and partnerships as concepts
that might enhance the success of CBNRM
initiatives in the region, and has been promoting
them aggressively. This is not surprising given the
philosophy of ‘learning by doing’ that characterises
the CBNRM movement in the region. A resistance
or failure to confront the complexity of the
communal lands construction and the lure of donor
funds are logical explanations for pursuing this
model of functional implementation of CBNRM. It
seems more convenient to move towards CBNRM
models based on enterprise development and
partnerships than to seek appropriate interventions
that can effectively devolve property rights to local
actors while ensuring local accountability.
External constituency influence extends to
scholarship and the evolution of concepts that have a
direct bearing on CBNRM. For instance, CBNRM
has been strongly influenced by the common
property resource literature. We need to understand
the extent to which such literature is creating what
Campbell et al. (2000:13) refer to as ‘a theoretical
ideal’. Despite the theory, it is not clear that there is
an understanding of the nature of common pool
resources in southern Africa and the users thereof.
CBNRM has to respond to the regional realities such
as the complexities and heterogeneity of communities
and how power and equity struggles define resource
use.
In southern Africa, a clear distinction between
‘individual’ and ‘communal’ ownership needs to be
made, depending on the type and location of the
resource. The case of the Makuleke community in
South Africa (Box 3) is cited by Rihoy (1999:6) as a
land claim that gives the community real power over
their resources. While regaining ownership of the
land can be considered as a step better than the
previous situation, the 1998 agreement between the
Makuleke community and South African National
Parks effectively imposed the conservation status of
the land as non-negotiable. It further limits
‘ownership’ by imposing significant restrictions
including on direct consumptive use of resources
(Shackleton & Campbell 2000:32; Mail & Guardian,
20 January 2000). These restrictions assume that by
regaining ownership of the land, the Makuleke
community will change their individual and
communal attitudes and values towards wildlife
management and conservation to be in line with
those of the park authorities.
Do partnerships guarantee
participation?
Closely linked to decentralisation and devolution of
power is the concept of participation. The CBNRM
approach is underpinned by the acknowledgement
that local communities and civil society in general
are no longer the destroyers of the environment.
Instead they are credited with possessing local or
indigenous knowledge that can be combined with
science to the benefit of the environment and people.
At the same time, while everyone desires less state
involvement in natural resources management, it is
clear that the state has a positive role to play with
regard to institutions. This polarisation between the
state and civil society around roles and responsibilities
is credited with boosting the notion of participatory
approaches to natural resources management (Ribot
1999:28). Participation is now seen as the means to
involve civil society in the decisions that were
previously the domain of state agencies.
Many new laws and policies in the region in areas
such as CBNRM are intended to foster
decentralisation and participation in natural
resource management with the long-term goal of
boosting economic development, eradicating poverty,
resolving resource inequities, and improving the
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administrative efficiency for the management of land
and natural resources. This partially mirrors the
changes taking place within international law that
prioritise participatory approaches and that
increasingly focus on the rights of local communities.
Unfortunately the reflection is somewhat distorted
as the emerging right of participation, at
international law, is proactive in that it creates
opportunities for individuals and groups to
participate in the formulation of management
strategies and their implementation (Mohamed-
Katerere 2000:4).
Effective participation requires equally effective
devolution and the existence of competent
community structures for making decisions that are
locally accountable. Where local representative
organisations or individuals within a CBNRM
initiative cease to be locally accountable for
whatever reason, then the entire process of
participation is undermined. In fact, in the absence of
locally-accountable representation, Ribot (1999:29)
argues that there is no community participation.
Local accountability is not only dependent on the
existence of elected authority and is possible if
‘traditional’ institutions are strong enough to
enforce controls and be accountable to the people.
However, given the long history of traditional
institutions being empowered and disempowered by
the colonial and post-colonial state, and modernisation
of national economies, there has been a gradual but
steady weakening of traditional institutions and
undermining of ‘traditional’ values and rights
(Mohamed-Katerere 2000). Traditional institutions
have lacked the capacity to respond and adjust to the
socio-economic changes. The inability of traditional
institutions to reform has been complicated by
migration of people as they are resettled by the state
or try to escape human insecurity, population
growth and attendant resource scarcities.
Given this continuous shift in the political and
economic authority systems from traditional
authorities to the state, it is little surprise that
traditional authority has become subordinated and
elected officials of local authorities are assuming
greater power than traditional leaders. Recent
attempts in some countries such as South Africa and
Zimbabwe to restore eroded powers of traditional
authorities is likely to shift the responsibility to
deliver and provide wise stewardship for natural
resource management back to traditional authorities.
If this transformation were to materialise, then the
observed trend of a shift from communal use rights
to de facto and de jure management by restriction and
exclusion that is part of the overall ‘modernisation’
bandwagon can be countered. This would effectively
acknowledge the actual role of traditional authorities




CBNRM itself implies a form of partnership
between individuals within communities, and
between communities and public agencies and the
private sector. Many partnership arrangements are
driven by intermediaries and private sector interests
seeking new business opportunities and consequently
do not always benefit the communities or national
economies. As communities become more
empowered, (have the capacity to negotiate, identify
opportunities and can access required inputs) then
we might begin to see different forms of partnerships
evolving.
In some countries the concept of CPPPs has fuelled
a phenomenal growth in a new wave of investments
in charismatic business ventures such as tourism and
sport hunting intended to benefit local ‘communities’.
Whether this is in fact the case is highly
controversial. Madenda (2000:93), for example, is
critical of the preferential treatment given to South
African investors over Zambians in eco-tourism and
timber-harvesting ventures. He describes investors
from South Africa as ‘natural resource raiders’, who
take advantage of the under-valuation of natural
resources by Zambians to exploit indigenous timber
and wildlife. Similar trends are evident in
Mozambique that not only give rights to regional
investors, but also global investors. Indeed there is a
growing regional trend towards the privatisation of
control over natural resources, often by transnational
companies. This process of globalisation may denote
the recolonisation of Africa’s resources. This process
not only promotes a false sense of scarcity, but
undermines the ability of local actors to utilise
natural resources in a sustainable manner and accrue
economic benefit from them. It may also be an
important factor in generating conflict that is yet to
be analysed and understood.
To facilitate granting of permits and licences, many
such investments are often disguised as ‘partnerships’
with communities. Similarly, communities deprived
of essential social infrastructure due to dysfunctional
and corrupt governments become desperate and
enter into less than perfect ‘partnership’ arrangements
with the private sector in order to generate some
revenue. Under these circumstances, many resource
raiders have little long-term commitment in the
country (Madenda 2000:93). The resource-raiding
phenomenon can be attributed to inappropriate
national government policies that are designed to
promote direct external investment but instead
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encourage pillage of national resources by external
actors. In the end, neither the communities nor the
national economy benefit from such investments.
The resource raiders can be said to have contributed
to the current optimism in CBNMR and a general
euphoria of partnerships. This they have achieved
through the sheer power of the revenue they
contribute towards CBRNM initiatives. Essentially,
CBNRM initiatives should not be isolated income-
generating projects. They need to be an integral
component of overall development strategies.
Unless partnership agreements and indeed the
private sector recognise that successful CBNRM is
not driven by the single variable of revenue, they are
unlikely to succeed. Establishing and maintaining
successful CBNRM initiatives requires a more
nuanced understanding of how community resources
are managed and the associated struggles around
equity and power within the communities. These
local-level complexities need to be recognised and
taken into account by CBNRM implementers. At
the same time, the role of the state with respect to
policies of equity, social justice and conflict
resolution between the elite and marginalised and
weaker groups cannot be underestimated.
Redefining CBNRM and
partnerships
CBNRM is increasingly becoming a contested model
for resource management because community
involvement in how CBNRM projects are developed
and implemented is far from satisfactory. Where
relevant and appropriate CBNRM policies exist,
local communities do have opportunities to
influence CBNRM implementation and subsequent
refinement based on experience and local knowledge.
Still, in some localities the struggles over
decentralisation and devolution create competition
and conflict between government and communities
over authority and control of natural resources. In
some instances, CBNRM is being justified as a means
of compensating for weak or dysfunctional
governments in that proceeds from CBNRM
projects are used to develop social infrastructure that
should be provided by governments. While there can
be many reasons to explain the growing voices
questioning the promise of CBNRM, the most
plausible explanation is what Campbell et al.
(2000:12) describe as the disparity between the oasis
of optimism found in the literature and the desert
that is the reality on the ground. While very few
would argue against the rationale for CBNRM,
problems arise when expectations are not being met.
The distribution of revenues from resource
utilisation is not sufficient incentive to secure the
participation of people in CBNRM activities. A
recent study in the Lupande Game Management
Area in Zambia confirms that revenue generation per
se was not sufficient incentive for communities to
support wildlife conservation efforts (Hachileka
2000:15).
The success of any partnership varies from country
to country and issue to issue. However, there are
several issues that must be addressed, not only for
CBNRM, but for all forms of partnerships. These
include accountability, economic diversification,
rights and entitlements, local values, institutional
development, decentralisation, the contestation over
resources, and legal systems. These are addressed
below
Accountability
Accountability is a critical point to consider when
analysing the impact of partnership arrangements
within CBNRM involving significant income
generation. The Mahenye case study (Box 2 on page
35) and many other eco-tourism ‘investments’ are
excellent examples of how many communal areas
can be transformed together with the people
themselves into expendable ‘resources’ for profit
generation through inappropriate partnership
arrangements. In the case of Mahenye we have the
rural district council acting as an intermediary and
demanding a share of the revenue generated through
CBNRM, and the private sector providing capital
and expertise to generate revenue and profits from
tourism.
The exact implications for local accountability of
such partnership-based investment patterns in the
communal areas are yet to be fully understood.
Through these investments, leadership of the local
community can gain access to an external power base
that is not accountable to local people, thereby
undermining local checks and balances. Where this
occurs, it can undermine locally-accountable
representation, and consequently any community
participation which all CBRNM initiatives claim
exists.
The partnership models being promoted under
CBNRM are transforming traditional communities
into new forms of communities susceptible to the
power of profit and commercial interests. Such a
process threatens to marginalise millions, dismantle
and degrade the commons, denigrate cultures and
reduce their worth to their value as labour. New
forms of resource ownership and use patterns will
emerge that will change the nature of CBNRM as it
is known today. The end result of the emerging
partnership models should be to create viable and
sustainable economic bases at the local level, not
merely enclosing people into a new form of denial
and dispossession.
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Another issue of accountability is how the
representatives of the group or community are
defined. In particular, the extent to which traditional
leadership and local government institutions are
representative must be considered. The issue of
representation is inextricably linked to the issue of
legitimacy.
Rural development
A continuing shortcoming of CBNRM and indeed
partnerships is its dependence on primary utilisation
of natural resources that limit the choices available to
communities. If partnerships are to move beyond the
failures of CBNRM, then they should be an integral
part of a broader rural development strategy with the
goal of economic, social and political upliftment.
Consequently, partnerships and CBNRM must
ensure that communities have access to multiple
opportunities so that they can add value to resources
through secondary activities and diversify the
product base. The private sector can potentially be
an important player if it is able to ensure skills
development of local level partners. Additionally,
the private sector can play an important role in
developing the local productive base by acting as
guarantor to community and individual loans. The
Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources (Safire),
a Zimbabwean NGO, has a programme to address
this through guaranteeing local loans.
Current inequities with respect to access to land and
other resources are not only the source of many
conflicts within the region, they also constrain
economic opportunities. Consequently, for
partnerships and CBNRM to meet the broader
objectives of economic development, they must
respond to the challenges facing local actors such as
incomplete devolution of decision making. For
southern Africa, the big question is whether
partnerships and CBNRM are feasible without
addressing the issue of inequities with respect to land
and other key resources. In the broadest sense, for
CBNRM to contribute meaningfully to rural
economic transformation, the central causes of the
failure of entitlements must be resolved. This means
addressing the land question and inequities with
respect to access to financial resources, information,
knowledge, technology, skills, markets and
employment.
Rights and entitlements
Another key success factor relates to rights and
obligations that communities have over land and
natural resources. Currently these rights tend to be
limited by the rights of other users and institutions,
including the state. In many instances, there are no
meaningful rights to resources that are enforceable in
law and consequently communities are unable to
contest use regimes that run counter to their
interests. It is also important for communities to
understand whatever rights they may have on the use
of resources. Additionally, such rights must
necessarily be complemented with obligations
related to how such resources are used. The difficulty
is that rights and responsibilities are not always clear
and at times it is necessary for communities to
identify and insist on their rights.
Definition of clear rights and responsibilities over
resources could prove more important than area
ownership issues, especially in the case of
collaborative and co-management of wildlife
resources. It might be necessary to consider a flexible
approach to rights over natural resources through a
process of continued negotiation as economic, social
and ecological parameters change.
Local values
Improved management of natural resources by
communities demands new arrangements that can
combine traditional institutions and knowledge
with modern science and vice versa. More important
is the need to recognise that local institutions and
organisations are part of a hierarchy of institutions
and organisation that are involved in management of
natural resources (Cousins 1995:495). Ignoring this
reality results in misplaced expectations of local-level
institutions and organisations and consequently
undermines CBNRM.
Institutions
Globalisation is transforming traditional institutions
and communities faster than they can adapt and
modernise. If not managed, globalisation threatens
to marginalise millions, dismantle and degrade the
commons, denigrate cultures, and have the worth of
people reduced to their value as labour. New forms
of resource ownership and use patterns will emerge
that will change the nature of CBNRM as it is known
today. Partnership models should result in viable
and sustainable economic initiatives at the local level
and not merely enclose people into a new form of
denial and dispossession. Globalisation threatens this.
While there is general consensus that devolution of
power to local actors is essential for the success of
CBNRM and, consequently, CPPPs, the exact
mechanisms, including institutions, for making this
happen remain ever-elusive. Communities should
control their resources so that they can enter into
legal agreements with the private sector. The
dilemma is that, while less government is desirable,
there is an acknowledgement that many local
institutions are weak, making it difficult to devolve
downwards. This means that a balance between state
intervention and community empowerment is
essential and that local institutions need to be
supported to modernise. Equally important is the
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fact that efforts have to be made to ensure that people
at the local level appreciate the problems they face so
that they can adequately address these and demand
their rights. Achieving this requires a holistic
approach to resource management that includes
addressing the land question.
Within southern Africa, the term ‘partnerships’ is
being abused. In many instances partnerships have
become a compromise for communities entered into
simply to gain some rights over resources. Tourism
investments in both consumptive and non-
consumptive safaris have been the main vehicle for
CPPPs. These eco-tourism ‘investments’ are not just
examples of partnerships in enterprise development,
but also excellent examples of the ‘new’ struggles for
control over resources and territory that have
traditionally been used and cherished by others. In
an effort to attract direct domestic and foreign
investment, regional governments are encouraging
an invasion by ‘resource raiders’. The ‘resource
raiders’ are nothing more than investors seeking
opportunities to get a share of a huge and growing
tourism market by entering into ‘partnership’ with
communities. These ‘raiders’ are defining the terms
and conditions of a range of many so-called
partnerships. Unless the real rights of local actors are
meaningfully addressed, resource-based conflicts can
be expected to escalate.
The contested nature of CBNRM from which the
concept of partnership derives its meaning inevitably
influences the type of CPPPs entered into. Many
communal areas are being transformed – together
with the people themselves – into expendable
‘resources’ for exploitation. We have never sought to
understand the exact implications of this new wave
of investment patterns in the communal areas.
Through these investments, leadership of the local
communities can gain access to an external power
base that is not accountable to local people, thereby
undermining local checks and balances.
NGOs and donors have been active in the evolution
of partnerships as they are known today through
their support to CBNRM in areas of capacity
building, exchange visits, supporting policy dialogue
and, at times, acting as intermediaries in partnership
formation processes. But CBNRM success can only
be achieved if local actors have real power to make
decisions about key resources and to benefit from
their efforts.
The role of external agencies such as NGOs and
individuals as intermediaries is absolutely critical to
assist communities and the private sector to get a
better understanding of each others’ needs and to
make the partnership successful. However, the
intermediaries need to be accountable to a legitimate
local constituency and avoid conflict of interest
where their own agendas and interests become the
motivation for mediating in CPPPs.
Legal arrangements
In the context of southern Africa, the focus on
communities for CPPPs requires enabling policies
and legislation. Legal rights must not only address
substantive rights such as those to resources, but also
procedural rights that form the basis of good
governance, of which a fair and transparent
administrative process is one aspect. Such rights
must include access to information and the right to
be given reasons for decisions.
Conclusion
The notion of partnerships is gaining currency as a
policy intervention despite the fact that it not only
responds to an external constituency, but also
attempts to replace the state with the private sector
and market mechanisms. This development has
major consequences for communities that need to be
understood and addressed and not side-stepped,
given that many CBNRM initiatives continue to
yield lopsided benefits.
The greatest challenge for the region is to ensure that
CPPPs graduate beyond their current loose and
broad meaning. We need to improve on the
partnership-development process so that the
partnerships themselves go beyond appeasement of
communities through payment of ‘fees’. We need a
new generation of partnership arrangements defined
and driven by the communities and not just the
‘resource raiders’ and NGOs.
Unless the above steps in the partnership-building
process are adhered to, any emerging partnership is
likely to be beset with problems and conflicts as in
the case of Mr. Collins in Botswana (see Box 1).
Effective partnerships add value to the venture so
that the outcome is better than if each party acted
alone. Successful partnerships are built on
collaboration, not competition, and they emphasise
areas of synergy and complementarity.
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Box 1: A private sector-community joint venture case study
Example of a failed partnership in Botswana
Mr C Collins (Director: Game Safaris)
This case study summarises the experience of Mr Collins, a private safari operator based in Botswana in his
efforts to secure a joint venture partnership with a local community.
The advertised tender stated what the communities wanted in the form of camps, how the bid would be
handled and the length of the lease. Mr Collins was told to follow the joint venture guidelines in his tender
document. Little did he know that the community had already decided who they wished to have as the
partner before the tender was even presented.
As a hunting operator, he had chosen a photographic operator to handle the non-consumptive tourism. Mr
Collins was awarded the tender by majority vote at a community meeting. He was number 4 in line as far
as technical plan was concerned and his money bid was the lowest. After the first meeting with the
community, he realised that he was selected because the community thought he was someone else.
Mr Collins went into the first year of the partnership full of enthusiasm and energy, strongly believing that
if he performed as he had stated in his management plan, he would create a good image of himself. He said
he became ‘the money tree’ and heard comments like ‘if you won’t help me you won’t get the area next
year’. He made it clear at numerous meetings that he was there for the community, not the individuals.
Towards the end of the first year, the community notified him that they were interested in continuing with
him for the following year. It became apparent that the community was not interested in a joint venture,
they wanted a cash cow. The community was only interested in sharing the benefits, they did not want to
take the risks as well. Huge amounts of money were demanded for an extension of the agreement. The
parties finally agreed to a 15% increase in lease fees, more employment for the locals and higher salaries for
employees. Mr Collins had the sole responsibility of building camps, paying all the salaries (plus rations),
providing transport, paying high yearly rental, taking all the risks and providing services to the clientele
without support from the community. In addition, the community wanted him to attend all meetings and
meet all associated costs. He decided that, in the second year of the partnership, the community should
contribute towards projects on a 50:50 basis since they had earned some money. However, the community
refused to co-sponsor the football team and the costs of harvesting animals allocated to the community for
local consumption.
Because of his efforts to promote the principles of partnership, the community decided to re-tender for the
three-year venture rather than continue with Mr Collins. He decided not to re-tender. He felt the
community was not willing to work with him as a partner. He felt that the community would not be
happy unless they got an operator who could respond to all their demands for money and services.
In his opinion, the community he worked with was not ready for the joint venture initiative. They were
preoccupied with resolving their own problems rather than contributing to a joint venture.
For his part, Mr Collins did not understand the potential partner and the two parties had not gone through
a partnership-building process. The partnership was characterised by a lack of transparency. In addition,
the key principles of equity and mutual benefits were not met.
Source: Collins 2000:43.
Box 2: A tripartite partnership model case study
The Mahenye village-Zimsum-Campfire partnership
Mahenye Village lies along the vast sands of what becomes the Save River, adjacent to Zimbabwe’s
Gonarezhou National Park, one of the country’s major game parks. The Mahenye people belong to the
Shangaan clan of the Limpopo province of South Africa. They were moved when the national park was
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created in the 1960s. Because of the location, (near the Mozambique border), the community was neglected
during Zimbabwe’s liberation war. After independence the community suffered destabilisation during the
civil war in Mozambique.
The Campfire (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) programme in
Mahenye was born out of conflict between national park authorities and the Mahenye community over
ownership of wild animals. In 1891 wild animals were proclaimed the property of the Crown and the
Mahenye Shangaan people were denied access to wildlife. They became classified as ‘poachers’ since the
wildlife was no longer the property of the community. In 1966 the western bank of the Save River was
incorporated in Gonarezhou National Park and the Shangaan people were evicted and their villages
destroyed. A group of the Shangaan people crossed the Save River to the east and settled on what is now
known as Mahenye Island. This marked the creation of a ‘rebel’ community that continued to hunt for
survival.
The conflict between the Mahenye people and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife
Management over wildlife ended in the 1980s when a white farmer persuaded the government to allow the
Mahenye community a hunting quota with the proceeds going to the community. With the advent of
Campfire, the Mahenye community has been earning income from consumptive wildlife utilisation.
Threatened with major environmental problems such as siltation caused by streambank cultivation and
human-animal conflicts, the community, which had always prided itself on its treatment of the
environment, readily took up a private sector offer to go into partnership in their conservation efforts.
They also realised that there was an opportunity to make money for themselves through non-consumptive
safaris. These partners came in the form of the Zimbabwe Sun (Zimsun) Hotels and Campfire. The new
development of non-consumptive opportunities is enhanced by the Mahenye’s proximity to Gonarezhou
National Park and Mahenye Island which has riverine forest of great aesthetic and botanical interest.
The hotel group set up Mahenye Safari Lodge and Chilo Safari Lodge. The two lodges have a total capacity
of 40 beds. The community in 1998 raised Z$448 000 from hunting and Z$590 000 from photography. It
also received Z$430 000 from Zimsun as part of its annual share from tourist occupancy. A total of 880
households received Z$640 each. So far Z$340 000 has been raised to build Mahenye’s first secondary school.
Through funds generated from the safari lodges, the community has extended the power line from Chilo
Lodge to Mahenye business centre, leading to the electrification of the clinic and the community-run
grinding mill.
Note: 1 US$ = Z$55 (July 2000)
Box 3: A case study of devolution in South Africa
The Makuleke land claim
In 1969 villages belonging to the Makuleke clan were forcibly removed from some 24 000 hectares of land
known as the Pafuri Triangle. Most of the Pafuri – in which nine ecological zones overlap, resulting in
extremely high biodiversity – was then incorporated into the Kruger National Park. This move was
viewed as a great success by conservationists. To the Makuleke it was a crushing blow, leaving them
disempowered and impoverished. With the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, legislation was
passed that enabled the Makuleke and other dispossesed people to get their land back.
In 1996 the Makuleke lodged a formal claim for the restitution of their land. This claim was the strongest-
ever land claim against a Schedule 1 park and was bound to establish an important precedent for South
Africa. The Pafuri was viewed as an ‘environmental hot spot’ and lay at the heart of several planned
conservation initiatives for the area. Its prominence as a conservation area meant that decisions on its
future would have profound policy implications, including redefining the term ‘conservation’. This
process was characterised by conflict due to numerous external interests, ranging from animal rights to
sustainable use advocates.
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After an 18-month negotiation process, an agreement was reached. This recognised the Makuleke as
owners of the Pafuri. The Makuleke voluntarily agreed to use the land for conservation purposes,
subjecting conservation and land management decisions to a Joint Management Board, consisting of
themselves and the South African National Parks (SANP). Essentially, the Pafuri remains an integral
component of the Kruger National Park, but the Makuleke have exclusive commercial rights over the area.
This deal is now viewed as a template for dealing with similar claims against protected areas throughout
South Africa.
The agreement provides the Makuleke with real power in their relationship with SANP and has created
a ‘win-win’ situation. The power given to the Makuleke over their land has enabled them to launch several
conservation initiatives. These include the development of an intensive conservation training programme,
which integrates modern approaches with traditional knowledge. This is now the largest training
programme of its kind in southern Africa and has already resulted in some 20 young Makuleke gaining
national diplomas.
Adapted from Rihoy 1999.
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Abstract
Co-management has recently been put forward as
one of the key approaches towards community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) in
southern Africa. Co-management in CBNRM
involves the building of partnerships between
communities and other stakeholders in which
decision-making power, responsibility and authority
for natural resource management is shared. This
paper evaluates the potential of co-management to
strengthen local resource governance. The experiences
of two long-standing co-management cases, based in
Malawi and South Africa, will be drawn upon to
assess the prospects for co-management in the region.
Fisheries co-management in Malawi, premised on a
partnership between government and local-level
fisheries committees, was initiated in 1993 and has
since been extended to artisanal fisheries management
throughout Malawi. In 1991 a contractual national
park was proclaimed between the national
conservation agency and a local community in the
Richtersveld area, South Africa. Despite the stark
bio-physical and socio-economic differences between
the two cases, they highlight fundamental lessons
related to governance issues in co-management.
Primarily, they illustrate that initiatives such as co-
management that seek to bridge the gap between
centralised and local resource governance regimes
have yet to achieve joint power sharing that one
should find in a co-governance regime.
Introduction
Community-based natural resource management, a
term frequently used since the 1980s, denotes the
increasing rapprochement between social justice and
conservation management objectives in southern
Africa. This can be seen in the proliferation of
decentralised, community-based projects and
programmes, such as community wildlife
management, social forestry and land use planning.
An emerging characteristic of CBNRM programmes
in southern Africa has been the development of
partnerships between communities and other
stakeholders, broadly termed co-management.
Limited state capacity to implement conservation
and natural resource management policies effectively,
and the incapacity of local/community-based
institutions to enforce rules, distribute benefits
equitably and manage natural resources sustainably,
have all contributed to the evolution, development
and promotion of partnerships in natural resource
management (Lawry 1990). Co-management thus
proposes to develop a resource governance regime in
which power, authority and responsibility for
resource management is shared.
Governance is about finding a way to make
‘decisions that reduce the level of unwanted
outcomes and increase the level of desirable
outcomes’ (Ostrom 1998:1). These outcomes in the
case of resource governance include efficiency,
equitability and sustainability of resource access,
management and use. This paper will assess whether
co-management contributes towards strengthening
these outcomes at the local level. The experiences
from two established co-management cases are
drawn upon to assess whether shared responsibility,
authority and decision making, three key components
of resource governance, have been realised.
Co-management of artisanal fisheries in Lake Malawi
has been adopted as a national management strategy
and essentially involves a partnership between the
Fisheries Department and local-level institutions.
The Richtersveld National Park, established as a
contractual national park in 1991, has many lessons
Co-management as co-governance:
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for the establishment and management of community-
based conservation projects. The national park is
currently managed jointly by the conservation
agency and a local community but was initially
premised on the notion of local ownership with
management functions resting with the national
park. The experiences of these two cases provide
valuable insights into the viability of co-
management, currently receiving a great deal of
attention in resource governance debates in southern
Africa. Both secondary research and short field visits
informed the findings in this paper.
Co-management as co-
governance
Governance of natural resources involves:
the structures and processes of power and
authority, co-operation and conflict, that govern
decision making and dispute resolution
concerning resource allocation and use, through
the interaction of organisations and social
institutions (Woodhouse 1997:540).
Central to an examination of governance in
CBNRM is therefore an assessment of the measures
and procedures for ‘setting the rules for the exercise
of power and settling conflicts over such rules’
(Hyden 1998). Furthermore, governance involves
the implementation of these rules through a variety
of institutional mechanisms such as policies, laws
and organisational structures (both formal and
informal). Murphree (1999) rightly states that,
within the context of CBNRM, one of the key
elements of governance is the capacity of
communities to participate and contribute to
decisions on access to and use of natural resources.
What is co-management and how does it relate to
governance?
There are many definitions of the term co-
management. While some regard it as a middle-range
management option situated somewhere between
state and community management (Jentoft 1989),
others say that it ‘covers various partnership
arrangements and degrees of power-sharing and
integration of local and centralised management
systems’ (Pomeroy & Berkes 1997:466). Key issues
of power and authority are therefore the degree of
local participation in decision making or the extent
of devolution to the local level. Co-management
arrangements are situated along a continuum, from
coerced partnerships which are generally not
motivated by local concerns, to an organic
partnership, where ‘the community has a sense of
ownership of its resources, a clear vision and often
has an idea of the type of partner and partnership it
desires’ (Katerere 1999:6). Middle-range arrangements
can be classified as co-operative arrangements where
decision making is shared by the state and local
groups (Sen & Nielsen 1996). Co-management thus
spans partnerships in which the varying objectives of
actors have to be met (Table 1). However, the weak
definition of the concept has also served to empty
‘the concept of its value as a precise tool when
applying it to the local context’ (Hermes &
Sandersen 1998:5).
Co-management can be based on a localised coherent
group having responsibility for ‘their’ resources in
co-operation with central state agencies or other
partners. This type of co-management is often based
on a geographical locality and the resources that
occur within this area, and can be termed territorial.
The second type of co-management is based on a co-
operative tradition, where government is co-
operating with functional groups, representing the
fishers, the farmers or hunters (Isaacs & Mohamed
2000). According to Jentoft (1989), co-management
has to include a considerable degree of responsibility
for resource management by the users, not only
token consultations with them by outsiders.
One of the key benefits put forward by the
proponents of co-management is its ability to move
beyond the limitations of either state or community
management (Taylor 1998). For example, lack of
accountability and limited enforcement capacity of
Table 1: The objectives of key partners in co-management initiatives
Partners
Objectives Government NGOs Private sector Local groups
Regulation X
Redistribution X X
Biodiversity conservation X X X
Service provision X X X
Facilitation X X X
Enterprise development X X
and profit
Socio-economic development X X X
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community-based institutions, and limited state
understanding of local conditions – shortcomings
that seriously undermine both state and local-level
environmental management – could be addressed by
combining the knowledges and strengths of various
partners (Lawry 1990; Taylor 1998). Co-management
arrangements thus potentially provide incentives for
a variety of actors and objectives. It can result in
sustainable natural resource use, power sharing for
natural resource management and conservation,
participation of local peoples, legitimacy, and an
opportunity to introduce enterprise-based
partnerships with the private sector (Jentoft 1989;
Berkes 1997; McCay 1998; Brosius et al. 1998;
Uphoff 1998; Hara 1999). Co-management also
requires the development of accountable local
institutions to participate in the management and
distribution of benefits arising from co-management
in an equitable manner.
Recently, a range of criticisms against co-
management has developed around the lack of
community capacity and state willingness to engage
in partnership arrangements such as co-management.
Furthermore, evidence is emerging that local elites
are capturing the action space created by the co-
management paradigm (Isaacs & Mohamed 2000).
Thus, limited capacity within local communities
could result in the usurpation of local needs and
priorities by outside actors in pursuit of their own
goals. Community involvement will thus have to
move beyond coercion and consultation to
participation.
Co-management approaches combine the strengths
of the partner institutions and can result in enhanced
outcomes such as efficient, equitable and sustainable
use of natural resources. It also involves many of the
key governance issues raised above: attempts are
made to develop joint structures of power and
authority, decision making and responsibility for
resource use and allocation. Institutional mechanisms
are being developed to implement joint decisions.
While co-management involves technical management
decisions related to resource use, access and
management, it also incorporates elements of
governance. Has co-management, as displayed in the
two cases, strengthened resource governance? Has it
resulted in desirable outcomes such as efficient,
equitable and sustainable local resource management?
Who has benefited from co-management? In the
following sections the background and governance
aspects of the two cases will be discussed.
Co-management of fisheries
in Malawi
In 1993, the government of Malawi, with the
assistance of a multi-donor funded programme,
piloted a new management regime for regulating the
artisanal fisheries sector in Malawi. The pilot
programme, premised on the principles of co-
management, was initiated in Lake Malombe and the
Upper Shire River, Mangochi District. This project
was called the Participatory Fisheries Management
Programme (PFMP) and aimed ‘to persuade the
fishing community to allow fish stocks to recover’
(Fisheries Department 1993:5) by developing and
enforcing mutually acceptable regulations for
managing the fishery. This management regime was
further extended to the artisanal fisheries sector in
the rest of Malawi through the National Aquatic
Resource Management Programme (NARMAP),
initiated in 1998. The process involved in
establishing a mutually beneficial relationship
between the Fisheries Department and beach village
committees (BVCs), local-level institutions tasked
with fisheries management, provides important
lessons for the prospects of co-management of
natural resources in southern Africa. It is one of the
long-standing examples of co-management in
southern Africa and presents an opportunity to
evaluate whether the benefits claimed for co-
management arrangements are being realised in
practice.
Malawi is a land-locked country. The second largest
inland lake on the African continent, Lake Malawi,
covers 20% of the country’s surface area. In addition
to fishing on Lake Malawi, the fishing industry on a
number of smaller water bodies, such as the Shire
River and Lakes Chiuta, Malombe and Chirwa, has
an equally important role to fulfil in the rural
economy of the country. Ranked in 1993 amongst
the poorest 15 countries in the world, Malawi has a
very high population growth rate and one of the
highest population densities in southern Africa
(GoM 1993). The majority of the population is
dependent on subsistence farming and fisheries
provide a substantial percentage of the animal
protein intake (GoM 1996). A lack of manufacturing
and industrial development in Malawi means that a
large portion of the population is directly dependent
on the natural resources of the region.
Mangochi district, the pilot district for the co-
management initiative and located in the southern
part of Malawi, echoes these statistics. The district
suffers from low agricultural productivity, a lack of
income opportunities and poor health and social
infrastructure. The Mangochi district office of the
Fisheries Department has jurisdiction over the south
eastern arm of Lake Malawi, the Upper Shire River
and Lake Malombe. In Mangochi, fisheries form one
of the major sources of livelihood. Lake Malombe
and the Upper Shire were selected as the pilot areas
because the fishery is primarily artisanal, is highly
co-management as co-governance
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productive and 90% of the fishing units operating in
Lake Malombe were classified as illegal in 1992
(Fisheries Department 1993). Though only 283km2,
Lake Malombe provided 17% of Malawi’s total fish
production (Fisheries Department 1993). The ideas
presented in this paper were drawn primarily from
the experiences of the pilot programme in Lake
Malombe and the Upper Shire River.
Toward fisheries co-management
Mistrust and suspicion characterised the relationship
between state officials and artisanal fishers in the
decades preceding the introduction of co-management
(Hara 2000). Dwindling catches and the collapse of
the key species (Oreochromis spp.) in the late 1980s,
locally known as chambo, prompted the investigation
of alternatives to the centralised fisheries management
systems in place (Fisheries Department 1993).
Several studies were commissioned in the early 1990s
to assess the management options for artisanal
fisheries management in Malawi. It was proposed
that a co-management arrangement, in which the
responsibility and authority for fisheries management
is shared between the government and a local-level
institution, be instituted. With the assistance of
donors, a co-management initiative was launched in
1993, and beach village committees were elected to
represent the interests of fishers. Traditional leaders,
in the form of village headmen or chiefs were
incorporated into the BVCs as ex-officio members.
The gear owners and crew members were the main
target of the co-management programme and were
also elected onto BVCs.
The PFMP hinged on a number of activities aimed at
broadcasting and facilitating the development of co-
management. This includes: policy and legislation;
research, monitoring and extension messages;
community participation; public relations and
extension; licensing; compensation and income-
generating activities and law enforcement (Fisheries
Department 1993). The Extension Unit of the
Fisheries Department was most active in working
with villagers in the establishment of the community
structure, the BVCs, which would be pivotal in the
co-management structure. Fisheries extension officers
are based in the communities to provide assistance to
the BVCs. It is therefore evident that this
management strategy encompassed transformation
of not only the practices, but also the philosophy and
policies of fisheries management in Malawi (Chirwa
1998).
The Fisheries Department approached the villages
located around Lake Malombe and the Upper Shire
with the idea of co-management. It was hoped that
the co-management arrangement would eventually
evolve to a self-regulated system more akin to classic
common property resource management systems.
BVCs were elected to represent the interests of
fishers. This local-level institution, it was hoped,
would enhance the legitimacy of fisheries management
and ensure co-operation with regulations. It would
also act as a negotiator between the fishers and the
department. The BVC members received training
from the Fisheries Deparment, who developed a
training programme with the assistance of donors.
BVC members are elected for a period of two years
after which re-election should take place.
Unfortunately elections have not been held on a
regular basis. In 1998, a Lake Malombe/Upper Shire
River Fisheries Association was formed as an
umbrella body to co-ordinate the inputs of the
various BVCs in Mangochi District. The key
regulatory techniques adopted in the co-management
of the fishery include regulating gear types, adhering
to closed seasons and checking licences.
Table 2: Responsibilities of partners in fisheries co-management, Malawi
Fisheries Department Beach village committees (BVCs)
Key role To conserve and manage fisheries To participate on behalf of fishing
resources in a participatory manner. communities in conservation and
management of the fisheries.
Main functions To orientate existing services towards  To register all users on the beach
facilitating co-management. This  To issue licences and maintain
includes: records of licences issued
 Policy development  To discuss problems with fishers
 Legislation  To enforce fishing regulations and
 Extension services expel members who don’t comply
 Training  To control admission and limit access
 Enforcement  To represent the fishers at higher
 Research forums, such as policy development
 Monitoring and evaluation processes
Source: Mkandawire 1996; Hara 2000
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Joint management forums at which the various role
players are given opportunities to discuss fisheries
management issues occur on an annual basis. At this
forum BVC members are given an opportunity to
input into the development of an annual fisheries
management plan and to review fisheries regulations.
Inter-BVC meetings are also held in the various areas.
The Fisheries Department has also been involved in
developing alternative income-generating activities
in order to decrease the pressure on the fishery.
Support has been provided for small-scale farming,
trading, crafts and other retail activities. The dire
socio-economic circumstances of many of the rural
people in Malawi and the limited production
capacity of fisheries require that alternatives be
investigated. The primary roles of the various
partners in the co-management arrangement are
outlined in Table 2.
In practice, however, fisheries co-management faces
many obstacles. With the extension of this
philosophy to the rest of artisanal fisheries
management in Malawi, it is imperative that these
issues be highlighted. Firstly, the constitution of the
BVCs met with many obstacles. It did not factor in
the existence of the Beach Chairman, an advisor to
the Village Headman, and thus potentially an
important source of legitimacy. However, while
village headmen enjoy support in some villages, in
others they view the BVCs as a threat to their power
base and conflicts have arisen between BVCs and
traditional leaders. Fisheries co-management in
Malawi is essentially focused on a particular user
group – the fishers – but the composition of many
BVCs does not always reflect this. Attempts are
being made to include more crew members and gear
owners and elections were being held in the area
from May to June 2000. In some villages there were
also poor feedback mechanisms between the BVC
and the villagers. However, a major issue for many is
the fact that BVCs are still not legal bodies, despite
numerous calls to grant legal status to them. This can
be very problematic as BVC members are putting
themselves at risk when they confiscate and destroy
undersized nets. Instances have already arisen in
which BVC members, in the process of confiscating
nets, have been involved in altercations with fishers.
A second concern relates to a lack of clarity on the
roles and responsibilities of BVCs, the Fisheries
Department, the donor agency, local enforcement
agents and the Fisheries Association in fisheries
management. The Fisheries Association that would
have originally played a co-ordinating role is also
engaged in enforcement of regulations. Furthermore,
allegations of corruption in the police department
undermine the decisions taken by the BVCs. For
example, a BVC member reported the use of an
undersized net during the closed season to the police
department who subsequently fined the offender
only for using the net and not for fishing in the closed
season. Furthermore, the fines imposed by BVCs are
much more stringent than those of the magistrate,
but the ‘powers’ of the BVC and the Village
Headman in particular to impose fines on offenders
have no legal backing. Underlying this is a lack of
clarity on resource tenure, responsibility and
authority.
A third issue, that of joint decision making, is an issue
that many BVC members feel has not been achieved
yet. They feel that their opinions are not taken into
consideration at annual meetings when fishing
regulations are made. Scientific knowledge is still
privileged and despite the opportunity provided by
annual meetings to voice their concerns, these are
not taken into account. Furthermore, limited
provision for input into fisheries policy amendments
has led to the view that joint decision making has yet
to be put into practice.
The failure to uphold promises of training, sitting
allowances and transport for BVC members has also
hindered the development of joint decision making.
Initial commitments to provide compensation to
fishers who were changing their mesh size were also
not kept. Though a loan scheme was eventually put
in place to assist fishers, this has not made the
development of co-management any easier. The
payment of sitting allowances to BVC members is
also problematic as this weakens the development of
a sense of self-help and ownership of the programme
among the fishers. If the benefits from fisheries co-
management that were initially envisioned had
materialised, that is, paying licence fees to BVCs to
act on behalf of fisher communities, then this
conflict might not have arisen. Villages would then
have been able to provide administrative support to
the BVCs.
Other issues relate to the role of the various donor
agencies in the fisheries programme; the lack of
harmonisation of natural resource policies and the
lack of local ownership of the programme. One
Fisheries Department official criticised the donor-
dependent character of the PFMP and has said that it
was unlikely that the department would be able to
provide adequate training for BVC members
without donor support. It is also doubtful that the
government of Malawi, in view of its current
adherence to a structural adjustment programme,
will be able to contribute to the programme.
There are many advantages to co-management in
Malawian fisheries. There was an overwhelming
consensus amongst the BVCs that relations between
the Fisheries Department and the fishers have
co-management as co-governance
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improved dramatically and fishers feel more
empowered through the BVCs to manage the
resource. However, many of the benefits that should
have accrued from co-management have not yet
materialised. It is clear that there are critical issues
that emerge from the experience of the pilot areas.
Key challenges
Fisheries co-management in Malawi, as in other parts
of southern Africa, is increasingly being promoted as
a management model. It holds great benefit in
reversing the trends of top-down, command and
control approaches that characterised fisheries
management in Malawi. In line with decentralisation
trends observed in governance systems throughout
southern Africa, Malawi has also embarked on
decentralisation processes in several natural resource
departments. Community-based policies and
approaches that involve the establishment of local-
level structures, such as village natural resource
management committees (forestry) and wildlife
management authorities (national parks and wildlife)
are being developed (Trick 2000). However,
contradictions, lack of harmonisation and integration
of natural resource policies and practice also hamper
fisheries co-management (Trick 2000). Key issues
relating to the co-management of fisheries in Malawi
can therefore be of relevance to these sectors as well.
The roles and responsibilities of the various partners
in co-management remain unclear. Tensions are
emerging between the various actors because of this.
There are concerns related to the representivity of
BVCs and the recent elections attempted to involve
more gear owners and crew members in co-managing
the fishery. This could enhance the legitimacy and
authority of BVCs who are faced with the difficult
task of regulating access to the fishery. Joint decision-
making structures, such as the annual meetings, are
still not functioning to the satisfaction of the BVCs.
They feel that their inputs are not counted and that
‘the government has more power and that BVCs are
not fully empowered yet’ (pers. comm., local
villager, Mangochi, 2000).
Co-management of natural resources in Malawi is an
approach that is increasingly being investigated as a
resource management regime. It is an approach that
many feel could work in view of budgetary cuts and
diminishing government support and capacity for
resource management. Local people are being co-
opted into the management of natural resources such
as forests and wildlife. For co-management to
develop, government will have to hand over the
stick. As in many parts of southern Africa,
governments are still not relinquishing enough
power and authority to local-level institutions, such
as BVCs. In reality, the BVCs lack the authority
provided by legal standing to manage their resources.
Strengthening the legal framework for co-
management could thus facilitate the sharing of
authority, decision making and responsibility that




The local communities of the Richtersveld, an area of
South Africa rich in mineral and natural resources,
entered into a contractual agreement with the
National Parks Board (NPB)1 in July 1991. This
agreement was a milestone for the implementation
of new conservation policies and practices. This
biologically rich area, situated in the north-western
corner of the country, had long been earmarked as a
potential conservation area. The mountain desert
environment, with its associated natural endowments,
is said to be the most biologically diverse occurrence
of this particular biome. With substantial support
from the wider conservation community, the NPB
entered into negotiations to establish a contractual
national park in the Richtersveld. In August 1991,
the 162 445ha Richtersveld National Park (RNP)
was proclaimed.
The people of the Richtersveld, a former coloured
rural reserve2 in what is now the Northern Cape,3
South Africa, were subject to not only colonial and
apartheid legislation and development schemes, but
to the exploitation of the region’s mineral wealth by
state and private mining operators. In addition to the
arrival of colonial settlers in the late 19th century, rich
deposits of alluvial diamonds were discovered in the
1920s. While many Richtersvelders were employed
in the mining operations, very few benefits and
improvements were visible in the towns located in
the ‘reserve’. Instead, wealth was siphoned away
from the area to fill distant coffers.
The Richtersveld communal area consists of four
towns, Kuboes and Sanddrif in the north, and
Eksteenfontein and Lekkersing in the south. The
people of the Richtersveld are poor and ‘both
infrastructure and service provision is undeveloped’
(Eco-Africa 1999). Two of the towns were electrified
only in December 1999, but roads remain in poor
condition. By way of contrast, infrastructure is
strongly concentrated around the mining towns of
the region. In addition to employment at the mines
and in distant places like Cape Town, the 5 000 souls
of the Richtersveld depend on the natural resources
of the area for their livelihoods. Livestock farming
forms an important source of livelihoods, but the
mountainous terrain and mining concessions reduce
the amount of land available for grazing. Increased
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pressure is therefore placed on existing grazing lands.
An attempt to privatise the communal grazing land
of the Richtersveld was met with opposition and was
challenged in the Supreme Court in 1989. The
difficulties in establishing the contractual park have
to be seen within the context of this legacy of
mistrust.
Motivation and process for
co-management
Two decades of negotiation preceded the
proclamation of the national park in the
Richtersveld. Vehement opposition from the local
people to the establishment of the park led to a court
interdict at the eleventh hour. Though the park was
to be premised on a contractual model, the
communities were not satisfied with the
compensatory mechanisms, or with many other
conditions set out in the draft agreement with the
local authority. Negotiations had primarily been
taking place between the NPB and the local
authority. At the time, people regarded the local
authority as having ‘sold out’ their interests. The
Parkeweerstandsbeweging (Park Resistance
Movement) was formed to ensure that representatives
from local communities were included in negotiations
around the establishment of the park.
After lengthy negotiations, an agreement was finally
reached in 1991. This agreement addressed
community concerns and culminated in the signing
of a contract between the NPB and the community
of the Richtersveld. The contract agreement
specified a number of conditions for co-management
of the park. The key differences between the 1989
and 1991 agreement are outlined in Table 3.
According to the contractual agreement, a
Management Plan Committee (known by its
Afrikaans acronym BPK) was set up to guide the
management of the park. The park accommodated
the seemingly competing land uses of conservation,
grazing and mining within its borders. Agreements
were reached that existing mining operations could
continue and that local stock farmers would be
accommodated within the park. The farmers were
allowed to graze 6 600 livestock in the park, a figure
that was to be reviewed and tested. South African
National Parks (SANP), successor to the NPB,
would also compensate the stock farmers for the loss
in grazing by providing two farms for their use. The
contribution of the park can be seen in both direct
and indirect benefits for the Richtersvelders
(Participatory Research and Planning 1999).
SANP leases the park land from the community and
the monies are then distributed by the Richtersveld
Community Trust. This charitable trust, which
consists of independent board members, administers
the funds that are primarily spent on educational and
social upliftment programmes in the area. Presently,
approximately 16 residents of the Richtersveld are
employed at the park in both conservation and other
positions. The park has assisted in securing the
services of a social worker for the area. No senior
positions are occupied by Richtersvelders. The
initial fears of the community that stock farming
would be phased out (as proposed in the 1989
agreement, see Table 3), have been allayed and the
farmers who use the grazing land within the park get
assistance and support from SANP. Social ecologists
have also been involved in an arts and crafts project
involving women from the Richtersveld and a
Table 3: Incorporating community considerations in the RNP contractual agreement (Archer et al. 1996)
The Richtersveld National Park contract
Pre-1989 Post-1990
Management structure NPB – with input from an Management Plan Committee with
Advisory Board (no decision-making four members from the NPB and five
powers) appointed by local elected from and by the community –
government. one for each of the villages and one
to represent stock farmers.
 Use of the park Three zones with gradual withdrawal Utilisation of grazing and other natural
of all use within one year. resources remains. Stock numbers
‘Corridor west’ farms as compensation limited to status quo of 1989
for grazing. But
Ceiling of stock numbers to come
down as stock enters the ‘corridor
west’ farms for grazing.
Payment of lease Into coffers of local government. Trust formed. Community members
elect trustees (who are outsiders).
Lease period 99 years 24 years + 6-year notice period
co-management as co-governance
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German-funded programme, TRANSFORM
(Training and Support for Resource Management), is
also actively involved in facilitating sustainable
resource management and eco-tourism in the
Richtersveld. These tangible benefits do not reflect
all the objectives of the contractual agreement, but
are nevertheless important signs that some benefits
have filtered through to the community.
The primary institutional mechanism guiding the co-
management arrangement was the constitution of
the BPK. Four town representatives, a stock farmer
representative and four SANP officials constitute the
BPK. Community representatives are elected on a
biennial basis. The key function of the BPK
representatives is to ensure that the interests of the
Richtersvelders are being met in the management of
the park. However, there have been many problems
with the functioning of the BPK, such as a lack of
active participation in decision making by community
representatives of the BPK, as well as poor feedback
to communities (Participatory Research and
Planning 1995; Reid 2000). BPK representatives have
to attend meetings at their own cost and distances
between the Richtersveld towns are very far. The
poor functioning of the BPK relates both to a lack of
capacity to participate in decision making, as well as
a lack of community interest in the park. The BPK is
seen as an ineffectual committee, but at the same time
community attendance at elections or feedback
meetings is poor. BPK members are known to only
some of the community. Frequent changes in park
management do not facilitate continuity on the side
of SANP and it becomes difficult to build the rapport
required for the BPK to function effectively.
Numerous attempts have been made to strengthen
the capacity of local representatives to participate in
the BPK. Two of the representatives on the BPK told
the researcher that they needed more training,
particularly in scientific knowledge, in order to
participate effectively. One of the key outputs of the
BPK should have been the development of a
management plan which, nine years since the signing
of the agreement, has not been concluded. This is a
critical issue as the tenuous relationship between
conservation, mining and stock farming in the RNP
needs to be guided by sound management guidelines.
As long as these have not been put in place,
transgressions by the resource users cannot be
effectively monitored and rectified along agreed
lines. Research currently being undertaken into the
sustainability of grazing within the park could be
important in kick-starting the development of a
management plan.
The failure of the SANP to deliver on the promises
made during the signing of the agreement and the
concomitant social problems facing the
Richtersvelders, such as unemployment and poor
infrastructure, are other key issues impacting on co-
management. However, many of the promises made
by the SANP were unrealistic and beyond the scope
of a conservation agency (Reid 2000). This has had
serious implications in creating a perception that the
park had not delivered on its promises. Underlying
these issues is a history of tension between the
northern and southern towns of the Richtersveld,
further undermining the smooth functioning of the
park.
In practice therefore, the RNP as it currently stands,
is to some people a ‘paper park’ or as Fakir (1996)
puts it, a ‘compensatory mechanism’ in which
SANP is the key decision maker. The community at
present does not influence the way in which
development in the park takes place. In principle, the
process of SANP-community negotiations should
have led to community-driven co-management of
the RNP. Poor representation of community
interests on the BPK has resulted in the conservation
agency being, in practice, the lead partner. Important
shifts in South African conservation thinking have
stemmed from the RNP, such as the framework for
co-management of conservation areas. But there
have been criticisms that the conditions set out in the
contractual agreement have not been met.
However, in the broader political economy of the
area, there are presently a number of initiatives that
provide an opportunity for restructuring co-
management. These external processes add great
complexity, but also windows of opportunity for
infusing conservation and tourism issues into the
broader development debate of the area.
The future of the co-management initiative hinges
on the development of much stronger links between
the institutions governing conservation, tourism and
development in the Richtersveld. Co-management,
as Hasler (1998) states, is influenced by institutions
and development processes at a number of levels.
Key challenges
The contractual national park holds great benefits
for the Richtersveld. The RNP has increased the
potential of community-based tourism in the area,
generated revenue for the community and provided
some employment opportunities. The RNP was the
first park in South Africa that was established, in its
entirety, on a contractual basis. Since 1991, the
contractual model has been replicated elsewhere.
Broader developments in South Africa that include
paradigm shifts in conservation, an increase in land
claims in and around national parks, and changes
within SANP structure all favour the introduction
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of the co-management model (Cock & Fig 1999;
Wynberg & Kepe 1999).
The vision of the SANP is ‘to acquire and manage a
system of national parks that represents indigenous
wildlife, vegetation, landscape and associated
cultural assets of South Africa’ (Joseph & Parris
2000:19). However, as in other sectors, SANP has
embarked on a process of commercialisation in
which non-core functions, such as lodge development
and service provision, will be outsourced. The
private sector is well placed, in terms of capacity,
skills and capital, to perform non-core functions in
conservation areas. However, contractual parks bind
conservation agencies to identify communities as
key partners in conservation development and the
increasing eco-tourism opportunities that accompany
these. In a market increasingly driven by economic
growth rather than redistributive or ecological
principles, contractual agreements could thus
entrench local involvement in protected area
management. Privatisation is one of the most
important challenges for the Richtersveld case.
The establishment of joint management committees
is a critical step in giving effect to the principles of
contractual parks. There is a need for clarity about
the objectives and responsibility of such committees.
Local representatives have to understand whom,
how and what they are representing. Capacity
building and training should be tied closely to this
process, as limited organisational capacity has also
impacted on joint decision making.
The institutional mechanisms for governing land
and natural resources in the Richtersveld are
currently being negotiated. It is critical that co-
management of the national park be included in this
process. If the BPK or another management
structure is to attain the authority and legitimacy of
a community-based structure, it should become a
part of the current debate. The Richtersveld has not
capitalised fully on the opportunities presented by
co-management of the national park – current
institutional development processes thus offer a way
to address this.
The challenge for co-managing protected areas is for
communities to position themselves to occupy the
action space created by the paradigm shifts in
conservation. A number of processes broadly aimed
at rural restructuring, such as the transfer of
communal lands4 to the Richtersvelders, local
government restructuring, opportunities for
community-based tourism development and
conservation (conservancies) and trans-frontier
conservation initiatives are a few of the processes
currently impacting on the area. Moreover, a
pioneering court case, in which the Richtersvelders
have instituted a claim against a state-owned mining
company, is currently underway. The strengthened
proprietorship of the Richtersvelders will require
the development of institutions to control access and
use of the land. This could be a unique opportunity
to ensure that the national park, which remains an
important asset for the Richtersveld, can be linked to




In relation to the three governance issues discussed
above, that is, the process of establishing local
structures to share responsibility, authority and
decision making, neither of the two co-management
cases display meaningful power sharing yet. Despite
the differences in the nature and history of the co-
management arrangements, the Richtersveld being
largely territorial and Mangochi being largely
functional in nature, the considerable resources
committed to these two initiatives have not resulted
in fundamental shifts in power. This relates to the
difficulty in reconciling the diverging motivations of
the key partners, relinquishing power to local groups
and capacity constraints. The approach adopted in
the two co-management initiatives present glaring
similarities that could provide important guidelines
to partnership models of resource governance in the
region.
In both instances, the key motivation of the state
partner for entering into co-management was the
conservation and management of natural resources.
They were both the initiators of the co-management
arrangement. Both state partners made unrealistic
promises at the outset of the arrangement. A history
of poor relations with local groups and limited
experience with participatory management regimes
characterised the state partners. The motivations of
the two local groups on the other hand are strongly
linked to securing access to resources that were
important in local livelihoods – grazing land and
fisheries. While the motivations of the Richtersvelders
had a strong land rights basis, access to a healthy fish
resource for socio-economic well-being was the
primary motivating factor for the fishers in Malawi
to enter into co-management. At the outset of these
two initiatives, expectations of remuneration were
raised amongst local representatives. Remunerating
representatives on local structures has been an issue
discussed in both the cases. It illustrates the lack of
ownership of the programme and also the need to
increase the stake of local partners in co-
management.
The state partners in both cases showed very little
willingness initially to share real power with the
co-management as co-governance
48
contested resources: challenges to the governance of natural resources in southern Africa
local groups and participation was seen as a means to
achieve their goals of resource conservation and not
as a political or governance process. As in the case of
decentralisation initiatives in other parts of the
world, these co-management approaches ‘do not
show enough awareness of the very process of
disempowerment of communities and usurpation of
community resources by the state, even when the
reversal of the same process is supposed to be the goal
of devolution efforts’ (Jodha & Bhatia 1998:4).
Several years later, the policies of state agencies in
both conservation in South Africa and fisheries in
Malawi have changed dramatically. While
participatory approaches such as co-management are
now virtually entrenched across the region, the
willingness of the state to relinquish power still
remains in doubt. As Chirwa (1998:61) comments on
the co-management of fisheries in Malawi:
...the initiative to institute the co-management
arrangements did not come from the fishing
community in the area. Instead, it came from the
Fisheries Department (FD), donor agencies and
other external stakeholders. As a result, the
philosophical bases of the programme have not
taken root.
The governance components of co-management
investigated in both cases relate to the sharing of
responsibility, decision-making and authority for
resource management. The process of developing
institutional mechanisms to implement the new
management regime proceeded in a similar manner.
New institutional structures (BVCs and BPK) and
policies were developed to facilitate joint management
of the resource. Uncertainty about the particular
responsibilities of the local representatives and
structures still persists. According to Symes (1997:5)
‘the roles and responsibilities ascribed to user groups
[in co-management] should be clear, specific [and]
substantive’. The legitimacy of the institutions in the
Richtersveld at the time were questionable due to
their link with apartheid governance structures, and
traditional systems of governance in Malawi should
have been investigated more intensively (Hara 2000).
Capacity constraints and the low legitimacy and
authority status still exist within the two local
structures.
The process of decision making also displays clearly
that the knowledge and inputs of scientists and
experts are still valued above that of local groups.
This makes local representatives in both cases feel ill-
equipped to participate in joint decision making. In
the establishment of these two co-management
regimes of governance, it was envisioned that a
relationship would be established between the two
partners in which meaningful power-sharing would
take place. In this sense, the authority and
responsibility for local resource management would
be shared. Writing on local resource management,
Murphree (2000:4) states that:
Authority and responsibility should be linked.
When they are de-linked and assigned to
different institutional actors, both are eroded.
Authority without responsibility becomes
meaningless or obstructive; responsibility without
authority lacks the necessary components for its
efficient exercise.
Participants in both co-management initiatives listed
good relations, trust and respect as the primary
benefits that they have derived thus far. Furthermore,
co-management in both cases has broadened
livelihood opportunities in the areas, by way of the
increased community-based conservation and tourism
opportunities in the Richtersveld and alternative
income-generating activities in Malawi. While
conservation objectives have been met in the
Richtersveld, the chambo fishery in Malawi has
never recovered in the pilot area. Fish catches have
fluctuated, but the dramatic collapse that occurred in
the chambo fishery has not occurred in the rest of the
fishery . While these are certainly desirable outcomes
for the state partners in both cases, many of the key
outcomes relating to local participation, benefits and
ownership have not yet materialised.
I concur with Jodha and Bhatia (1998) that rebuilding
community stakes in resource management,
increasing local control and using local knowledge
and perspectives can make CBNRM more relevant
to local groups. The institutional frameworks for co-
management are located within the stark realities of
much of rural southern Africa – insecure tenure,
limited resources and economic opportunities and
poor infrastructure. Institutional frameworks for co-
management are also being formulated in a context
in which local-level social organisation has been
altered by the colonialist history that the majority of
the countries in the region share. From these two
long-standing cases, it is clear that what counts for co-
management today clearly does not reflect the
aspects of governance discussed in this paper. In view
of the considerable resources committed in these two
cases, it is debatable whether the willingness and
capacity required to develop co-governance regimes
in southern Africa exists. The increasing reliance on
the inputs of donor agencies and the private sector in
CBNRM pose further challenges for the efficiency,
sustainability and equitability of co-management
initiatives.
Conclusion
The move towards privatisation and market
liberalisation across the southern African region
confirms that the private sector is increasingly
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becoming involved in economic development
programmes linked to the utilisation of the rich
natural resource base in communal areas. While this
approach potentially holds benefits for local groups,
critical questions are emerging, such as how to
reconcile short-term priorities of the private sector
(for example, profit generation) with local benefits
and goals related to sustainable natural resource use,
justice and equity. The experiences from Malawi and
South Africa discussed here clearly indicate that joint
governance regimes such as co-management have yet
to successfully combine the strengths of state and
local resource governance systems.
A suite of international and national laws, policies
and programmes have created a space for the
development of co-management of natural resources,
as well as natural resource-based enterprises and
industries. Key questions remain. How do we
develop a legal and institutional framework for
community-based co-management? How do we
translate natural resource policies, management
structures and laws into a system that addresses the
key resource governance issues, such as secure
resource tenure, in southern Africa? It is only by
responding to these questions that co-management
could begin to resemble a system of co-governance in
which outcomes such as local participation, joint
power-sharing and sustainable local resource
management can be achieved.
1The National Parks Board was renamed South
African National Parks (SANP) in 1996.
2This refers to land set aside under apartheid
legislation for occupation by people classified
‘coloured’ by the government of the time.
3The Northern Cape province came into being in
1994.
4The Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs,
according to the Transformation of Certain Rural
Areas Act 94 of 1998, will transfer the land of the
‘coloured’ rural ‘reserves’ to the local municipality
or a legal entity. This Act applies specifically to
‘coloured’ rural areas in South Africa and not the
former ‘homeland’ areas.
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Sharing products or power?
Intentions, meanings and
approaches to community
involvement in forest management
in East and Southern Africa
LIZ ALDEN WILY
Abstract
As is the case more widely on the continent and
beyond, forest administrations in east and southern
Africa are finding it necessary to directly involve
forest-local communities to secure the forests and to
halt their degradation and loss. This and related
strategic changes are being expressed in a wave of
new national forest policies and laws. Helpfully, an
important source of guidance derives not from
theoretical considerations, but from the accumulating
experience of field initiatives – practice that will be
further shaped by the dictates of new policy and
especially law.
This paper provides an overview of changing forest-
people relations in the region as evidenced in both
main projects and new forest law. Two main
paradigms are identified: one which is founded upon
a view of local communities as primarily user
beneficiaries co-operands of improved forest
management, and another which seeks to involve
them as actors in management, endowing them with
varying degrees of power to determine and regulate
the forest themselves.
Using the case of Tanzania as main example, it is
argued that the latter power-sharing paradigm is
altogether more transformatory of conventional
resource management, and more likely to prove
effective. It is suggested that this devolutionary
approach will increasingly become the strategy of
choice, prompted in part by concurrent increase in
the right of local people to secure local land
resources, including forests, as their own, and as
widespread moves towards decentralised governance
take place. Although still very new, a trend towards
community forest owner-management is emerging.
This suggests a more definitively community-based
forest future than envisaged a decade past and the
promise of democratisation in this and related
spheres.
The democratising context
As is the case elsewhere on the continent and
beyond, ordinary rural citizens living within or next
to forests in eastern and southern Africa (hereafter
‘the region’) are being afforded opportunities to
participate directly in the processes of retaining and
sustaining forests in ways not envisaged a mere
decade past (FAO 2000).
This arises out of concern that forests (which in the
region are mainly woodlands) have continued to
dwindle in all but a few states and the pervasive
conclusion is that radical alteration in strategy is
required to stem the trend and to place those forests
that remain under secure and effective management.
Everywhere the response has been towards greater
participation of civil society, variously to the private
sector and to non-governmental organisations, but
most profoundly, to the key target group of citizens
in respect of these resources – forest-local
communities (Alden Wily 2000a).
In a sector that has fully embraced the command and
control approaches so characteristic of 20th century
transformation, this shift of necessity involves
release of powers from the state, or more specifically
from the ubiquitous central government forestry
department. It is hesitant and still uneven steps
towards this that centres a wave of forest law reform
in the region at this time. These gain from wider
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forces of devolution and consequent adjustment in
the roles of state, as being embedded in a comparable
wave of constitutional and other sectoral law reform
(Alden Wily 2000b).
Two threads are of special relevance here. First, is the
beginnings of a new wave of decentralisation, setting
up elected local councils where they have not existed
before (Lesotho, South Africa and Rwanda), or
where they have been in place for some time, moves
to extend democratic governance to more grassroots
levels (Uganda, Zimbabwe and Swaziland). The
impetus this gives to community level socio-
institutional formation will emerge as acutely
pertinent to the discussion of this paper.
Of comparable importance to forests and
communities are shifts in the land relations rural
citizens hold with the state, through widespread land
reform, still in early implementation (Toulmin &
Quan 2000; Alden Wily 2000a). Decentralisation of
tenure administration is itself a common thrust of
these developments and influential upon the
parameters of forest reform.
The more influential tenure change is in the
common commitment to secure the occupancy of
those millions of citizens in the region who hold
their property in customary or other informal and
unregistered ways. Although officially still limited
to a handful of states (Uganda, Tanzania and
Mozambique), customary tenure systems are
gaining, for the first time in a century, direct
recognition as legal regimes in their own right (Alden
Wily 2000c). Inter alia, the customary capacity to
hold land (such as forests) in common is seeing new
support, including the opportunity to be registrable
entitlements as group-owned private property.
Elsewhere I have shown how the absence of such
commonhold tenure directly facilitated the removal
of vast areas of natural forest from people to state
during the twentieth century, a process upon which
there is now increasing legal constraint (Alden Wily
& Mbaya in press).
What the above bespeak are shifts in the balance of
power in state-people relations – and broadly to the
benefit of the latter.
This point should be kept in mind, for this is by no
means always the intention of moves to involve
communities in forest management, or a welcome
development for officialdom where it occurs.
Arguably, the more influential context to date has
been one that provides for local participation as a
means of securing local co-operation to retained
government forest management. Intentions to
devolve powers or to alter the tenurial conditions
upon which jurisdiction is founded often could not
be further from the strategic thinking upon which
early efforts toward participation are launched.
There have been exceptions. However, the
dominant paradigm has been one which is willing to
share use rights or income from a forest with local
people but not authority or ownership.
In some cases, this is but a reflection of time-old
reluctance of bureaucracies to share power;
particularly with a sector of society which
predominantly comprises remote rural poor. This
sector is not well-rooted institutionally and
therefore not easily made accountable, and its
capacity to manage resources has been unevenly
demonstrated. In other cases, truncation in
devolution of forest management is seen in the view
of forest-local communities as being concerned only
with immediate livelihood returns and therefore
with the products and benefits forests may yield.
These are citizens, it is premised, who are so poor
and so forest-product dependent that they could not
possibly be concerned with the tenurial status of the
forest or its long-term future, or their own right,
power and opportunity to determine this.
Such positions gain encouragement from the
livelihood-justified developments of early community
participation, especially in India where only local
persons who actively depended upon the forest were
involved and certain access made legal in return for
co-operation and sometimes fulfilment of protection
tasks (Alden Wily & Mbaya in press).
Whilst livelihood is very properly the major concern
of transformation in forest management as in other
spheres, there are clear signs of a more nuanced
approach as to how local forest-related dependence
may be most sustainably rooted. Ultimately this
requires attention about where and how control
over the resource itself is vested, and from which
resolution and rationalisation of local use more
satisfactorily proceeds.
Accordingly, in Asia, for example, greater attention
to power-sharing marks the emerging parameters of
community forestry in China, Vietnam, Philippines,
Laos (Enters et al. 2000) and perhaps most
surprisingly, Indonesia, where about three-quarters
of the country was appropriated as state forest land
in the 1970s (Wollenberg & Kartodihardjo 2000).
Demands towards greater power-sharing characterise
current critique of developments in Nepal and
especially India (Shrestra 1999; Kumar 2000).
Awareness of the shortfalls of ‘shared management’
where benefits, rather than authority, is being
shared, is similarly beginning to appear in western
Africa, where failure to endow communities with
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the level of powers they need to manage resources is
beginning to be perceived as frustrating real
improvement (Hesse & Trench 2000). Conferences
and documentation on ‘decentralisation and
devolution of forest management’ illustrate these
shifts.
Further, out of these developments, greater
attention of necessity is being paid to the
composition of forest-local populations and to the
troublesome but critical question of the institutional
and socio-legal personality of community. For with
devolution comes the question as to whom power is
being devolved, within what context and with what
measure of accountability – a recurrent problematic
of this paper.
In eastern and southern Africa, benefit-sharing
approaches received a special thrust from the
powerful wildlife-centred programmes of southern
Africa, and from the catalytic Communal Areas
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
(Campfire) programme of Zimbabwe in particular.
The starting point of this, and subsequent initiatives
in Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and
Mozambique, has been to draw down to dissatisfied
local populations at least some share of profits being
made by mainly non-local residents, through their
access to local woodlands and their wildlife
(Vudzijena 1998; Filimao et al. 2000). Whilst
alteration of the tenurial and jurisdictional
frameworks within which this has been able to occur
were not initially part of the plan, over time, it is just
such concerns which have begun to permeate; their
absence hints at souring these initiatives (Campbell
et al. 1999; Katerere et al. 1999).
This is not to say that benefit-sharing projects in the
region are not highly beneficial to forest-local
communities. Through the introduction of tourists,
hunters or timber concessions into the area, local
incomes may indeed rise. However, what is
occurring in these cases is not participation in forest
management but in forest benefit (or access).
Although respect for local needs is heightened in
management and consultation may occur, core
decision making itself continues to be made by
forestry departments or the agencies to which they
have devolved their powers.
There are other concerns that arise in the user-
centric, benefit-sharing approach, which will be
illustrated in this paper. A significant drop in the
costs of management (a critical objective for most
African governments) does not usually occur, and
may even rise, as foresters add the task of supervising
local use or benefit-sharing to their workload. The
project itself may be costly to initiate and sustain.
The source of benefit-sharing may emerge as less
stable than anticipated, particularly where it is
premised upon tourism.
The tangible return to the community may be less
than anticipated, and given that its support is
premised and measured in those terms, local
commitment may be undermined. A tug of war over
the share of resources may evolve, and over-use to
meet the escalating ‘needs’ of the local partner may
threaten sustainability. With only immediate
benefits on offer, and their custodial interests denied,
the incentive for a longer-term perspective to the
forest’s future may be foregone by communities.
Where benefits are considerable, state commitment
to local interest may give way to the greater benefit
to be gained by allocating those rights to commercial
interests. And, of course, where the community’s
role is fashioned around their role as users, not
guardians or managers, the approach does not easily
apply to that multitude of forests which, for reasons
of degradation or biodiversity, should see dramatically
reduced use or closure to all use. It is not surprising
therefore that ‘joint forest management’, such as it is,
has tended to be limited to those forests which are
not valuable for their timber nor their biodiversity,
or which are too threatened or too precious to be
managed by local populations. This has been the case
from Nepal to the Cameroon, from Mozambique to
China.
The task of this paper is less to expose such shortfalls
of the product-centred paradigm than to explore
how, in eastern and southern Africa, this approach is
giving way to a more profound concern to alter the
jurisdictional foundations upon which forest-local
participation is based, and through which local
livelihood concerns – always of critical importance –
may themselves be more securely rooted and
community-driven.
Just as important, relocation of product-sharing into
a power-sharing paradigm widens to the arena for
local-level interest beyond immediate users to those
who have interests in the survival of the forest in
ways less tangibly defined by either its wood or non-
wood product values. These are local people who
need the forest for social-environmental reasons as
much as for direct product support, and who fear its
loss less for the loss of wood and non-wood products
than for the loss of catchment function the forest
provides, the buffer role it may serve between
communities, or the space it provides for sacred
rituals or recreation. A narrow focus upon product
use may thus disable the community-centred rather
than user group-centred interests needed to regulate
local use in the least contentious ways.
Sharing products or power?
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Below the current and changing positioning of
community involvement in forest future is (of
necessity, very cursorily) outlined as evidenced from
both new law and new practice in a handful of




We may begin in the south of the continent with
South Africa – a fortunate choice in that it amply
illustrates the interconnectedness of land, government
and forest reform, and in this case, the particular
frustrations caused by long-standing absence of
accessible democratic local government. This is only
now beginning to be provided, and in ways which
fall well short of providing the kind of frameworks
needed to catalyse and embed resource or other
grassroot governance systems. South Africa also
provides a clear example of shifting strategies to
forest management, including re-centring of
‘participation’ to imply a good deal more than
sharing access and benefits with local populations.
Devolutionary forest management is driven at this
time primarily by the post-apartheid land reform
programme, and in particular by its commitment to
restore lands lost through racially-discriminatory
laws (Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994,
Constitution, 1996, White Paper on South African
Land Policy, 1997). Much of South Africa’s
expansive (±30 million ha) forest estate is held under
private and state tenure, variously subject to claims.
The National Forests Act, 1998 accordingly provides
for communities to apply to, or to be invited to
apply, to manage a state forest or ‘any other
protected forest area’, jointly with an organ of state,
or alone, albeit largely on terms determined by the
state (s29–31). This moves some distance from the
hope expressed two years earlier in the 1996 Forest
Policy that communities would abandon their claims
in return for cash compensation.
With each passing year, the need to find workable
mechanisms through which forests may be divested
and safely managed becomes more urgent. Interest in
the new construct of communal property associations
(1996) has given way to recognition that less
complicated and community-initiated frameworks
are required (Grundy in Alden Wily & Mbaya in
press). This is frustrated, however, by weak and
conflicting local level organisation through years of
demise, and emerging new conflict with revived
tribal authorities and incipient rural councils
(Ntsebeza 1999).
Uncertainty and change thus characterises the
handful of state-people agreements under way. This
is illustrated in the case of the natural forest reserves
of Dwesa/Cwebe in the Eastern Cape. Recent
intentions to set up a trust through which
community access and benefit could be managed
have given way to yet more recent intentions to help
the community devise management over these
forests, almost certainly to be returned to their
custody (Grundy in Alden Wily & Mbaya in press).
Meanwhile, the Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry (DWAF) is apparently accelerating
privatisation of at least the commercial estates to
investors, on terms which protect their leases from
cancellation in the event of change of ownership.
Over a quarter of the total forest/woodland resource
falls within ex-homelands and trust land. Uncertainty
as to whom these lands will ultimately be divested
(people directly or tribal authorities) impedes action.
Tenure decisions themselves are greatly frustrated by
conflicting loyalties and claims within the community
(Cousins 2000).
Lesotho
The devolutionary intent of Lesotho’s new National
Forestry Policy, 1997 and Forestry Act, 1999 is
striking and, on the surface, simpler. A declared
principle is to locate the future of both planted and
natural forests in the hands of individuals,
communities and co-operatives. With the
commencement of the law, the multitude of tiny
forests, woodlots and bushlands reserved as liremo
and matsema by chiefs, entered a new class of
designated forest – ‘community forests’ (s17).
Even those reserves held by the state are to be
divested, through agreements which allow the Chief
Forestry Officer to reclaim the reserve should the
agreement be breached materially (s11). Again, these
are generally small in size, amounting to no more
than 10 000ha, and originally planted with
community labour (Chakela 1999).
Designation of private forests out of private land,
long encouraged in forest legislation throughout the
continent, receives extra encouragement in Lesotho’s
new law, with assurance that both the land and trees
will be held to be private property and subject to
private control (s17). These are helpful provisions in
circumstances where constitutional and land laws are
in conflict as to where title over customary property
lies (Alden Wily & Mbaya in press). Failure to
resolve conflicting loyalties to state and king have
dogged land relations for some years, exacerbated by
weak administration, issues which have now been
posted to yet another Land Commission to deal
with.
In principle, local-level powers to manage forests in
justiciable ways has also been recently enhanced with
the passage of the Local Government Act, 1996,
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which creates elected village governments, drawing
in part upon a tradition of village development
committees. In practice, this development is not yet
implemented and the level of powers they will attain
uncertain given contradictory traditional authority
in the several of the same spheres.
Namibia
Namibia has been drafting a new National Forestry
Policy and Bill since 1998, to be read in Parliament
before the end of 2000. Over this period the
substance has shifted, from an early focus upon the
creation of new state and regional forests, to creation
of community forests and the abandonment of the
class of regional forests (Shidewa 2000).
Once again, new land policy (1998) and debate
surrounding tenure issues has exerted influence upon
the rights of communities to woodland resources.
Not least, this comes from growing recognition that
lands out of which new government reserves might
be created are, more properly, already owned, albeit
held customarily (Alden Wily 2000c).
Field practice has also had an effect. Both have been
realised in the recent establishment of two
community forests made out of two of the four vast
woodlands in the northern communal lands,
originally surveyed to become state forests. Now,
the Forest Bill is emphatic that the minister may not
create state forests until he is satisfied that ‘effective
management cannot be achieved through
management of that communal land as a community
forest’ (clause 13(2)).
However, at least in the penultimate versions of the
proposed law, provisions for community forests
remain limited. Although intended to be community-
owned, the meaning of this remains ambivalent for
as long the state continues to be the owner of
communal lands, as is the case under the
Constitution (1990, Schedule 5(1)). The intention of
the Communal Land Reform Bill, 2000 to open local
commons to individual entitlement also threatens
local forest tenure security. Although rejected by
Parliament, this bill is being redrafted. It may be
optimistic to think that Namibia will follow the
innovative lead of Tanzania, Uganda and
Mozambique by providing for registrable customary
commonhold entitlements in the resubmitted bill.
Provision for local management is also limited.
Management associations, which need not necessarily
include local representatives, may manage the
community forest on their behalf (clause 15). The
emphasis is upon the community receiving rights to
use the area. Critical management powers, such as
the capacity to issue permits, apply fines or sanctions
upon illegal users, appear not to be vested in
community committees but in government-appointed
honorary foresters and headmen (clause 8). Nor is
there any provision for forest-local communities to
be involved in the management of state forests,
beyond needing to be consulted prior to the
preparation of management plans for those areas
(clause 12).
Pilot practice thus far mirrors (and may have
influenced) these limitations. It is the Honorary
Forester rather than the Ontanda Community
Forest Village Committee, for example, who patrols
the forest and may issue permits whilst the
committee is responsible for mobilising a lengthy list
of public works associated not only with the forest,
but on-farm developments as well (Shidewa 2000).
Numerous foresters advise and the whole is
underwritten by a substantial donor-funded project
which may be difficult to sustain. Still, this and two
other donor-supported initiatives (Okongo
Community Forest development, Oskani
Community Woodlot Project) are new, and likely to
evolve fairly quickly into more community-centred
arrangements as the need to make community-based
operations more community-driven come quickly to
roost.
Mozambique
Mozambique has an invaluable natural forest
resource of at least 30 million ha, but one where
overlapping rights frequently exist, complicating
definition of ownership rights and potential
management powers over forests. This arises from
extensive population dislocation from years of civil
war. Even major reserves like the 196 000ha
Mecuburi Forest Reserve are now occupied by
thousands of people, whom the state is unwilling to
evict (Mushove in Alden Wily & Mbaya in press).
Community organisation has also been badly
affected. Traditional leaders may vie with each other
and with politico-administrators sent by the central
state (McGregor 1997). Elected local government
does not exist outside municipal areas.
The situation is now complicated by the issue of
concessions and leases for timber extraction,
hunting, safari and agricultural enterprise. Local
inhabitants have rarely been consulted as to this de
facto reallocation of their commons (Kloeck-Jenson
1999).
These factors combine to undermine the intention of
Mozambique’s new Reform Land Law, 1997 to
recognise customary land rights and to encourage the
recording of these rights. A main task of regulations
under the Act (1998, 1999) has been to ease the
passage towards this, but with more development
clearly still needed.
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The Forest and Wildlife Act 1999 has not
significantly facilitated this development in respect
of forest land, although this is being addressed. The
law itself is perceptibly more concerned to promote
and regulate the still-burgeoning concessionaire
culture. No strategy is advanced for harnessing the
thousands of communities located in forested areas as
a conservation and management force.
The law does, however, make improvement in the
potential of forest-local populations as forest owners,
managers and users. Although they have no power to
halt the issue of licences or concessions, they must
now be consulted prior to issue (article 17).
Communities may themselves apply for permits and
enter concession contracts of up to 50 years (articles
15 and 16), an unlikely event given better-funded
competition from the private sector.
More usefully, communities may now secure some
forests as their own through the introduction of a
new class of protected forest, ‘areas of historical and
cultural value’ (article 10). However, these may only
be created and used for social and subsistence
purposes (articles 1 and 13). The state may also
delegate its forest management powers to ‘local
communities, associations or the private sector’
(article 33). Local resource management councils
may be created to ensure that there will be local
participation ‘in the exploitation of resources and in
the benefits generated through such utilisation’
(article 31).
This mandate reflects the dominant perspective of
local populations as beneficiaries in mainly private
sector enterprise, rather than as forest managers in
their own right. This was the hallmark of the first
wave of community projects in the mid-1990s,
building directly upon the revenue-sharing Campfire
programme (Filimao et al. 2000). Accordingly,
Tchuma-Tchato, the heavily-funded flagship
programme, set out to secure a share of the revenue
being garnered by a licenced safari operator. This
was achieved through a tax-sharing agreement
between community, operator and government.
The project has since extended into the Daque area
and exists alongside a handful of other benefit-
sharing initiatives (Mushove 2000). Issues of
sustainability afflict these programmes, given the
instability of the tourist market which underpins
them, and the often-expensive administrations
established to support them (Filimao et al. 2000;
Negrao 1998). Nonetheless, creation of local
committees has increased local interest to secure the
resource as their own (Filimao et al. 2000).
Of the 20 or so forest management projects now
operating in Mozambique, only the more recent seek
to involve local communities more fully in
management roles. This is the case, for example, in
the Food and Agriculture Organisation/Dutch-
funded programme to assist residents of the
unreserved Narini woodlands and the reserved
Mecuburi Forest to respectively establish community-
based and partnership management regimes (Mushove
in Alden Wily & Mbaya in press). Even more
forcefully, it is the case in the Chipanje Chetu
Project in the north of the country, helping
occupants of a 400 000ha woodland put village-based
forest management in place (Anstey 2000).
In such efforts, difficulty with the weakness of local-
level organisation impedes success. In borrowing
from the village-based forest management strategies
of neighbouring Tanzania, Chipanje Chetu, for
example, has been unable to access or devise
community rules which have the same legally-
binding effect as Tanzania’s village by-laws
(described later). Nonetheless, such efforts break
new ground, identify institutional and legal needs
more clearly, and are serving to slowly relocate
forest management interests towards more locally-
based regimes.
Malawi
A clearer strategic orientation towards community
interests is given in Malawi’s National Forest Policy,
1996 and subsequent Forestry Act, 1997 towards
facilitating access to forest resources. To realise this
however, the law promotes ‘the communal and
individual ownership of forests and forest resources’
(Policy:2.2.1–2.2.3). No competing role is given to
the commercial sector.
Local ownership is to be restricted to the poorer,
unreserved forest patches and woodlands of
customary lands, those forests which the state has
not already declared to be reserves. Creation of
village forest areas is not new, but builds upon a
tradition begun some 80 years ago, when headmen
were directed to demarcate and manage such areas,
and allegedly did so successfully up until their
relocation into the hands of new district councils in
the 1960s (Dubois & Luwore 2000).
Now this construct is being revived with helpful new
assurance that the forest will be community-
managed and the land community-owned (s30). This
is important in an environment where land policy
and law has seen customary lands steadily diminish
under mainly leasehold tenure, prominently
absorbing commons in unaccountable ways (Alden
Wily 2000c). Still, exactly what is meant by
‘community-owned’ is again, like Namibia, unclear,
awaiting finalisation of new tenure policy and law.
Drafts of the former (GoM 2000) do not yet offer a
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commonhold option and favour vesting customary
lands in headmen, albeit strictly in trust, not as an
estate private. This is designed to inhibit the
tendency of customary authority to confuse the
boundaries of customary jurisdiction with customary
tenure. This has been a common problem in the
region, prompted in part as resistance against the
reallocation of communal lands by state agencies
into freehold and leasehold tenure. In the interim,
the formation of village trusts, through which group-
held property such as forests might be secured, has
been considered by some development projects
(Dubois & Luwore 2000).
No opportunity is afforded communities to retrieve
forest reserves, nor to be designated their manager
(s21). They may be party to state management
through agreements, the terms of which the Director
controls (s25). This includes possible access to bare
areas of reserves for planting and their right to freely
dispose of the produce offered (s36–37). Contrarily,
the draft National Land Policy strongly eschews
even this limited right (GoM 2000).
Limitation of local involvement in respect of
reserves is clear in the case of Chimaliro Forest
Reserve, the first such initiative. Three adjacent
communities have informal permission to extract
minor products and graze livestock in blocks
amounting to only 400 of the 16 000ha estate. Rights
to harvest wood are excluded (Dubois & Luwore
2000). In return, the communities patrol against
encroachers, maintain fire breaks and carry out
approved early burning; typical arrangements of
many so-named co-management projects in the
region at this time where, in reality, local decision
making has no role.
The Forestry Act, 1997 provides for village natural
resource management committees as the approved
institution of unreserved forest management. These
may source funds but lack legal person status (s3).
They may make rules but subject to the approval of
the Minister, who retains regulatory powers and
determines the sharing of costs and benefits between
his department and the committee (s32–33; 74). It has
taken three years for the first project to seek approval
for minor rules (the South African Development
Community-funded Mwanza Project) (Mauambeta
2000). Facilitating and, perhaps, through experience,
easing such processes, will be the task of the new
United States Agency for International
Developmemt-funded Compass programme,
mandated to enhance government and NGO
capacity to support community-based natural
resource management in 27 districts (Commons
Southern Africa 2000).
Zambia
A literal approach to joint forest management
characterises developments in Zambia, aptly
illustrated in ungazetted Chinyunyu Forest near
Lusaka, where communities patrol against illegal
immigrants and charcoal burners at the directive of
the local headman, but report offenders to the
Forestry Department (Lukama 2000). Lack of
community authority to actually regulate access
characterises other small initiatives.
A rather different development operates over nearly
1 million ha of intact woodland in North Western
Province. Whilst described as joint management, this
Muzama programme does not in fact involve
communities in forest management, but has created
a substantial support framework for international
marketing of honey and wood products by some 70
local licenced user groups (Uchi Makula Trust 2000).
In 1999 the Forestry Department did not renew the
licences for pit-sawing; instead it advertised the area
as being available for commercial logging. The forest
lost the stewardship certification upon which
international trading was premised, leading to the
collapse of incomes and heated protest, a dispute
which remains unresolved a year later. A much
smaller project has been launched in Chiulukile
Forest in Eastern Province.
Both initiatives may now fail. It is tempting to
conclude that had either sought to entrench
community management roles and rights in the
forest (and ideally local ownership of these still
unreserved areas), a rather different outcome might
have resulted.
In practice, securing tenure of unreserved forests is
not easy in Zambia where the Land Act, 1995
provides no avenue for acknowledged customary
rights to be secured, other than through individual
leasehold entitlement.
Nor does the new Forests Act, 1999 provide for
community forests, a mechanism through which
local custodianship could be entrenched. There is
considerable constraint on the extent to which
communities may actually manage forests, including
even those they may consider their own and denoted
as such in the law as ‘open areas’ (unreserved). No
opportunity is availed for local participation in the
management of the important category of state
forests. Even in respect of local forests and
unreserved woodlands, local management is to be
expressed through joint management committees,
more notable for their prescribed representation of
central government bodies, local government, tribal
authorities and licencees than for the token
representation of local people (s26). Once formed,
the committee may apply to have part of a local
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forest or open area declared a Joint Forest
Management Area (JFMA).
The committee may ‘hear submissions’ from
communities in drafting the management plan for
the JFMA (s31), which will be subject to the approval
of the proposed Forest Commission (s32). Whilst, in
principle, formal agreement between the Commission
and a committee could endow substantial
management responsibilities upon the latter,
sections dealing with the issue of licences, collection
and use of revenue, and apprehension of offenders do
not suggest this is likely. The more powerful clauses
embed control in the hands of the proposed Forestry
Commission, the creation of which is undoubtedly
the main purpose of the new law.
Kenya
This will also be the main preoccupation of
implementation of Kenya’s Forest Bill, 2000, should
it be enacted as planned. Ownership of all state
forests is to be vested in the proposed Kenya Forest
Service, as a way of removing authority over these
lands from the Commissioner of Lands who has in
recent decades excised a great many areas from
reserves, and decreasingly for other public purposes
(Alden Wily & Mbaya in press). Local forests are to
be vested directly in county councils which already
hold these and other trust land areas in trust for
inhabitants. No provision at all is made for creation
of community forests out of either the millions of
hectares of unreserved woodlands in Kenya, or
through divestment of already reserved areas.
Nonetheless, through three iterations, the final
version of the Forests Bill provides for local people
to take on management responsibility for any forest
in the country (clause 45). This may be achieved only
through formation of a forest association, which
may then ‘apply to the Chief Conservator for
permission to participate in the conservation and
management of the forest’ (clause 45(2)). How a
forest association is to be constituted is not
described, other than providing that any person/s
may form one as long as they live within 5km of a
forest edge (clause 3). Such provisions as given
indicate their character as NGOs, likely to be formed
by local elites which have the means to register such
organisations. Unfortunately, in spite of ample
evidence of the importance in Kenya (as elsewhere)
of involving all members of (only) those villages
which directly border the forest in its management,
these bodies have no obligation to involve such
persons. Local communities may well find
themselves excluded in any real sense.
Kenya has very little in the way of field pilots upon
which to build genuine community-participation
processes in the law; those it has point clearly to the
kind of tenurial and jurisdictional problems facing
community-based forest management in that
country. One initiative helps coastal groups gazette
tiny ritual forests (kaya) as ‘ancient monuments’ or
(government) reserves in order to prevent their
reallocation by county councils or the Commissioner
of Lands. Another persuaded local owners of a larger
unreserved coastal forest to sell it to a trust in order
to provide a corridor for elephant movement, and in
return gain tourist revenues. Yet another coastal
development promotes buffer zone development
around Arabuko Sokoke Forest Reserve, famed for
its endemic bird life, to secure local co-operation
with conservation (Alden Wily & Mbaya in press).
The only direct community-management initiative
so far involves Loita Forest, a trust land forest in
Maasailand, under threat nonetheless from the
intentions of the County Council to declare it a local
forest under its own aegis in order to lease it to a
safari company (Alden Wily & Mbaya in press).
Local protest resulted in the submission of the issue
to the Constitutional Court, yet to rule after three
quiet years.
In such an environment, it is rewarding to observe
that one or two NGOs in the country are taking note
of developments elsewhere in eastern Africa, and
beginning to at least plan small projects which will
involve forest-adjacent communities as management
partners. Such an initiative relates to Rumuruti
Forest Reserve (KFWG/Salama Marmanet Wildlife
Forum 2000).
Uganda
Since the mid-nineties, limited buffer zone
development combined with issue of permits to
selected local user groups has characterised early
initiatives in Uganda in six forest parks managed by
the Uganda Wildlife Authority (Bwindi, Mgahinga,
Elgon, Kibale, Ssemliki, Ruwenzori). This was
aborted in the last two areas, partly due to security
problems. Only in Mount Elgon has the programme
evolved to include several of the 57 forest-adjacent
parishes in management, and to a very limited
degree, whereby they mainly supervise extraction of
certain agreed resources (Hinchley in Alden Wily &
Mbaya in press). The same project has launched two
other agreements as to the use of trees planted on the
boundary. Ranger enforcement continues to
dominate management.
Since 1998, more significant local involvement is
emerging through pilots launched by the Forest
Department itself in several small forest reserves
(Scott in Alden Wily & Mbaya in press). In both
Tororo (369ha) and Namatale (663ha), one hundred
or so households from several villages have entered
agreements to protect adjacent parts of the reserves
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in return for the right to plant degraded areas with
their own trees. The agreements are structured as
long-term plans offering considerable local security
in the local partnership. The approach is extending
gradually to more parts of the reserves and to other
similar degraded reserves.
A new National Forestry Policy and Forestry Act is
nearing final draft in late 2000 but, as yet, only
general parameters through which local involvement
might be developed are acknowledged as essential.
Local involvement is posed as collaboration with the
proposed National Forestry Authority in respect of
central forests and with district and sub-county
councils in respect of minor local forests which
together account for some one million hectares.
Note will have be taken in due course of the
provision of the Land Act 1998 that communities
may seek the review of the status of a reserve in their
vicinity (s45(6)).
Of greater note is the effect of recognition of
customary rights as fully justiciable tenure by both
the 1995 Constitution and Land Act, 1998 (s3–27),
which renders most of the several million hectares of
still unreserved forests legally owned, and accordingly
less easy to appropriate for the creation of more
government reserves. A further provision of the
Land Act is for the creation of communal land
associations, a construct through which either
unreserved or reserved forest land might be
accountably held and managed. Such developments
lead logically towards provision for a new class of
community forests, a construct curiously
undeveloped in draft policy and law thus far.
Tanzania
Forests in mainland Tanzania represent a resource of
an estimated 33 million ha, some 14 million of which
is reserved (national and local authority forests). The
remaining 19 million ha occur within or adjacent to
village lands, over which village communities may
secure tenure, under the terms of new land law (Land
Act, 1999, Village Land Act, 1999).
Community-based forest management has advanced
steadily since 1994, mainly through donor-
supported projects, as is generally the case elsewhere
in the region. Today nearly 600 village forest reserves
have been declared, ranging from ten to 10 000ha,
each managed by its owner-manager community
(Alden Wily 2000d). Some twenty other communities
co-manage parts of eight national forest reserves with
government.
A draft Forest Bill, 2000 now makes devolution of
responsibility for the management of forests ‘to the
lowest possible level’ – a main objective (clause 3(2)).
Guidelines have been drafted to guide forests in all
districts towards achieving this and adopting broadly
the same processes for government and non-
government reserves (FBD 2000).
The Bill greatly amplifies the general commitments
of the National Forest Policy 1998 to community
participation, building directly upon experience in
the field. It recognises non-government reserves
already declared and devolves formal declaration of
future local reserves to the district level, to speed up
the process and enable communities to avoid the
costly procedures typically incurred in national level
gazettement (clause 39).
There are three constructs laid out in the law for
community-based forest management: village land
forest reserves (VLFRs), community forest reserves
(CFRs), and village forest management areas
(VFMAs). The first two are declared out of village
lands and are different only in that a CFR caters to
owner-management by groups smaller than a whole
village community. Some 28 CFRs have already been
declared (Alden Wily & Monela 1999). The core
distinction of the third is also tenurial: VFMAs are
areas within government reserves delegated to an
adjacent community to manage.
VLFRs will derive mostly from common lands
within a village’s area, and may be registered as such
once commencement of the Village Land Act, 1999 is
gazetted. That law directly encouraged formation of
VLFRs by preventing registration and entitlement of
individual properties within each village area until
the community has set aside and registered its
common properties (s13). This provision promises a
break upon the attrition of woodlands, swamps and
pasture to uncontrolled encroachment and
subdivision. It also inhibits the creation of new
government reserves out of these lands. Even if the
minister seeks to create more national or local
government reserves, he or she will now be obliged
by the proposed forest law to justify why the forest
could not be better managed as a community-owned
and managed estate (clauses 30–31).
VLFRs and CFRs will be autonomously managed.
The Director of Forestry is to provide guidelines to
village forest management committees, but with the
caveat that they are not legally bound to take the
director’s advice (clause 41(6)). They are, however,
bound to manage in full consultation with the
community members who appoint them to manage
their forest (clauses 40(2); 41(4)). The support of the
elected village government (village council) is also
essential, given that it will delegate the significant
enforcement powers it holds as a local government to
the committee.
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Unlike any other law in the region, the Tanzanian
law is precise as to the rights and responsibilities of
committees as managers (clauses 40; 47; 53; 56). This
includes drawing up and implementing simple
management plans, to be approved by the whole
community, as to how the forest may be used and
not used, zoned for protection and use, access
regulated, permits and licences issued, fees collected
and expended, fines to be levied on illegal users, and
forest rehabilitation and development. Rules within
this plan may be made legally binding upon
themselves and others through iteration in a village
by-law to be approved by the district council.
In regard to government’s own forests (national and
local authority reserves), participation in management
by communities which share boundaries with the
forest is posed as obligatory in the Bill. This will be
delivered either through management planning or in
response to an application by the adjacent
community. Through a formal agreement, it may be
agreed that the community will manage the VFMA
autonomously or in operational partnership with
the forester (clauses 34 and 46). Nor is there legal
impediment to the transfer of such areas eventually
to the community: on a case-by-case basis the
Minister may reclassify a reserve or part thereof as a




Taken as a whole, emerging new strategies locate
forest-local communities in ways which contrast
sharply with those of last century. Whilst old laws
tended to focus upon the level of dry fuelwood
collection they should be permitted, new laws are
locating these same citizens as more and more central
to management processes. It is no longer a question
of whether communities should be involved, but on
what terms and with what powers. Different levels
of power-sharing most clearly distinguish approaches
among states, but with indications that the balance is
commonly in flux, and likely overall to become
more, not less, devolutionary. The practicalities of
implementation and expansion of involvement has
been identified as a likely catalyst towards this.
Already the impact of a somewhat unusual but
pleasing level of praxis between practice and policy
may be noted in this particular field of rural
development.
Arguably, the case of Tanzania stands, at this point
in time, as most cogent and fulsome in its
expectations of the role communities could and
should play in the future security and sustenance of
dwindling forest resources. The reasons for this
deserve some attention. The first is that efforts to
involve communities began from the outset within a
context that could not long avoid addressing matters
of jurisdiction, and then forest tenure. Where many
developments in southern Africa in particular took
their starting point as an attempt to secure local
populations a share in benefits from forests (often
private sector forests), in Tanzania, the fundamental
question of ‘who owns this forest?’ and ‘who will be




The early case of Duru-Haitemba Forest may suffice
as example. This was a 9 000ha hilly miombo
woodland surveyed and demarcated along with
several larger forests to become a National Forest
Reserve during 1990–1994 (Alden Wily 1997). Forest
guards were posted and local communities
abandoned customary limitation upon forest
clearing or farming. Instead, considering their
custodianship ignored, villagers proceeded to extract
as much as they could from the forest before it was
‘lost’ to them. Outsiders from the area joined in,
arguing that as it was now government’s property, it
belonged to everyone. By 1994 the forest was
severely encroached, degraded and critical hill
springs it supported had dried up (Alden Wily 1997).
Concerned foresters offered legal access for basic
needs as the way forward but could not accept the
extensive ‘essential needs for livelihood’ listed. These
included charcoal burning and felling for incomes,
bark-stripping for making grain stores, and
movement of the boundary to exclude in-forest
farms which had been established. Challenged
during heated meetings to demonstrate their claim
that if the forest were returned to them, they would
manage it better than government, the communities
responded with unexpected alacrity. Each of the
eight villages on the boundary formed forest
management committees, appointed volunteer
forest guards and drew up simple action plans for
that part of the forest which it was agreed (with some
inter-village disputation) as logically falling within
their respective spheres.
Access rules formed a central part of these plans,
including the banning of the very uses such as
charcoal production and felling which the same
villagers has claimed, a mere month previously, as
indispensable to livelihood (Alden Wily 1997).
Leaders explained: ‘it is different if it is our forest’.
Those who had encroached were forced to return to
the village and outsiders were banned from entering
the forest. Each village closed off degraded areas to
any use. Government withdrew the forest guards.
Within the space of a few months, it was obvious to
foresters and villagers alike that, at no cost to
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government, the forest was on the road to recovery.
It was also clear that what had been traded to achieve
this was not access rights at all, but control. The
approach was applied to a larger and more
threatened forest (Mgori) also nearing final
gazettement as a National Forest Reserve. Today,
Mgori and Duru-Haitemba are managed as,
respectively, five and eight discrete village forest
reserves (Alden Wily 2000d). With one variation or
another, the stratagem has been adopted in 18
districts and has come to form the foundation of
policy and now legal commitment to what is
accurately described in Tanzania, not as joint forest
management, but as community-based forest
management.
During the early trial months of community
management of Duru-Haitemba, matters of tenure
came to the fore and strengthened the local case.
Whilst at first villagers only sought to retrieve
control over the forest, they soon established the
forest as firmly within respective village lands.
Survey records of each village’s boundaries, prepared
for planned entitlement, showed this to be the case.
Limits of co-management
If there have been marked failures thus far in
Tanzania, it has been in respect of early co-
management of several national forest reserves
where government has firmly retained not just
ownership of the estate but, more critically,
authority over it. These involve villagers as largely
co-operating users, in much the same way as is
characteristic of ‘joint management’ more widely in
the region.
Urumwa Forest Reserve may serve as example. In
1996 the Forestry Division drew up ‘joint
management agreements’ with five villages adjacent
to Urumwa Forest Reserve in Tabora Region, and
with another more distant village, and the local
prison authority (Alden Wily & Monela 1999). Each
of the seven parties were permitted to harvest coupes
demarcated by the foresters in return for keeping the
forest clear of illegal users. By late 1998, enthusiasm
had waned. Villagers explained that the coupes only
benefited villagers who had the tools and transport to
harvest and sell. Also, whilst they were content that
certain more general uses had been legalised, they felt
that ultimately they had lost more than they had
gained through collaboration. In particular they
resented the inclusion of the distant village and
prison department, which had no traditional
interests in the forest. They considered their own
custodial interests had been ignored, downgraded to
mere use rights: ‘We gained fuelwood collection, but
lost the forest’ (Alden Wily & Monela 1999).
Newer projects involving government reserves in
Tanzania have learnt from such experiences and now
seek to designate villages as outright managers in
agreements reached, Foresters playing technical
advisory and watchdog roles only (Alden Wily
2000d). Operational co-management is increasingly
reserved for occasions where the operational and
decision-making presence of foresters is considered
essential, such as where commercial plantations are
involved (Iddi 2000). The more powerful strategy in
respect of such forests is in any event, privatisation,
with ample provision for this in the proposed new
law.
Separating management and use
Moreover, where communities are involved in
national forest management, it is not as users, but as
managers. Accordingly, it is only those communities
which directly share a boundary with the reserve
who are targeted, not those who may also have been
using the forest but live in villages slightly more
remote from the forest. Whilst practice and now
proposed new law requires that customary access be
considered in the use regimes drawn up by the forest-
managing community, such persons have no role in
this decision making, the preserve of management.
So too, members of the community-designated
management have varying interests in using the
forest and some may make no use of the forest at all.
Nonetheless, posed in the community-wide rather
than user-centred context, decisions as to the
management regime to be pursued are agreed by
majority decision of the entire community (Alden
Wily 2000d).
Socio-institutional community
All these attributes are founded upon the fact that
rural communities in Tanzania have a level of
discrete socio-institutional community that is
unique in the region, and one which in addition
enables the community to act as, in effect, a legal
person, and have significant powers vested in it.
This characteristic has its origins in the village-
making policies of the 1970s, whereby groups of
several hamlets were reconstructed (sometimes with
movement) into new, named village entities; each
with its list of registered members, and own discrete
and described ‘village area’ (Alden Wily 1998). In
addition, each village community represented a
constituency permitted to elect its own government
(village council). This is a level of government which
has seen increasing powers bestowed upon it through
legislation, not least in recognition of the practical
self-reliance necessitated at the grassroots in the
absence of significant infrastructural or other
provision from either the district level of local
government, or central government.
Sharing products or power?
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Enforcement capacity
One of these powers has been the capacity of village
councils as governments to legislate upon issues
directly affecting the community and local
resources. Village by-laws are promulgated by village
councils with majority approval of the constituent
community assembly and enter law on the approval
of the district council. Adoption of this instrument
has been mainly where communities have faced
challenge to their rules, either by individuals in the
community disgruntled by majority decisions about
forest access, or by outsiders who have no social
incentive to adhere to community rules (Alden Wily
1997).
Binding communities as managers
Through the use of village by-laws, communities and
their forest management committees have not only
been able to defend their management regimes in
local courts, but have in turn found themselves
equally bound (Alden Wily 1997). This is because the
act of legislating as to the management and use of a
forest (whether belonging to community or state)
has the effect of reserving that area for forestry,
preventing it from later use for settlement and
agriculture. It also binds the community to the
management regime expressed in the by-law. Whilst
neither central nor local governments have so far
taken a community to court for failing to meet these
commitments, the possibility that it could do so is
very real.
If the advantages of developed socio-institutional
formation at the community level in Tanzania has
tangibly facilitated power-sharing in forest
management, so too has its absence elsewhere
obstructed this development. Frustrations caused by
difficulties in defining who is the community and
especially enabling its decisions to be enforced has
been repeatedly noted in the country reviews above.
Legal provision for forest associations in Kenya,
management authorities in Namibia and natural
resource management committees in Malawi go
some way towards filling the vacuum, if imperfectly
so. Nonetheless, it could well prove the case that the
creation of these embryonic community institutions
marks out the path towards the formation of more
profoundly rooted community governance – a
development through which not just community
participation in social change is promoted, but
community itself may be empowered.
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Lessons from Malawi’s experience
with fisheries co-management
initiatives
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ABSTRACT
Co-management initiatives were launched on Lakes
Malombe and Chiuta in 1993 and 1995 respectively.
The contrasting outcomes of the regimes so far
provide some important lessons about the
introduction of co-management arrangements in
Malawi. One of the critical aspects is the tension that
is created around two organisational aspects. The
first concerns the struggle for authority and power
between the (supposedly) democratically elected
management bodies such as beach village committees
(BVCs) and the existing hereditary (undemocratic)
traditional authorities. The second source of tension
is attributable to the source of initiative and drive for
co-management – whether top-down from govern-
ment or bottom-up from the fishers themselves. As a
fisheries management institution, the BVC has to
achieve a balancing act among three forces namely
the Fisheries Department, the village headmen and
the fishers, each seemingly pulling it in a different
direction in terms of influence and derivation of
power and authority. Probably the most formidable
but necessary task in the reform of the management
regime towards co-management is crafting local
management institutions that are independent
enough to command the respect and confidence of
fishers, that at the same time do not rival or
antagonise the village headmen, and that are not
contradictory to the aims and objectives of
government. Other areas of concern have been the
negative effects of short-term donor funding,
ineffective enabling legislation and the prevailing
socio-economic conditions. The cases also provide
some insights on the practicability and applicability
of co-management theory in contexts such as
Malawi. Finally, the multiplicity of factors that
determine decisions about exploitation patterns of
user communities means that while co-management
might be a positive reform, it will not on its own
provide for a complete shift towards patterns of
exploitation that could translate into sustainable
fisheries management.
INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed an increasing
paradigm shift in fisheries management towards co-
management. Two such arrangements were
introduced in Malawi on Lakes Malombe and Chiuta
in 1993 and 1995 respectively.1 While the
introduction of co-management was in response to a
particular crisis in each lake, government had
motivated and facilitated the partnership in the
former while fishers themselves initiated it in the
latter (Figure 1).2 Because of these differing
backgrounds in terms of motivation, the two cases
offer an interesting perspective about how the
formulation histories of such partnerships can be
important determinants of the institutional
arrangements, patterns of interaction and outcomes of
the regime.
What is co-management?
Although the definition of co-management remains
widely debated, most scholars agree that co-
management is a form of institutional and
organisational arrangement between government
and user groups for effective management of a
defined resource3 (Berkes 1997). The general
functions of co-management can be identified as: the
encouragement of partnerships; provision of local
incentives for sustainable use of resources; and the
sharing of power and responsibility for conservation.
As a management strategy, co-management is a
compromise between government concerns for the
conservation and efficient utilisation of the resource
on the one hand, and resource users’ concern for
equal opportunities, self-determination and self-
control on the other. The co-management solution is
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based on two assumptions: that local people must
have a stake in conservation and management and
secondly that partnership between government
agencies and resource users is essential for sustainable
exploitation. Co-management advocates a shift away
from autocratic and paternalistic modes of
management to approaches that rely on the joint
efforts of government agencies and users. The basic
concern is the reshaping of state interventions so as
to institutionalise collaboration between
administration and resource users and end those
unproductive situations where they are pitted
against one another as antagonistic actors (Baland &
Platteau 1996).
In the Western approach, three arguments have been
used to justify the increasing adoption of co-
management: that concerned interests should be
heard; that the information from users would result
in improvement of management decisions; and that
co-management would improve legitimacy of the
management system, thereby reducing ‘transaction
costs’ (Hanna 1995; Hersoug & Rånes 1997). In
developing countries, community participation is
increasingly being introduced as part of
conditionalities for development aid in the resource
management sectors as part of the democratisation
project (Hara 2000). Apart from the preceding
arguments, there has been a growing recognition –
among managers, scientists and politicians – that no
management scheme will work unless it enjoys the
support of those whose behaviour it is intended to
affect (Hersoug & Rånes 1997). Evidence shows that
if fishers willingly accept the regulations as
appropriate and consistent with their existing values,
the regulatory agency and the scheme will gain
legitimacy with the fishers (Kuperan & Abdullah
1994). Regulatory schemes that have high legitimacy
among fishermen face much-reduced problems of
non-compliance with the regulations. It is in this area
of securing legitimacy that co-management shows
promise of being a better resource management
approach for fisheries. As Hersoug and Rånes (1997)
have stated, while the problems of lack of co-
management and fishers’ participation have been
widely documented, the scientific challenge remains
demonstrating what kind of co-management has
been successful and under what conditions. This
article is a contribution towards this challenge,
particularly in the context of sub-Saharan Africa.
This study draws upon the Institutional Analysis
Development (IAD) framework (Oakerson 1992) as
adapted for application in the International Centre
for Living Aquatic Resources Management/Institute
of Fisheries Management/National Aquatic Resources
Systems (ICLARM/IFM/NARS) Coastal Resources
Co-management Project (Sen & Raakjær Nielsen
1996; ICLARM/IFM 1998). The adapted research
framework and approach enable comparisons to be
made between case studies, country research and co-
management models.
REASONS FOR SEEKING AN
ALTERNATIVE REGIME
On both lakes, the decline in catches was one of the
main reasons for seeking an alternative regime. Thus
main objective in each case was to stem the decline
and put the fishery on a course of recovery. While
there seems to have been a reversal in the negative
catch trends and a stabilisation of catches in Lake
Chiuta (Figure 2), this has not been the case in Lake
Malombe (Figure 3). The question to pose therefore
is why the shift to a co-management regime has had
a positive impact in the former but not in the latter.
If we disregard the probability of environmental
factors, one of the main reasons for the lack of real
progress in recovery of the fishery in Lake Malombe
could be attributed to the fact that the regime has
not, as yet, resulted in any real noticeable change in
fisher behaviour that could have translated into
sustainable patterns of exploitation. Fishers have
continued to use illegal nets and also to disregard
other regulation such as the closed season (Banda
1996). Measures that were intended to introduce
limited access in order to limit and reduce capacity
are viewed as unwelcome by most fishers. This can
be contrasted to Lake Chiuta, where co-management
seems to have resulted in greater adherence to
regulations and continuing denial of access for what
are seen as ‘destructive’ fishing gears.
WHY THE PRESENT OUTCOMES?
While many factors could have contributed to the
present contrasting outcomes, the reasons for the
lack of genuine positive impact of the new regime in
Lake Malombe compared to Lake Chiuta can be
explained as being a result of a cluster of factors, the
main ones being: the role of government in the
partnership and the organisational set-up; power and
Figure 1: Shifts in management approach in












authority struggles between the new management
groups (BVCs) and the existing traditional authority
(village headmen); the extent to which vested
interests in the fishery participate in the management
regime, issues of legitimacy and the incentives for
participation; effects of limited short-term external
(donor) funding on the programme; ineffective and
ambiguous enabling legislation; and the effects of
prevailing socio-economic conditions on operational
decisions and resulting dilemmas around the
implementation of limited access. These factors have
greatly influenced the levels of compliance to
regulations and, in the end, are likely to be crucial for
the sustainability of the new regimes. We elaborate
on each of them below.
The role of the Fisheries
Department
In the Lake Malombe/Upper Shire River Programme,
the Fisheries Department’s role as facilitator and
funder (mostly through donor projects) had great
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Figure 2: Estimated total catch from Lake Chiuta (data source: Fisheries Department, Malawi)





































Total 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Total)
Lessons from Malawi’s experience with fisheries co-management initiatives
70
contested resources: challenges to the governance of natural resources in southern Africa
also, allegedly, on the composition of the beach
village committees.4 Due to this, BVCs are seen as
representing the Fisheries Department. Currently,
most BVCs feel that they derive their powers and
authority from the Fisheries Department. Because
BVCs have assumed what are still viewed as Fisheries
Department duties such as enforcement and
licensing, the impression that they represent the
department has been strengthened. This in turn has
resulted in the alienation of BVCs from their
constituency, greatly affecting their effectiveness and
authority within the fisher communities.
In contrast, the user-based arrangement on Lake
Chiuta was largely mobilised by the fishers, with the
objective of getting support and approval for the
expulsion of migrant nkacha5 fishers. Because the
impetus came from the fishers themselves, the fishers
see themselves as having largely determined the
objectives of the initiative. Because the fishers
conducted elections of BVCs on their own without
the facilitation of the Fisheries Department, they
have a much stronger feeling that these committees
are their own creation.
The legitimacy of the BVCs in the fisher
communities is related to their perceived source of
authority and also their representivity. In addition,
the source of the initiative for the partnership is a
crucial determinant of the sense of ownership of the
process and support for the regime. In this context,
there is a much greater sense of ownership of the
BVCs and their functions on Lake Chiuta than in
Lake Malombe. This has also meant that, in case of
Lake Malombe, government has had to continue
driving the process. When such support is linked to
short-term project funding, reduced support after
project phase-out is having an increasingly negative
effect on the BVCs and the regime as whole, as will be
shown below.
Struggles for power and
authority
The creation of BVCs in Lake Malombe/Upper
Shire River and Lake Chiuta has presented problems
around the conflict of powers and authority between
the new bodies and the village headmen. The
functions and authority of BVCs, in some instances,
infringe on the powers, authority and economic
privileges of village headmen. BVCs were intended
to be strong, independent user-community
representative bodies which could eventually assume
delegated management responsibilities from
government. The organisational model gave village
headmen presumed honorary positions on the BVCs
as ex-officio members. However, in the village
setting, decision-making and authority have
historically been dominated by the village headman
(Mamdani 1996). While issues may be discussed in an
open forum or by the council of elders and a
consensus reached, the village headman retains the
ultimate authority for making the final decision.
Village headmen can even issue authoritative decrees
without consultation (Donda 2000). By being a
member of the BVC, the village headman becomes
the de facto leader of the BVC, even though he is not
the chairman. In this context, the village headmen
are prone to ignoring the authority of BVCs since,
by historical tradition and custom, they hold the
ultimate authority. Where BVCs have resisted being
taken over by village headmen and have established
some semblance of independent authority, the
fishers have often been confronted with a situation
of dual authority in which village headmen continue
to exercise their traditional authority in parallel
(Donda 2000).
By custom and historical tradition, village headmen
derive economic privileges from the fishery through
their positions. As local administrators under the
colonial government’s ‘indirect rule’ policy (Mamdani
1996), village headmen were allowed to collect taxes,
which came in many forms (monetary or material).
While village headmen are no longer allowed to
collect taxes in form of money, the system of
coercive material contributions to village headmen
remains widely practised. For example, when a
migrant fisherman comes into the village he
normally has to seek permission from the village
headman to stay and has to pay something to the
chief as a token of thanks. In addition, all fishers
landing their fish in his area are supposed to give him
a determined amount of fish, locally called mawe, as
an honorarium every week. Under the co-
management arrangement, incoming migrant fishers
have to seek permission from BVCs. This directly
infringes on the powers and privileges of village
headmen. In some cases, gear owners saw the new
arrangement as a chance to cut out headmen by
encouraging BVCs to challenge such practices. For
example, on Lake Chiuta, fishermen are increasingly
refusing to give mawe to their village headmen and
the BVCs seem to be conniving with the fishermen
in this development (Njaya et al. 1999). The
challenge to their powers and privileges has left
strong village headmen with no option but to try and
curb the powers of BVCs. It is in this context that
village headmen such as Kadewere disbanded the
elected BVCs by removing members who would
stand up to them and replacing them with others
who would support them (Hara 1996). In such cases,
the fisher communities feel that BVCs largely act for
and represent the interests of the village headmen,
which may be different to their own interests.
It is interesting that village headmen have been
largely kept out of BVCs in Lake Chiuta. Since the
fishers elected the BVCs on their own without the
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facilitation of the Fisheries Department, they were
able to ignore the Lake Malombe model that
incorporated village headmen as ex-officio members.
To a large extent, this was also due to the fact that the
village headmen had alienated themselves from the
fishers following allegations of corruption and
collusion with nkacha fishers.6 As far as fishers were
concerned, to include village headmen on BVCs after
the role they had played in the saga around the
expulsion of nkacha fishers would have been
unacceptable. The fishers have argued for the
exclusion of village headmen from BVCs and
fisheries issues in general by saying that village
headmen should limit themselves to the
administration of land issues and leave fisheries to
fishers (Njaya et al. 1999). But the sidelining of the
village headmen in the composition of BVCs and the
growing reluctance of fishermen to give mawe is
increasing the tension between the BVCs and the
village headmen. Thus while BVCs have so far
functioned effectively in keeping nkacha fishers out,
it remains to be seen whether they can continue to do
so without the blessing and involvement of village
headmen in the context of growing antagonism
between the two power bases.
While there is need to have reasonably independent
management bodies, it seems to be necessary to also
ensure that these are somehow complementary and
accommodating to the existing traditional authority
and powers of village headmen. It is likely that the
traditional and customary system of justice, under
traditional authorities, will play a role in
administering justice and sanctions in community-
based management arrangements (Hara 2000). Thus
village headmen cannot be completely excluded
from a community-based regime. It would appear, in
the first instance, that building the new institutions
around the existing traditional authorities could
provide a possible solution. But since the traditional
authority institution is not seen as incorruptible,
especially with the dire economic situation that
exists in rural areas, this necessitates the formation of
new organisations that should be reasonably
independent from the traditional authorities.
What can be deduced from the preceding sections is
that, probably, one of the most critical aspects in the
introduction of co-management arrangements is the
tension that is created around two organisational
aspects. The first problem concerns the struggle for
authority and power between the (supposedly)
democratically elected management bodies such as
BVCs and the existing hereditary (undemocratic)
traditional authorities, while the second source of
tension can be attributed to the source of initiative
and drive for co-management, whether this is top-
down from government or bottom-up from the
users themselves (Figure 4).
The balance between traditional power and
authority/democratic representation on the one
hand and top-down/bottom-up initiatives must
gravitate towards the centre (Figure 4) in order to
produce effective and legitimate management bodies
and institutional reforms. For the regime to be seen
as being legitimate and representative, the fisher
community must feel that they own the process and
the resulting management bodies in terms of the way
in which the arrangement was initiated and how the
representatives were elected. Too much influence
from the Fisheries Department or village headmen
results in a process and bodies that are seen as being
alienated from the stakeholders they are supposed to
represent. The most formidable but necessary task in
the reform of the management regime towards co-
management is probably the crafting of local
management institutions that are independent
enough to command the respect and confidence of










Figure 4: Two dimensions of tension relevant to introduction of co-management in Malawi (adapted from
Hara 2000)
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village headmen or being contradictory to the aims
and objectives of government.
As the focus or vehicle for user participation in the
partnership, the BVC is located between three forces
– the Fisheries Department, village headmen and the
user community – each of which seems to be
straining to control and influence it. BVCs must
achieve a balance between the three in terms of
influence and derivation of power and authority
(Figure 5). The government’s main aim for BVCs is
that they should act as a vehicles for implementing
and achieving its conservation objectives. At the
same time, BVCs must contend with the intolerance
of village headmen losing any of their traditional
powers and authority in the villages. In addition,
BVCs must try to fulfil their obligations of
representing the interests of their constituency – the
fisher communities – even if these might not be in
line with objectives of the Fisheries Department or
interests of village headmen. The BVCs on Lake
Chiuta represent and act in the interests of the users
more effectively than those on Lake Malombe. As a
result, users on Lake Chiuta see the BVCs as theirs.
In contrast, most of the Lake Malombe BVCs are
more closely aligned with either the Fisheries
Department or village headmen. It would therefore
appear that, for an effective locally based regime, the
influence and stamp of the users on the management
and representative bodies should be greater than
those of the Fisheries Department and the village
headmen.
The participation of vested
interests and incentives for
participation
The issue of the active participation of vested
interests is crucial. This is related to the gear
ownership and organisational structure of the
industry in the two lakes. In Lake Chiuta, most gear
owners are also active fishers themselves whereas in
Lake Malombe the majority of gear owners employ
crews to fish on their behalf. In the latter case, the
operational decisions out on the lake are taken by the
crew members. In terms of the Fisheries Act, it is the
gear owner, not any crew member, who is legally
responsible for any infringement of the regulations.
Thus, whereas in Lake Chiuta it is the legally
responsible gear owners who make most of the
operational decisions, crew members, who are not
legally responsible for the decisions they make, take
such decisions in Lake Malombe. Since the benefit-
sharing systems between the gear owner and crew
members are based on the size of the catch, and the
crew members’ security of tenure within a fishing
unit depends on their performance, there is great
pressure on crew members to engage in activities that
could possibly increase their catches. For the gear
owners, keeping a good and productive crew is
essential. Gear owners tend to avoid interfering with
operational decisions that will determine the size of
the catch and therefore the benefits to the crew. In
general, the sharing systems and the lack of long-
term tenure within fishing units encourages crew
members to take operational decisions based on
short-term economic maximisation, in the event
encouraging illegal activities that would increase the
amount of catch. In view of this, who participates
and is represented on the management bodies and in
the management processes in general becomes a very
important factor.
In Lake Malombe, fishers (gear owners and crew
members) comprised only 30% of the BVC members
compared to 80% in Lake Chiuta in 1999 (Donda
2000). Moreover, most of the 30% were gear owners
rather than crew members. As a result, most fishers
in Lake Malombe shun or boycott meetings called by
BVCs and are inclined to ignore the resolutions that
are passed by BVCs. They complain that BVCs take
decisions on fishing issues that they have little
knowledge about. Some fishers have gone as far as
saying that they feel that BVCs take decisions that are
meant to punish fishermen. For example, most
fishers said that the BVCs did not consult them about
the decision to change the closed season taken in 1998
(Donda 2000). They claim that the BVCs did not
have the mandate from the fishers to make or agree
to such a proposal. One effect of the high percentage
of non-fishers on BVCs in Lake Malombe is that
there is great feeling among the BVC members that
they ought to get paid for their services since they do
not benefit directly from the fishery (Hara 1996). In
contrast, there is a very high sense of ownership of
decisions and regulations in Lake Chiuta due to the
high participation of vested interests (gear owners) in
both the actual fishing and in the management
bodies. Material incentives have not, so far, been an
Figure 5: The three forces straining to influence









important factor for involvement in management
functions. Another observation is that, because of
the high percentage of vested interests in both fishing
and BVCs in Lake Chiuta compared to Lake
Malombe, peer monitoring is much more common
in Chiuta than in Malombe. Moreover, the fishers,
led by BVCs, carry out enforcement activities on
their own on Lake Chiuta. Enforcement of the
regulations by the fishers among themselves rarely
happens in Lake Malombe.
The greater the participation of vested interests, the
greater the possibility of creating effective
management bodies. The involvement of crew
members – the people who take operational
decisions out on the lake – is particularly important
if BVCs are to function effectively as management
institutions.
Negative effects of short-term
external (donor) funding
The introduction of co-management on Lake
Malombe/Upper Shire River has been implemented
as a multi-donor funded programme (Fisheries
Department 1993). This raises the usual issues about
donor-funded projects such as the dependence
syndrome and sustainability of activities after the
project is phased out. Already, the Lake Malombe/
Upper Shire River programme has been severely
affected as most donor projects that supported the
programme were phased out before the regime could
be firmly entrenched (Donda 2000; Hara 2000).
Unlike the programme in Lake Malombe, the setup
in Lake Chiuta is run by fishers without outside
financial assistance. The only government assistance
the Chiuta group received towards institutional
setup was training during the initial stages of
implementation of the programme. The fishers
make contributions towards a fund and this money
is used to pay for agreed items of necessary expenses
(Njaya et al. 1999). They call their own meetings and
enforcement is carried out using their own fishing
vessels. Because it does not rely on outside assistance,
the programme on Lake Chiuta would appear to
have a much greater chance of being sustained than
that on Lake Malombe. In addition, the impression
seems to have been created in the case of Lake
Malombe that co-management is a donor-funded
government project of limited duration rather than a
long-term partnership that should move towards
being self-sustaining. Even the incentives for
participation are largely seen as monetary.
Ineffective and ambiguous
legislation
While the revised Fisheries Act of 1997 seems to
provide adequately for most of the needs for a co-
management regime, there are still some aspects in
which it seems to fall short. Two of these are the
transfer of property rights and the right of local
management institutions to prosecute offenders and
apply sanctions.
The legal transfer of property rights was also seen as
being important for implementing limited entry/
access in order to reduce capacity and effort in the
fishery. The changes in the powers of the various
courts under the new judicial system have the
potential to hamper the ability of the traditional
courts to prosecute and apply sanctions (Hara 2000).
Under the new system, criminal offences must be
heard in magistrates’ courts. Because traditional
authorities are now permitted only to hear civil
cases, they may no longer adjudicate fisheries
offences, because these are criminal matters. In
addition, under the new system, village headmen can
no longer impose fines. The revised Act might still be
inadequate because its provisions do not enable local-
level institutions under a community-based regime
to carry out their assigned tasks efficiently and
effectively. However, the main problem is that, two
years after it had been passed, most of its provisions
had not yet been implemented. This has affected the
programme in the areas of the legal authority of
BVCs, the legality of enforcing the revised
regulations, and in the legality of ploughing part of
the license fee funds back into the communities to
pay for incentives and some of their administrative
costs under the arrangement.
The effects of prevailing socio-
economic conditions
Mangochi, the district in which Lake Malombe is
located, is characterised by very adverse socio-
economic indicators; high unemployment; high
population growth; inadequate land size holdings;
low agricultural productivity; high rates of illiteracy;
a low spirit of voluntary self-help; and weak micro-
enterprises (Government of Malawi/United Nations
Development Programme 1998). Poverty is
widespread in the district. The inability of seasonal
agriculture and the formal sector to absorb most of
the economically active proportion of the
population means that fisheries is the main economic
sector in which most people work. The increase in
the number of crew members has continued even
though the number of fishing units has been
declining during most of the 1990s (Hara and Jul
Larsen, forthcoming) is a clear indicator of this
phenomenon. This absorptive role that the fishing
industry has to play is putting fisheries under ever-
increasing pressure.
One of the underlying reasons for government
introducing co-management on Lake Malombe/
Upper Shire River was that this could facilitate the
Lessons from Malawi’s experience with fisheries co-management initiatives
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introduction of measures to limit access and entry
into the fishery, thereby reducing overall fishing
effort. In the context of Lake Malombe and the
Upper Shire River, measures that could limit or
reduce effort in order to improve the fishery and thus
incomes in the long-term were seen as desirable in
principle but unpalatable in the short-term due to the
economic hardship and possible social disruption
they could bring about (Bell & Donda 1993). In
addition, there are moral and strategic dilemmas for
fishers as far as proposals to limit access are
concerned. Fishers are adamant about accepting the
proposal to introduce limited access due its
implications as a form of privatisation of a common
pool resource in which everyone has historically
been free to fish (Hara 1996).7 Secondly, the fishers
have expressed the worry that they risk being
excluded from other fishing areas to which they
seasonally migrate during the closed season as a tit-
for-tat by other fishers from other areas. Jentoft
(1993:24) captures this moral dilemma in fishing
communities highly dependent on fishing accurately
in what he terms the ‘lifeboat dilemma’:
What is to be done when the life boat is full?
Should one more be taken abroad at the risk of
sinking, or should those aboard row hard to get
away from all those crying to be saved?
Clearly, the success of measures aimed at limiting
effort would be dependent on the ability of the
general economy to act as a sink for excess labour
from the fishing communities. So long as
employment opportunities in the other sectors of
the economy remain low8 and the fishery continues
to act as an employer of last resort, such measures are
likely to be viewed unfavourably within the fishing
communities. In Lake Chiuta, fishers combine
fishing with farming as the area  has adequate farming
land. With the growing population and increasing
commercialisation as the area becomes opened up
through improved communications, similar problems
are likely to become prevalent in that area too.
In the first instance, the rural setting of most
communities, the ‘community’ character of their
social structures and traditional authority systems of
governance would appear to provide favourable
conditions and ambience for community-based
management systems. In reality though, most of the
fisher communities have not remained untouched by
market economies. Thus, this ‘rural community’
character should not be assumed without question
any more. Here, the point is that whereas most rural
fisher communities might have fished for subsistence
in former times, their objectives nowadays are
clearly economic.
In the 1990s, the Word Bank/International Monetary
Fund Structural Adjustment Programme, together
with increasing trends towards globalisation, have
resulted in the increasing collapse of local manufacturing
industries and the shrinking of the sector (National
Economic Council 1998). Unable to find work in the
formal sector, most people of working age are
increasingly being forced to derive income and
livelihood from natural resource-based activities
such as farming, fishing and selling firewood. With
the average population growth rate standing at over
3% per annum (Government of Malawi/United
Nations Development Programme 1993), this
pressure on natural resources can only increase.
Communities are finding it increasingly difficult to
apply controls around limiting the exploitation of
fisheries, and natural resources in general, due to the
prevailing socio-economic conditions. Whether co-
management could influence the fishers to adopt
sustainable patterns of exploitation is rather
doubtful.
SOME THOUGHTS ON THEORY
AND PRACTICE
In the West, there has been increasing distrust among
the public about line-agency discretion in the
management of natural resources (Lawry 1994). The
last two decades have therefore seen growing
demands and advocacy for public involvement in
environmental issues. The Brundtland Report
(World Commission on the Environment and
Development 1987), which argued that communities
should have greater access and control over decisions
affecting their resources, enshrined this growing
movement. Following the end of the Cold War in
the early 1990s, donors have demanded political
democracy and transparency as essential conditions
for development aid. Community participation,
which is seen as part of the general drive towards
empowerment of the formerly disenfranchised local
people, has increasingly been one of the conditions
for donor aid. In this sense, donors seem to believe
that the subsidiarity principle being commonly
applied in the West should also be applied in
developing countries as this would result in greater
accountability at local level, resulting in improved
resource management and positive socio-economic
effects on user communities (Lawry 1994).
In view of the foregoing, how serious is the
commitment of recipient governments to community
participation? Are they just going along with the
approach in order to get the much-needed donor
money into their cash-strapped departments and
programmes? In this context, it is possible that
communities are being forcibly co-opted into
participating so as to meet donor-funding
requirements. In general, there seems be a weak link
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between the theoretical basis for introduction of co-
management and its applicability and practicability.
Secondly, how appropriate is a regime based mainly
on the Western democratic principles that
‘concerned interests should be heard’ and the idea
that public environmental advocacy can take root
easily in communities which have been subjected to
dictators at national level and autocratic and
undemocratic traditional authorities at local level?
Such historical contexts have relevance in that, given
a political environment in which people are not used
to arguing with their village headmen and
government officials, providing people with a formal
platform for expressing their views and suggestions
will not necessarily empower them to do so. In this
sense, what is left unsaid could be more important
than what is said. This will usually manifest itself in
actions that might be contrary to what was
apparently agreed by the group at public forums.
The question remains: is the real objective for
community participation to enforce participatory
democracy or to achieve better resource management?
Whether Western-type democracy and advocacy can
work and be of benefit to management of fisheries in
developing countries such as Malawi is an important
agenda for research. However, it is important to note
that most decisions in the communities are still taken
either by consensus or by means of the autocratic
authority of the traditional leaders, not through
some type of democratic institution.
The third question pertains to the practical issue of
reliance on what is usually short-term donor funding
for what are essentially programmes for long-term
institutional reform. If governments and donors are
serious about the introduction of institutional
reforms towards community-based regimes, then
long-term human and financial commitments will be
necessary. The effects of short-term commitments
that abandon programmes in mid-implementation,
could be very harmful for the trust between
government and user communities. Since the
phasing out of most projects in the Lake Malombe/
Upper Shire River Programme and the resulting
scaling down of activities, BVCs have expressed the
view that the Fisheries Department lacked
commitment towards the programme.
Finally, one of the critical aspects of introducing co-
management is that the diagnosis of problems is
based on models fostered by ‘outsiders’, in this
particular context, the Fisheries Department and
donors. The ‘outsiders’ influence the problems that
will be considered and it is common for such models
to use templates that assume a direct cause and effect
connection when analysing a problem (Turner
1999). In adopting co-management, it was assumed
by the Fisheries Department that making the user
community responsible for management of ‘their’
own fishery could rectify the problem of over-
exploitation by making them morally conscious
about their negative patterns of exploitation and
illegal activities. The guilt they would feel could
reduce illegal activities and make them more
responsible towards the regulations. But problems
concerning fishers and why they choose particular
strategies for exploitation of the fishery are usually
far more complex than such a simple characterisation
would allow.
Despite the foregoing, the apparently positive
achievements of the user-based management regime
on Lake Chiuta provides a valuable lesson. Where
co-operation with government is initiated and driven
by the fishers themselves, the regime appears to have
much greater potential for achieving positive
management outcomes in terms of sustainable
exploitation patterns and optimum socio-economic
benefits for the concerned stakeholders. The Lake
Chiuta case gives hope that, given the right
conditions and appropriate government
interventions, it is possible to introduce viable
community-based regimes in Malawi.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have attempted to analyse and draw
lessons from the contrasting outcomes of the two co-
management regimes in Malawi. We have argued
that both internal and external factors have had great
impact on the outcomes of the regime. In the context
of the internal factors, organisation for co-
management, struggles for power and authority, the
level of involvement of vested interests and the
incentives for participation have been crucial to the
workability and stability of the arrangement. The
external factors that have impinged on the regime
include limited financial support, the inadequacy the
revised legislation and most of all, the prevailing
socio-economic conditions.
There is little doubt that the increasing over-
exploitation of most capture fisheries in Malawi is
dangerously eroding the very basis of livelihoods for
fishing communities. Whether the real solution lies
in institutional reform of management regimes
towards co-management is an important question. In
great part, though, the solution might lie outside the
immediate sector, as problems in the fishing sector
are also related to the macro-economy of the
country. The main problem is the narrow economic
base of rural communities, with their extreme
dependence on the extraction of natural resources
such as fish for their economic needs. Broadening the
economic base and widening job opportunities will
be indispensable to any solutions to problems
experienced in the sector. Thus while co-
management might be one positive reform, it will
not be sufficient on its own to solve the increasing
crisis in fisheries management.
Lessons from Malawi’s experience with fisheries co-management initiatives
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1Lakes Malombe and Chiuta are in the southern part
of Malawi at grid locations 14o 21/ to 14o 45/ south
and 35o 10/ to 35o 20/ east for the former and 14o 30/
to 15o 00/ south and 35o 45/ to 36o 00/ east for the
latter.
2The difference in importance attached by the
Fisheries Department to the two lakes can be seen in
that more research and management attention had
been given to Malombe than to Chiuta. In its 1971
annual report, the Fisheries Department indicated
that Lake Chiuta was not a priority in its
management and conservation mandate because it
was sufficiently remote and relatively unimportant.
3This broad definition of co-management will be
used for the purposes of this article.
4BVCs are committees that had been instituted
through a ‘democratic’ process as vehicles for the
participation of fishing communities.
5Nkacha is the local name for an inshore seine net that
is used for catching kambuzi (lethrinops spp.). It was
invented in the late 1970s in Lake Malombe to target
offshore kambuzi, as a response to the declining
availability of chambo and kambuzi in the inshore
areas.
6Village headmen are said to have given no support to
local fishers in their quest to expel the migrant
nkacha fishers because, allegedly, they had been
bribed. Fishers had to solicit and get the support of
government officials (the Fisheries Department, the
District Commissioner and the police) in order to
effect the expulsion. Even then, the local fishers had
to forcibly evict the nkacha fishers who refused to
leave because, apparently, some village headmen had
tacitly given them permission to stay even after they
had been officially told to leave.
7Brox (1990) demonstrates this problem.
8In 1996, an estimated 75% of the people in the
economically productive age bracket did not have
formal full time employment (Government of
Malawi/United Nations Development Programme
1998).
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Preconditions for implementation
of co-management in small-scale
fisheries in South Africa
ANNE KATRINE NORMANN
Introduction
Fisheries management is basically politics. Politics is
about distribution and allocating resources. Fisheries
management is largely about distributional politics –
the basic and conflictual issue is ‘who gets access to
what’. The socio-economic side of the politics is a
central issue, which in South African fisheries
management means focusing on the redistribution of
licences and quotas. The fisheries management
policy in South Africa is still in a trial phase and is the
subject of much controversy. In general, there are
many different management options, which can be
classified within three broad institutional orders:
state, market and community. The state alternative is
broadly characterised by hierarchical order,
bureaucratic structures and authority relations. The
market alternative promotes competition, economic
efficiency and rationality, with impersonal and goal-
oriented relationships, and is often represented by a
management system of individual transferable
quotas. The community alternative implies close
interpersonal ties, egalitarian and often multiplex
social networks and shared identities among the
actors. Belonging to the latter category are models of
co-management, which seek to integrate fisheries
management in local community structures in order
to increase legitimacy of resource regulations
(Hersoug & Holm 2000). Co-management as a
decision-making arrangement has been gaining
ground worldwide over the last decade. In southern
Africa, there are several co-management arrangements
in different resource management systems. While
there are many examples of co-management setups in
the Western world, Hara (1999) argues that there is
no proof that co-management is more viable than
other decision-making models. In most countries
where it is being practised, co-management is still at
the trial and experimental stages. Hara criticises the
fact that this model is being exported to developing
countries, often without its applicability having been
considered. South Africa has for a decade been in a
transition towards democracy. A huge challenge for
the government is to achieve development and
improved living standards for previously
disadvantaged groups. Regulating the use of natural
resources through redistribution of access is seen as
one way of enabling those groups to escape the
situation of poverty and dependence in which they
are currently locked.
The intention of this paper is to discuss whether the
institutional preconditions for implementing co-
management are present in South Africa, and which
modifications could lead to proper institutions for
co-management to be viable. The implications of the
new management policy on issues of importance to
co-management such as ‘action space’ with its
enabling and constraining structures, democracy and
development, and empowerment are studied in the
light of the ideology around co-management. The
state has an important role in co-management – the
additional role the state should take on in this
particular context for achieving the goals of
democracy and development in fisheries management
is also discussed. The paper also looks into the area of
property rights. Co-management does not
‘recommend’ what kind of property rights will be
suitable. Quotas are used in South African
commercial fisheries. Few analyses are done on
whether co-management is compatible with quota
regulations, and which institutional conditions work
to achieve redistribution and poverty reduction.
Experiences from this transition phase of South
African fisheries management can contribute to co-
management theory, with a view to using the South
African experience to developing co-management
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Management consists of a chain of procedures. The
different levels of management are design (policy
formulation), implementation (access right decision,
establishment of quotas, rules for conduct of the
fishery); and enforcement (monitoring, control and
surveillance) (Jentoft et al. 1998). Co-management is
an ongoing collaborative and communicative
process, where resource users, together with
government representatives and other actors, are in
an entrepreneurial and creative role. The bottom line
is that government agencies and local user groups
form organisations through which they share
management power and responsibility for
management functions. The government and the
user groups have different but complementary roles
in the management scheme. The fishing authorities
may delegate exclusive management authority to the
local user groups over a given fish resource or a given
sea territory. It is decisive that the fishers have a
collective voice, that they appear as a group instead
of as dispersed individuals (Jentoft 1989; Jentoft et al.
1998; Hernes & Sandersen 1998). The specific
context determines at what level management user-
groups and the state can and should co-operate, and
what aspects of management activities co-management
will cover. There are limitations on what functions
can or should be transferred to the fishers’
organisations. The subsidiarity principle is that
management should be exercised at the lowest
feasible level. For example, the setting and
management of total allowable catch is better suited
for non-community management than the
management of space and gear, while it is good
democracy that user groups may provide input to
the process of deciding on the total allowable catch
(Jentoft et al. 1998).
There are different rationales for participating in co-
management arrangements, and why governments
and users embark on institutional change in fisheries
management. The biological rationale is based on the
fact that top-down, bureaucratic and science-based
approaches have not prevented resource crises and
experience shows that such management systems
have mixed success (Jentoft et al. 1998). Thus, there
has been an overall need for a change. One argument
is that fishers possess experience-based biological
knowledge which, if properly used, may add to
science and enhance legitimacy. If the users are
involved at an early stage, the hypothesis is that they
are more eager to conserve the resource because they
are ‘given’ more responsibility. Critics claim that it is
too late to involve users when the crisis has already
happened. Involving user groups and utilising their
knowledge of biology should be part of a strategy to
prevent resource crises and improve management
(Hara 1998; Maurstad & Sundet 1998). The social
rationale is linked to the conditions of the decision-
making procedures. Jentoft and McCay (1995) say
that, at a general level, the issue of institutional
design in fisheries management decision making is
analogous to issues that are addressed within theories
of democracy: participation, and at what level
participation takes place. Co-management is
consistent with the aims of democratisation and
empowerment (Pomeroy & Berkes 1997). Decen-
tralisation and involvement of the grassroots in
decision making will, according to Pomeroy and
Berkes, eventually lead to greater democratisation
and development of local communities. Sandersen
and Koester (2000) support this line of reasoning, and
say that more participation by user groups in
decision making will foster more democratic
management and strengthen the regulatory process.
As pointed out by Jentoft et al. (1998), em-
powerment of users and participatory democracy are
important goals in themselves, and sharing and
delegation of management authority are ways to
realise them. When responsibility is delegated, and
users are given more responsibility, and they take on
new roles within the management system, which in
turn can change the system further. This is closely
related to the psychological rationale, which has to do
with legitimacy and compliance. A worldwide
problem in fisheries management is that existing
regulation regimes in general have little legitimacy,
due to failed management both biologically and
socio-economically. Jentoft (1989) argues that the
legitimacy of fisheries regulations depends on
whether fishers accept the regulations as appropriate
and consistent with their persisting values. In
addition to the question of values, there is also the
matter of survival – when there are no alternative
ways of generating an income, fishers will transgress
the regulations. If the fishers find the regulatory
scheme legitimate, it is more likely that they will
follow the rules. A legitimate fisheries management
regime will enhance compliance. Users are likely to
become more knowledgeable of, committed to, and
supportive of regulations if they have had a say in the
process. When users obtain more management
responsibility in functional terms, they are likely to
behave more responsibly in moral terms, which in
turn leads to greater compliance (Jentoft 2000b).
Jentoft (1989) presents four dimensions of
legitimacy, each of which requires taking the fishers’
point of view into consideration:
1. The content of regulation: the more that
regulations coincide with the way fishers
themselves define their problems, the greater
will be their legitimacy.
Preconditions for implementation of co-management in small-scale fisheries
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2. The distributional effects: the more equitably
restrictions are imposed, the more legitimate the
regulations will be seen to be.
3. The making of the regulations: the more the
fishers are involved in the decision-making
process, the more legitimate the regulatory
process will be perceived to be. Legitimacy
depends on the decision-making process. If it is
fair and just, the majority rule is more likely to
be followed by all.
4. The implementation of the regulations implies
that the more directly involved the fishers are in
instilling and enforcing the regulations, the more
the regulations will be accepted as legitimate.
The first two points above have to do with content
legitimacy – their focal point is the content and
quality of regulations. Points 3 and 4 can be
characterised as having to do with process
legitimacy: they concern the organisation and
decision-making process.
Other rationales include donor influence, where
there may be pressure from international donor
agencies for government in developing countries to
embark on a co-management arrangement. In such a
case, the co-management procedure can be said to be
donor-driven, or induced from the top down. Cost is
another rationale. Fisheries management has been a
government responsibility – a heavy and costly
burden. Devolving some of the management
responsibility, for instance enforcement, may reduce
the costs for government. The level of conflict
between resource users is often high, and co-
management may improve the chances of avoiding
such conflicts.
Co-management arrangements may open up new
possibilities. For many groups, participation and
democratisation imply a widened ‘action space’. In
order to enable fishers to participate, there will, in




The basis of the policy in South Africa is the White
Paper (RSA 1997) and the Marine Living Resources
Act of 1998,1 which promotes the objectives of
‘equity, sustainability and stability’. The existing
regulatory system for commercial fisheries is mainly
based on catch control and leasing of rights to
persons or firms. The rights are partially transferable
and the duration is limited (Hersoug & Holm 1999).
A category of fishers created to accommodate
previously disadvantaged groups who do not fall into
the commercial fisher category is subsistence fishers. A
Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (2000) suggested
policy to be applied to this group. This differs from
the policy applied to the commercial fishers. In
neither case does the government commit itself to co-
management. The notion of co-management in
South Africa is used more or less uncritically by
academics, government officials, policy makers, and
fishers’ representatives and typically more in the
subsistence than the commercial sector of the
industry. Only a few projects in dispersed fishing
communities are using co-management on an
experimental basis. It is only in the subsistence
fishery sector that co-management is being suggested
as a way of managing the resources (Subsistence
Fisheries Task Group 2000). Official documents on
how to proceed with institutional change often give
a skewed picture about what actually happens when
the changes are implemented. It is how the policy is
implemented that matters, that is, what is actually
taking place at the grassroots. This can be studied
only by data collection in the communities, talking
to fishers and listening to their opinions about what
is going on, and analysing this data through
triangulation. Resource users’ interpretation and
opinions on issues such as efficiency, equity and
sustainability of management systems are rarely
investigated. Such research is not common before or
after the design and implementation of fisheries
management schemes. Instead, government relies on
input from organised user groups. Since many users
do not belong to an interest organisation, there is a
risk that the picture becomes skewed. Management
systems may not have legitimacy and enjoy support
at grassroots level, because the organisations that
managers consult are not representative of all user
groups (Jentoft 2000b). This is supported by
Endresen’s (1994) argument that, in social research,
the first step is to identify and label social
phenomena, the second is to establish to what extent
phenomena are related and form systems, and the
third is to trace structural principles and properties
of society by observing the actions of individuals.
This paper is based to a large degree on information
from the actors in communities, collected in the
Western Cape2 between February and March 1998,
and between November 1998 and July 1999. During
this fieldwork, fishers, organisational representatives
and government officials were interviewed.
The constraining and
enabling structures of an
‘action space’
By scrutinising the Marine Living Resources Act of
1998, it can be deduced that an action space is created.
Action space is defined as a possibility for people to
challenge and improve their working and living
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conditions and to create alternatives to their present
situation. It refers to a constellation of the structures
and institutions that form the arena in which
individuals exist and interact. Grove (1998) sees
action space as the space for poor people themselves
to resist and to challenge their conditions and to
create alternatives. Tarrow (1998) says that the
context determines whether people act or not. The
levels and types of opportunities people experience,
the constraints on their freedom of action, and the
threats they perceive to their interests and values
vary from time to time and place to place.
Participation and democratic decision making have
to do with power sharing and power redistribution
between the state and communities, and between
different interest groups in communities. When it
comes to redistribution of rights and quotas, and
when favouring previously disadvantaged groups,
this is a job only the state can do (Hersoug & Holm
1999). Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) claim that little is
written on the roles and activities that states and
governments take on in a co-management setup.
They emphasise the importance of having an
appropriate government administrative structure
and an enabling legal environment, either to sustain
existing local-level fisheries management systems, or
to develop new co-management systems. The
delegation of authority and power-sharing to
manage fisheries may be one of the most difficult
tasks in establishing co-management. Government
must not only foster conditions for fisher
participation, but sustain it. One issue Pomeroy and
Berkes (1997) mention is that the fishers must be
given access to government and its officials to express
their concern and ideas. Implementing co-
management means starting an institituonal change
in a revolutionary way. Institutional change means
changing the rules. This will most probably be
challenged by people who do not want a change of
the rules, people who benefit more from keeping the
system as it is. This means that the state will be
challenged, at the same time as it has an important
role with respect to the local-level fishers. Pomeroy
and Berkes (1997) say that only government can
legally establish and defend user rights and security
of tenure, and it can contribute to the creation of
legitimacy and accountability for the local
organisation. Supportive legislation, rights and
authority structures must be recognised. This will
legitimise the right to organise and to make and
enforce institutional arrangements at the local level.
The government’s role may also stretch to providing
assistance and service to support local organisations
and institutional arrangements.
The Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 is based on
a compromise by the various stakeholders in South
African fisheries. Nevertheless, the implementation
of the law in South Africa has been challenged on
various occasions, and the government has been
taken to court by actors who claim that they are
being unfairly treated. The first time the new
management principles were implemented, a share
of the total quota for the West Coast rock lobster for
the 1998/99 season was redistributed. The
government was immediately challenged by ‘old’
quota-holders who sued the government for
prematurely reducing their quotas. The ‘old’ quota-
holders won the case, for strictly juridical reasons.
The law created an action space, not only for the
previously disadvantaged groups, but also for people
who are strong enough to sue the state – for the
previously advantaged groups. The state did not
secure the formal requirements for institutional
change to a sufficient extent, and it expected all
stakeholders to act according to the intentions of the
new Act. The means the government has used to
promote its policy is to focus on ‘the local’, on
improving the situation of impoverished communities
through improving their access to the fish resources,
and by calling on the whole industry to demonstrate
solidarity with the new measures. However, this
strategy has already met much resistance, as
exemplified by the court case. There is a move
towards local ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’,
where the emphasis is on civil society, participation
and ordinary people. Mohan and Stokke (2000)
describe the tendency of participatory development
to mistake and treat ‘the local’ as an harmonious
community. This is often reflected in the way in
which participatory rural appraisal (PRA) tends to
promote a consensual view. Mohan and Stokke warn
against romanticising ‘the local’, and thus
downplaying social inequalities and unequal power
relations. In the literature on co-management, the
user groups are often treated as a homogenous mass
of people who agree on what their interest is. This
fails to make visible the powerful competing
interests at the intra-community level between the
local élites and the grassroots, and between different
groups at the grassroots.
Another effect of ‘going local’ is that the state is
downgraded in importance. The state has been seen
as being too centralised, but better localised research
will see that bureaucrats often consider local aspects
and thus help to achieve more appropriate
development. This assumption ‘forgets’ the ways in
which the state has used ‘the local’ politically
through material and discursive practices that
disempower instead of empower. One example
Mohan and Stokke give is the apartheid system that
at one level politicised local differences in order to
govern. They warn against romanticising the role of
local civil society in development theory and
practice (Mohan & Stokke 2000).
In sum, the structures that form the action space for
commercial fishers in South Africa are a combination
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of the fact that the resources are scarce, and access has
been reduced for some actors and increased for
others. Even though the Act provides a possible
entrance for new actors, there are certain restrictions
for new entrants to the industry – for instance,
complex application procedures and business plan
requirements. How people go about handling the
criteria, who they are affiliated to and the financial
capital for investment they possess are decisive for
who is in and who is out of the fishing business.
Actors with well-developed human and financial
capital have a marked competitive advantage.
Another restriction is the state of the physical
infrastructure. The varying distance to the centres of
power correspond with the varying possibilities for
influencing decision making. The action space is
widened in terms of an increased right to be heard,
but information about the opportunities for
interaction between the government and communities
is lacking. How the action space is perceived by
different actors depends on how the Act is
interpreted and whether the different actors are able
to take advantage of it.
The nature of participation
Democracy and development are concepts which are
closely related to the social rationale for co-
management. Democracy and development cannot
exist unless they co-exist, and the conviction is that
there can be no democracy without the pursuit of
‘the good life’ (Touraine 1998). Part of the process of
achieving democracy is including civil society in
decisions that influence them directly, an element
which is in keeping with the co-management
ideology. In the White Paper which forms the
background to the Marine Living Resources Act of
1998, it is stated that ‘local communities, labour,
scientists and resource users will play an active role in
the management of marine resources’ and that ‘all
resource users will be required to keep data for
management purposes’ (RSA 1997:13).
Without being precise, the White Paper is alluding to
participation in all phases of management, including
biological data collection. While this is encouraging
in a co-management perspective, there are few firm
guidelines on how to achieve active user group
participation. In the law, the issues of user-group
participation and poverty relief are referred to in the
following way (emphasis added):
The Minister and any organ of state shall in
exercising any power under this Act, have regard
to the following objectives and principles:…
h) the need to achieve to the extent practicable a
broad and accountable participation in the
decision-making processes provided for in this
Act…
j) the need to restructure the fishing industry to
address historical imbalances and to achieve
equity within all branches of the fishing
industry (Marine Living Resources Act of
1998, chapter 1 section 2).
There are no guidelines as to when and at what level
participation will and can take place, nor is there a
definition of who the previously disadvantaged are,
or what is meant by ‘historical imbalances’. The
‘active participation’ of users that is referred to in the
White Paper is omitted from the Act. Participation
of user-groups and co-operation between government
and industry are not new to South African fisheries
management.
Hutton et al. (1999) report that extensive
government-industry partnerships characterised the
fisheries management policy process over the last
few decades. Structures were set up at various levels
of the decision-making process in order to formalise
the management arrangements between industry
associations and the government in the form of
resource management committees. However, this
took place only between big business and
government. In these co-operative arrangements, the
state was devolving decision-making powers to big
business. Devolution of decision-making powers is
an important principle for co-management to work.
The new policy is meant to benefit the previously
disadvantaged but, because most are not as well
organised as big business, they do not have the
weight to back demands that power be devolved.
This is a general problem. According to Sverdup-
Jensen and Raakjær Nielsen (1998), experiences from
case studies on co-management in African countries
show that governments seem reluctant to devolve
power, legal rights and authority to user groups.
Devolution of management authority requires
changes in laws, policies and administrative
procedures. Section 79 in the Marine Living
Resources Act of 1998 says the following about
delegation of powers.
(1) The Minister may…
b) by notice in the Gazette, delegate any power
conferred upon him or her in terms of this Act,
excluding the power to make regulations, to an
authority in the local sphere of government, and
(c) No delegation of any power shall prevent the
exercise of such power by the Minister or the
Director-General .
The picture is that while at the present the South
African government is to some extent positive
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towards the idea of decentralisation,3 it is reserving
the right not be ‘disempowered’ itself. This is
consistent with government as the institutional pillar
of state management. One explanation for the
reservation is the uncertainty connected to giving
powers to an industry with a low degree of
coherence, co-ordination and organisation.
Decentralisation of management authority away
from the fisheries administration to user groups may
be one of the most difficult tasks of co-management.
As Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) emphasise, it takes
two to tango, and for the government to be able to
disempower itself, there must be someone
appropriate for the state to hand over power to. It
must know who is at the ‘receiving end’, which can
be problematic since the government generally lacks
knowledge about communities. The user groups
must be able to handle the responsibility of
management. In Europe, fishers are often organised
and appear as a strong collective voice, and are thus
able to manage, for example, quotas in a reasonably
fair manner.4 Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) say that
policies favouring co-management are a necessary
but not sufficient condition for successful co-
management. The participation of the users –
organisations and communities – is an important
element. A concern is the significance of leadership,
skills of fishers, resources, and capabilities of local
institutions. While responsibility will increase the
possibility of influencing decisions, it also demands a
certain effort from the users. But user-groups may
not have the aspirations nor the capabilities to
undertake enhanced fisheries management
responsibilities (Hersoug & Holm 2000).
The coastal communities of South Africa are seldom
the kind of ‘close knit’ communities found in many
other countries. Being a close-knit community is an
advantage when taking on responsibilities and
managing for the benefit of the community. The
South African situation is due, among other things,
to apartheid policies which led to forced removals
and the use of ‘divide and rule’ tactics which
contributed to making communities heterogenous.
A large number of fishers live far away from where
they fish, and they have to travel long distances to get
to sea. The capacity and competence to administer
and distribute resources is lacking in most coastal
communities. Poverty, lack of housing, alcoholism,
unemployment and illiteracy are pertinent features
of coastal communities in the Western Cape. In
general, the level of organisation is low, meaning the
ability to take on administrative tasks is very low
(Hersoug & Holm 2000).
The application procedures for quotas in South
Africa as elaborated by the government demand a lot
from applicants. If people are to be successful
applicants in the bid for quotas, they must be part of
business organisations, rather than acting as interest
organisations or unions. The companies must
elaborate a detailed business plan and show how they
will create employment for the previously
disadvantaged. This may seem premature and, as
Hersoug and Holm (1999) put it, it is unrealistic to
expect people who have been discriminated against
through all their lives to become professional
businesspeople within five years – the time limit for
quota holders to prove they can adapt to the new
system.
The South African Commercial Fishermen
Corporation is an example of fishers turning into
businesspeople. It was created by former poachers,
so-called ‘informal fishers’, and its 3 000 members5
belong to 24 different co-operatives along the coast
of the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape. The
corporation followed the prescriptions and criteria
of the law and received quotas for several species in
1998/99. It transformed itself from a resistance
movement in the middle of the 1990s to a business
with a complex organisational structure which
intended to become one of the biggest fishing
companies in the country. Fishers are linked to the
corporation by conditional employment. According
to the policy and practice, when a company receives
a quota, it is given the responsibility of managing this
quota in order to fulfil the intentions of the Act and
its own business plan. This is seen as a situation in
which the previously disadvantaged groups have the
opportunity to act.
In a context of action, power plays a decisive role. In
both neo-classical and Marxist theory, power is
treated as exogenous to economic systems and
processes. In her study of agricultural change in
Africa, Berry (1993) found that understanding
resource access and resource use is not simply a
matter of tracing rational actors’ responses to
relative factor prices and rules governing the
property rights. Farmers’ access to and uses of the
means of production have also been shaped by the
mobilisation and exercise of power and the terms in
which rights and obligations are defined. This also
applies to a fisheries management context, in which
the issue of access to the fish may be a highly
controversial issue and a source of multiple conflicts.
Central questions to be aware of with respect to
previously disadvantaged groups (although undefined)
are who has power, why they have it, and how
power is exercised. The grassroots in general have
little power when negotiating with the state and
other stronger stakeholders. But among the fishers,
there are élites that have been able to grasp the
possibilities provided for in the law, and have set up
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businesses according to the relevant criteria. A large
number of fishers reported that they had been
approached by what is here referred to as
organisational entrepreneurs in order to form part of
a new, small company that would apply for quotas.
The fishers were told that they would be part of the
company ‘staff’ that would be employed, and they
were a vital part of the compulsory business plan.
Affiliation to a company is a requirement for
consideration as a commercial fisher. Fishers agreed
and signed the application as proof that they formed
part of the company. Several fishers reported that
they had been ‘kicked out’ of the company whose
application they had signed once the company had
received a quota. Others were left in the dark, with
no information given on questions like how the
quota is to be ‘re-redistributed’ and many felt that
they were being misinformed. Figure 1 illustrates the
relations between the different levels of actors in
South African fisheries management.
Information about how to apply for quotas
according to the new policy is provided by the
government (top level) to the organisational
entrepreneurs (middle level). The organisational
entrepreneurs apply for quotas according to the laid-
down criteria, and some successful applicants are
allocated a quota. There is a strong element of state
control, and the state may consider the needs of the
previously disadvantaged favourably in order to
address historical imbalances in the society. There
are few guidelines with respect to how to redistribute
the resources and how to define previously
disadvantaged groups, but there are strict guidelines
on the procedure to be followed when applying for a
quota. However, there is much room for lobbying,
as the distance from the ‘people’ to the state is much
smaller with the ANC-led government than was the
case before it took power in 1994. The stronger
actors have a better chance of making a successful
application. When the successful applicants have
received their quota, further action depends on the
organisational entrepreneurs. At the risk of over-
simplifying, the organisational entrepreneurs are
split into an ‘opportunistic’ group which tends to
want the quota primarily for its own benefit, and a
group of ‘sincere’ representatives whose intentions
are to benefit the whole community. Unfortunately,
field research indicates that the majority of
organisational entrepreneurs are opportunistic.6 The
fate of many fishers depends on the decisions of the
organisational entrepreneurs, the group which is also
Figure 1: Organisational entrepreneurs between the government and the ground (elaborated from
Normann and Isaacs 1999)


























3) Decisions about quota
Grassroots – ordinary fishers
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responsible for providing information to the fishers.
Between the middle and the bottom level, the market
is the institutional pillar. Even though there might be
room for the fishers to lobby, it is a game of ‘survival
of the fittest’ and, by the same token, ‘survival of the
greediest’ (Normann & Isaacs 1999). The fishery
policy is in line with the South African government’s
neo-liberal, market-oriented macroeconomic policy
Gear (Growth, Employment and Redistribution)
(Bond 2000). Another aspect is that the middle level
operates as a ‘filter of information’. To a large extent,
the government expects organisational entrepreneurs
to inform the fishers on the grassroots about what is
happening at the policy level. Field data shows that
often the information from government does not get
past the middle level, keeping the grassroots in the
dark. The middle level also blocks information going
the other way – much information from the bottom
level that would be of interest to government never
reached the right person at the top.
The reason that this kind of gatekeeping activity can
continue after the advent of democracy can be
explained by the fact that the previously
disadvantaged have been underprivileged and
disempowered for decades. Most people living in
fishing communities are very poor and have little
education. They have problems with orientating
themselves to democracy, and know little about the
new policy structures and laws that have created an
action space which they could use. There is a need for
empowerment and education if the grassroots are to
participate. Empowerment is meant to enable the
previously disadvantaged to take advantage of the
new dispensation. While empowerment in South
Africa is thought of as financial empowerment
(through means like business share schemes),
empowerment has much to do with ‘social capital’,
which can be defined as ‘features of social
organizations, such as networks, norms and trust,
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for
mutual benefit’ (Putnam 1993).
Social capital is found at the local level. The level of
social capital may explain why there are differing
degrees of success in responding to the macro-policy
environment. Social capital will foster reciprocity,
and facilitate information flows for mutual benefit
and trust. Local communities are presented as being
characterised by trust, networks, reciprocity and
associations. A critique of the general discourse on
social capital is that controversial features of
communities, as power, class, gender and ethnicity
are not addressed. Strengthening of social capital can
take place through organisational activities and
networking, mobilising and utilising local resources
and energies for problem solving (Mohan & Stokke
2000). These authors see two ways of implementing
participation as part of an empowerment process.
The ‘revised’ neo-liberal position represents a ‘top-
down’ strategy for institutional reform because it is
an effort by central decision makers to make
institutions more efficient and include groups in
development processes. Power resides within
individual members of a community and can
increase with the successful pursuit of goals.
Empowerment of the powerless could be achieved
within the existing social order without any
significant negative effects upon the power of the
powerful. In contrast to this perspective is the post-
Marxist view, in which focus on empowerment is on
the ‘bottom-up’ social mobilisation in a society,
challenging hegemonic interests within the state and
the market. Key elements are the Freirean concept of
conscientização and collective identity formation
around common experiences of economic and
political marginalisation. Power is conceptualised
here in relational and conflictual terms.
Empowerment of the powerless requires a structural
transformation of economic and political relations
towards a radically democratised society. What these
two contradictory directions have in common is that
social equality and welfare growth will not be
ensured by the state or the market alone. Local
actors, knowledge and interventions are additional
key features in the conceptualisation of development.
In the White Paper (RSA 1997), the responsibility
for empowerment is partly given to big business.
This form of empowerment takes the form of share
schemes in companies. There are doubts to whether
this mechanism is benefiting the previously
disadvantaged. Workers of one fish factory which
had practised the share scheme policy for two years
did not feel that they had more influence or
responsibility than before, and they did not refer to
any improvement in socio-economic benefits. So far,
no real structural transformation in South African
fisheries has taken place. The ‘powerless’ are still
powerless and dependent, the difference is that now,
instead of depending on the state, they now depend
on organisational entrepreneurs. Responsibility for
achieving empowerment has been transferred to
existing and new companies.
Participation is supposed to take place at various
places in the management chain: design,
implementation and enforcement. In the process
leading to the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998,
which is the planning and design phase (1995–98),
stakeholders were called upon to give their input.
Several hearings were held in Parliament before the
Act was passed, and different stakeholders gave their
input to the policy process along the way (Hersoug
& Holm 1999). The press actively reported on the
process. Users were included in the planning and
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design phases and informed about the milestones in
the process. However, at the time of the fieldwork
(1998–99) many fishers claimed that they were never
part of any policy process and that they did not know
how they were represented in the process. They
complained that the outcome as the fishery policy is
far from anything they hoped for or expected. One
common thread that those who participated as fisher
representatives were not  representative of the fishers
at the grassroots, their needs and skills.
The design and planning process was revolutionary
in that it included the previously disadvantaged in
the process, but this was not enough to increase the
government’s legitimacy at the grassroots level.
Poverty, the lack of skills to obtain and absorb
information, and the speed at which the policy
formulation process happened may explain why the
grassroots claim they were not properly informed of
developments and why they say they have not
received the benefits they expected from policy
reform.
With respect to implementation of the policy, the
government established an advisory board, the
Consultative Advisory Forum, to provide advice on
how to set the total allowable catch for different
fisheries and how to distribute quotas. The Branch:
Marine and Coastal Resource Management, with
assistance and input from the Consultative Advisory
Forum, decides who among applicants are granted
quotas. Once quotas are allocated, the state does not
do much follow up work. In practice, its
responsibility ends, as it has delegated the task of ‘re-
redistributing’ the quotas to the members or
employees of the new companies or organisations.
When it comes to enforcement (monitoring/
control/ surveillance) of the regulations, the state has
sole responsibility. There is little checking of what
happens from the ‘middle level’ and below to find
out whether organisational entrepreneurs are
fulfilling their business plans. The state hardly plays
this ‘watchdog’ role at all, leaving the fishers to the
mercy of the organisational entrepreneurs on whom
they depend. Only commercial fishers can ‘climb’
the socio-economic ladder, but in a market-driven
environment such as the quota system it will be very
difficult for the state to perform the role of
protector. Figure 2 illustrates the degree of user
group participation in the different management
phases.
Legitimacy
Legitimacy is both a precondition and a result of
successful co-management. The previous apartheid
government did not enjoy legitimacy. In general,
during the process of creating a new policy, high
expectations were created by the government. When
their expectations were not met, people felt
deceived. According to Hersoug and Holm (2000),
one of the most serious management problems in
South Africa is the widespread lack of trust in the
administration, their regulations and their officers.
The legitimacy ‘balance’ is fragile. While co-
management is thought to improve legitimacy,
legitimacy must also be present in order for user
groups to be motivated to co-operate.
Legitimacy is conditional, and often depends on the
situation ‘here and now’. The government promised
a lot to the previously disadvantaged – promises that
have been hard to meet within the short time that has
passed since the Act has come into force. The view
people have of government and the feeling of trust
they have in it varies from time to time. For instance,
the group of leaders in one of the 24 co-operatives
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Fishermen Corporation was interviewed a few days
after the company had received its first quota,  late in
1998. The group was quite pleased and praised the
new policy, now that it could see that the
government had delivered what it had promised and
was listening to ‘the people on the ground’. The
group acknowledged that, had the interview had
taken place a month before when further
demonstrations were being planned to show their
lack of faith in the government and its promises, it
would have expressed a different view. A few months
after the interview, the government lost the court
case to the ‘old’ quota-holders. One consequence was
that the quota allocated to the South African
Commercial Fishermen Corporation was temporarily
withdrawn, so government legitimacy was reduced
again and the disappointment among the fishers and
their communities reached new heights.
The fishers were distrustful early in the process, not
only of the government, but also of the companies or
quota-holders with which they had affiliated
themselves. Since most members did not participate
in meetings of the leaders, many of them felt that the
South African Commercial Fishermen Corporation
was withholding information, that the leaders were
corrupt, and that the hopes that had taken root in the
communities were based on false promises. There are
strong feelings of disappointment and of being
deceived as expectations fail to materialise. It is
premature to draw conclusions about how the South
African Commercial Fishermen Corporation will
benefit the grassroots fishers in the future. As the
policy functions presently, the future of the people
on the grassroots level depends on their own actions
to a limited extent – they are strongly dependent on
how the organisational entrepreneur leaders take
care of them.
Legitimacy depends on the content of the policy
decision on whether fishers are allowed to operate as
commercial fishers or not (a decision made by
government). In South Africa, this is indirectly
linked to the effects of regulations on distribution
(decisions taken by government and organisational
entrepreneurs). When it comes to process legitimacy,
the majority of the fishers feel that they have not
been part of the making of the regulations. But the
perception that informs legitimacy is individual. The
actors and groups that benefit from the new policy
will ascribe more legitimacy to the government than
those who do not.
Lessons from South Africa
on co-management
A property rights system involving individual
transferable quotas, as is the case in the South African
system, implies exclusion of many actors wishing to
participate in the fishery. Quotas have not been
successful in terms of improving the socio-economic
situation for previously disadvantaged bona fide
fishers. Jentoft opposes individual transferable quota
systems that adhere to market principles. He advises
managers and decision makers to avoid the designs
that threaten the social fabric of fishing communities
– designs that make communities disintegrate and
become more stratified (Jentoft 2000a). Managers
should adopt designs that could potentially restore
and reinforce the solidarity and cultural qualities of
fishing communities.
However, this has been an extremely difficult task.
The social fabric of South Africa has been damaged
for decades and communities have been actively
disintegrated and stratified. The quota system does
not seem to alter this situation. If anything, quotas
are likely to exacerbate this problem. Existing
management practices in South Africa have so far
created more disruption, especially since people had
high (perhaps unrealistic) expectations. The fisheries
management regime in its current form does not
confront concerns such as atomisation and
stratification of communities. At a small-scale level
and in poor societies in transition to democracy,
quota systems expressed as individual transferable
quotas are not good. Quota regulations as seen in
South Africa work in a co-management setting at a
‘big business’ level, where the players are few and the
distance from the industry to the power’s corridor is
short. It would not be fair to draw final conclusions
about the South African situation because the new
fisheries policy has been in place for such a short
time. It is possible that the policy could work in the
way it is supposed to if applicants followed their
business plans. The state should perform a control
function in order to be a protector of previously
disadvantaged groups. Quotas are too valuable to be
left to organisational entrepreneurs or businesses, a
situation which has led to high levels of conflict and
inequality in communities. Those on the receiving
end suffer from lack of empowerment and have few
sanctions at their disposal when the law is violated.
The system in its current form relies on
entrepreneurs, but there are few ‘good’ entrepreneurs
who serve the ‘common good’ intention of the
policy.
O’Riordan (1999) supports Jentoft’s arguments and
claims that the quota system in South Africa is
inappropriate for developing the fishing sector. Since
it requires that all applicants establish a commercial
company complete with a business and marketing
plan, he claims that it places the sector in a
straightjacket, since quotas will only be awarded to
certain types of company structures. In most fishing
communities, literacy and education levels are low,
and the technical and commercial nature of the
Preconditions for implementation of co-management in small-scale fisheries
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application forms will make it almost impossible for
most bona fide fishers to receive quotas. The only
way for most fishers to become legal commercial
fishers is to submit to a more resourceful person and
become a part of that person’s team, albeit without
being able to influence the decisions made. Hersoug
and Holm (2000) are of the opinion that it is unlikely
that the market principle the quota system embodies
will work in favour of the previously disadvantaged
groups. While fisheries management is about
distribution of access, it is also about controlling use
of a scarce resource. International experience shows
that even though there are certain limits to the
concentration of fishing rights (monopolisation), it
is seldom a policy to involve as many people as
possible in the fishing industry. The fish resource is
a scarce resource, and this creates a huge dilemma
about who is included and excluded from being an
actor in the industry.
To sum up, co-management signifies that the state
and user groups share the responsibility of managing
the resources, and they must co-operate on a
continuous basis and take due care of the various
stakeholders’ interests. This is in line with the school
of development which places emphasis on the
importance of ‘participation’, ‘local knowledge’ and
‘putting the last first’. The co-management concept
is often used uncritically and is often too wide. Some
critics argue that all management is co-management,
because at some level or another the state and the
users will interact, have discussions and exchange
viewpoints.
The South African government is highlighting its
dedication to development and the eradication of
poverty to empower people and make people
responsible for their own lives – elements which are
found in all co-management thinking. The fishery
policy is not committing the government to
participation, and there are few co-management
parallels. Fishing communities have gained legal
recognition for the fisher profession, either as
commercial or as subsistence fishers, but they are
now at the mercy of the organisational entrepreneurs
or what the government decides with respect to
subsistence fisheries.
Implementation of the policy is far from what was
envisaged. At the outset, the previously disadvantaged
groups were in focus. As the fishery policy has
developed, the issue of poverty has been separated
from the quota question. The government’s practice
has clearly been to favour businesses and
organisational entrepreneurs, a goal which does not
promote poverty reduction. Market principles rule.
To be able to participate in the game, the previously
disadvantaged must be empowered, and the social
capital of society must be enhanced. Mohan and
Stokke (2000) say that the state’s role in enabling or
destroying social capital is often undermined, and it
is vital not to forget that social capital depends on an
interplay of the state’s willingness and its capacity to
encourage or dismantle social capital. This is an
important precondition for co-management and, so
far in the policy process, empowerment has been
limited to economic enrichment of the few.
The traditional role of the state as a provider of legal
frameworks is not enough when the objective is
more equitable distribution of access to resources.
Instead of letting the market take over from the level
of organisational entrepreneur and grassroots
communities, the state should perform a watchdog
role to ensure that the objectives of the policy are
being met. The state should perform the role of
protector, but without playing ‘dictator’.
As far as the development of co-management theory
is concerned, this case highlights the need to define a
role for the state in settings where resources are to be
redistributed in terms of quotas and the decisions are
challenged by strong actors who will lose out if the
new policy is implemented. Pomeroy and Berkes
(1987) are among the few who mention the role of
the government as protector in co-management,
although they do not elaborate on this point. They
suggest that the government should oversee local
arrangements and deal with abuses of local authority
and conflict management, because co-management
requires a clear commitment on the part of
government to the sharing of power and authority.
Hersoug and Holm (1999) agree that the state is
essential, and that redistribution should be a political
and administrative process – since the local
competence is weak, the organisation of the fishers is
weak, and there is a mutual lack of trust between the
state and the organisational entrepreneurs.
When identifying who benefits most from the way
the South African democratic institutions function,
there is a tendency to look back at what existed
before and how things have changed. This will
inevitably show that poor people have made
significant gains. Opportunities for people to
influence policy are greater now than ever before,
but their influence is still proportionately less than
that of other interest groups (Barberton 1998). Most
fishers in impoverished communities will not agree
with the assessment that they have benefited. So far,
redistribution efforts have not reduced poverty, and
as long as the grassroots feel that they are not
influencing policy any more than under the previous
regime, there is a long way to go to fulfil the
necessary preconditions for successful co-management
of small-scale fisheries in South Africa.
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1The Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 covers
such areas as administration, management of marine
living resources, marine protected areas, prohibited
activities and stowage of gear, law enforcement, and
judicial matters.
2In the fishing communities of Cape Town Harbour,
Hout Bay, Lamberts Bay and Ocean View.
3Decentralisation refers to the systematic and rational
dispersal of power, authority and responsibility from the
central government to lower or local-level institutions:
provincial, regional and/or local governments, or to
community associations. Increasing local autonomy is a
focal point in the decentralisation process (Pomeroy &
Berkes 1997).
4What “fair” means is itself a matter of contention and
cultural definition. To some people allowing neutral
“market” forces to work in a fishery through the transfer
of fishing rights is the fairest way of making allocative
and distributional decisions. To others and in other
contexts, “fair” includes the special claims of fishery-
dependent coastal communities or regions, or some
notion that there be a level playing field at the outset, so
that some players in the new market are not “unfairly”
positioned with regard to access to capital and other
resources enabling them to better adapt to the new
system (McCay 1995).
5An approximate number.
6A PhD student at the University of the Western
Cape is studying how entrepreneurs go about
obtaining quotas, what they do with them if their
applications are successful, and who benefits.
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partnerships: A popular trend or
a true devolution of authority to




South Africa’s forest sector is undergoing
restructuring fuelled by the wave of globalisation
and the influence of neo-liberalism as reflected in
South Africa’s Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (Gear) macro-economic policy – a
policy that significantly informed the making of a
new forest policy. The argument continuously
advanced by this line of thought is that the
withdrawal of the state from the key sectors of
national economies is imperative for a flourishing
investment environment which, in turn, will result
in a competitive market economy.
Based on ongoing PhD research, this paper assesses
the role played by globalisation and other factors in
determining the direction of the new forest policy
that paved the way for restructuring the
management of state forest assets. It discusses the
challenges these pose for the development of the
forest sector, especially in trying to address the needs
of rural communities with stakes in the industry. Of
particular interest to this author is emerging
community-company partnerships in the forest
sector, floated by the government to cover up for the
exclusion of rural communities and smaller black
businesses from direct ownership of state-owned
forest assets. In this context, partnerships are
understood as alliances between local communities
and private investors, with the state playing a
mediating role in the management of the forests and
forest assets. The partnerships expected between the
new owners of state-owned forest assets and rural
communities are perceived as a way of helping build
up local institutions, local capacities and in achieving
a wider redistribution of benefits from forestry. The
responsibility of addressing the needs of the rural
communities has been loosely transferred to the
prospective private bidders for the forest assets. In
addition, issues related to land ownership and
unclear or previously distorted boundaries between
communities and state-owned forests will constrain
the establishment of partnerships. Until land
claimants are identified and a definition of
‘communities’ obtained for the purposes of creating
partnerships, local communities may be in for a long
wait before they may be permitted to share in the
management of adjacent forest resources.
Inasmuch as governments and other agencies have
popularised partnerships as the way forward to
opening up the forestry sector to rural communities,
these efforts need to be supported and guided by
national forest policies and not left to the private
sector, which is primarily motivated by profit-
making. Proper and timely negotiations with local
communities as an interested party is crucial to the
success of partnerships and so is the recognition of
their rights of access, use and governance of these
resources. This will ensure that the partnership
arrangement is fair in the allocation of responsibilities,
the risks as well as the resultant benefits.
Restructuring the
management of forests
The government of South Africa is gradually giving
up ownership and management of forests and forest
assets in what has been described as the fastest and the
largest single privatisation on record (Kasrils 1999).
At the same time, some of the forest woodlands
previously under the management of the former
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homelands and currently managed by the Department
of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) are being
devolved to rural communities adjacent to these
assets, especially in the Eastern Cape province where
there is a relatively large concentration of woodlots.
The reason for devolving state-owned woodlots to
rural communities is to rescue DWAF from having
to manage loss-making forest assets while expecting
that the transfer of the management responsibility to
communities would help improve their management
abilities and capacities (Evans 1998a). These two
processes are important outcomes of the new forest
policy. Government’s withdrawal from active
involvement in forestry and other sectors is
perceived by the proponents of Gear as favourable to
the lowering of public expenditure while creating
further opportunities for growth through enabling
private sector involvement in key economic sectors.
Yet, in transferring the state forest assets to the
private sector, the government has opted to retain
ownership of forest land, thereby falling short of full
privatisation.
The government’s decision to undertake a partial
privatisation of forests by retaining ownership of the
land is to ensure security of tenure since some of the
plots are subject to claim under the national land
restitution programme, and to protect local people’s
land rights where these exist (Evans & Von Maltitz
1999). Moreover, the Interim Protection of Informal
Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 restricts the government
from transferring or selling any land on which
ownership claims are outstanding until these are
settled. The unique South African experience in the
forest privatisation process can be compared to
diverse policy approaches in other countries. It
illustrates the need to tailor policy to the national
context rather than submitting to international
pressure to replicate macro-economic policies that
may have worked in countries with different
economic and social conditions. The same could be
said of the decision by the government to devolve
certain forest plots to adjacent local community
control. These are government’s attempts to redress
inequalities perpetuated by apartheid policies
through facilitating participation of rural
communities in the management of local resources
and access to their benefits. Yet, these political
responses conflict somewhat with the economic
principles adopted by the government which
advocate full privatisation and emphasise market
forces.
The current approach also exemplifies the
contradictions inherent in privatisation processes,
especially since it involves land-based resources.
Introducing multiple players to the forest sector
could be seen as a way of intensifying competition to
achieve a thriving industrial forest sector, but this
may not necessarily result in positive benefits for
adjacent rural communities. Critical issues of local
governance which have been given little attention in
the past can no longer be sidelined or ignored. An
enabling environment where these issues can be
addressed is mandatory when we consider the
daunting challenges inherent in multiple alliances.
This could be attributed to the differences in needs
and the conflicting objectives of various parties, the
imbalance of power due to the financial strength and
human resource capacity of private companies, and
the lack of proper valuation of community’s stake in
natural resources, especially the land resource.
While privatisation of forests is intended to open up
the sector to multiple players to enhance
competitiveness of the sector and to create an
enabling environment for the economic
empowerment of previously excluded communities,
the position of rural communities as players has not
received meaningful attention. Attempts have been
made to facilitate the entry of emerging black
entrepreneurs into the sector through the forging of
partnerships with more established private players,
aided by the reservation of a 10% shareholding for
communities in the lease document. But the forest-
edge communities are in too weak a financial
position to establish consortiums with other private
companies. In the absence of special arrangements to
facilitate their entry into private sector forestry,
only selected local communities and individuals with
successful land claims to the forest assets will benefit
through land rentals that will accrue to them from
the state.
Yet, if we critically assess the meaning of
empowerment in the context of natural resource
management, rental would be considered as a form of
compensation and, by itself, is incapable of
contributing to the empowerment of communities
or individuals. Foy et al. (1998:2) define
empowerment as ‘a process whereby previously
disadvantaged communities or individuals benefit
from taking effective control and responsibility for
the decision making, over the assets that they own’.
The implication is that benefits to communities or
individuals is not limited to finances (through
rentals), but that they have governance over their
resources, retain control over related assets and
obtain value-added benefits gained from the
processing of these resources. To give practical
meaning to the debate around ‘local governance’ and
elude the trap of inapplicable academic paper
writing, it is necessary to question or assess what the
wider community and individuals (other than those
with formal land claims to the forests) perceive as
their stake in these forest resources. Studies
undertaken in parts of the Eastern Cape indicate that
communities regard the forest land as their own and
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the plantations as belonging to the state (Evans
1998b). It is therefore necessary to address the role of
the rural communities in the management of the
forest resources. But these efforts should go further –
they should integrate forestry activities into other
rural development initiatives in the fight against
rural poverty.
The rural development challenges facing South
Africa is what lies behind the recognition of the need
to achieve a more equitable redistribution of benefits
from natural resources and the need to include local
communities in private sector forestry. The current
tendency to systematically exclude local communities
seems to be the result of trade-offs between
government, private investors and others to try to
minimise investment risk. This is clearly
demonstrated by the failure of private companies
(apart from the Eastern Cape Forestry Consortium
comprising Hans Merensky and the Eastern Cape
Development Corporation) to establish partnerships
and offer the 10% reserved shareholding to
community entities. Instead, most private bidders
have found it safer and more convenient to team up
with black empowerment businesses.
Previous studies have pointed to the reluctance of
private companies to engage directly with local
communities because of the legal and operational
complexities involved. Private companies are also
understood to have low levels of capacity to
understand social dynamics (Evans & von Maltitz
1999) while communities may lack the financial
capacity, expertise and a well-defined organised
entity that could encourage private investors to team
up with them to bid for the forest assets. Should
these factors prevent the active entry of local
communities into private sector forestry? Were these
forest-edge communities given prior information
about the restructuring of state forests and did they
have a chance to explore other options that could
have facilitated their entry into private sector
forestry? Do black economic empowerment
initiatives only target a few affluent black businesses
at the expense of the rural black majority who, over
the years, have been directly affected by afforestation
practices through forced removals and other
discriminatory practices? These questions are
unavoidable when we consider the government’s
formal recognition of local people’s underlying land
rights, the local people’s proximity to these assets, in
line with the principles and global trends in
sustainable forestry development that greatly
influenced South Africa’s new forest policy.
It is clear that the most viable state forest assets
(Category A forests) will be transferred to private
forest companies. Local communities may only
benefit as junior partners in a process that has been
left to the successful private bidders to decide.
Though private bidders were required to give details
of facilitating black empowerment objectives, it
remains unclear what strategies successful companies
will employ. However, envisaged is an increase in
partnerships and the creation of new ones aimed not
solely at producing fibre for the industry but, this
time around, such partnerships are perceived as
instruments to achieve integrated rural development.
Partnerships with communities will be varied,
assuming that different players employ different
models, hence creating opportunities for research




In southern Africa, partnerships have evolved
differently and are often specific to the region and
type of natural resource in question. Some
partnerships have emerged as a result of private
companies’ initiatives to accumulate raw materials
and to contribute to social and economic
development of the rural areas (Mayers 2000). An
example is the decade-old household-based contracts
introduced by Mondi and Sappi in parts of rural
KwaZulu-Natal. Others are outcomes of conflicts
and claims to land and the management of land
resources as exemplified in the case of Makuleke
community and the Kruger National Park (Koch &
Massyn 1999). There are also examples of
partnerships arising after legal battles between trans-
national corporations and local communities over
the management and benefits of local resources. A
recent example in South Africa is the case between
the Royal Bafokeng Nation and Impala Platinum
over proceeds accruing from the mining of platinum
(Khunou 1999). Governments have also managed to
influence the creation of partnerships through
policy intervention to improve local incomes and to
enhance the equitable distribution of benefits from
local resources as currently being attempted in South
Africa’s forestry sector. Such initiatives have
increased with the spread of neo-liberal economics
advocating for minimal, if not complete absence of,
governments in the ownership and management of
national economic enterprises. On the other hand,
concerns have intensified for more local community
involvement in the running and the management of
these resources. Hence government-initiated
partnerships are efforts to find solutions in reducing
rural poverty and enhancing local capacities through
encouraging collaboration of local actors and private
investors.
In South Africa’s forest sector, community-
company relationship is a relatively new phenomenon
while partnerships between individual households
Community-company forestry partnerships
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and companies are already well-established (Ojwang
1999). Previously, private companies preferred to
engage in contracts with individuals for outsourcing
purposes, the basis of which was purely business.
Attempts have been made to initiate partnerships
with blocks of communities rather than household-
based contracts. The North East Cape Forests
(NECF) comprises Anglo American Corporation,
De Beers Holdings, Industrial Development
Corporation (IDC) and Mondi Limited in
conjunction with rural communities in the former
Transkei. NECF has initiated a joint venture model
for the purposes of growing timber for processing
within the Eastern Cape (Keet 1997).
New partnerships expected in the forest sector are a
result of the government’s policy requirement that
private companies intensify their contribution
towards rural development. Partnerships are
therefore expected to facilitate the entry of mostly
small-scale black business people into forestry and
forest-based downstream entrepreneurial activities
such as milling.
Secondly, the withdrawal of the state from the
management of these resources has also created the
need for new strategies in addressing and
representing the interests of local communities.
Issues of local governance are central to development
debates and respond to the need to boost local
management capacities and the need to gain other
social benefits from forestry.
Why community-company
partnerships?
Globalisation trends and subsequent pressure for
change in developing countries are stimulating the
creation of alliances between private companies,
communities, civil society and governments in
community-based natural resource management
(CBNRM). Partnerships are also emerging because
of civil society demands for greater accountability
and social delivery from governments. As
governments continue to streamline and reduce
public expenditures, the need to rethink strategies
for poverty alleviation has increased. Hence
partnerships with the private sector are seen as
critical for investment, the generation of benefits,
local capacity building, the creation of jobs, and
keeping abreast with fast-changing technology and
skills (Katerere 1999).
In CBNRM, partnerships are often attempts to
promote equity of benefits basically accruing from
natural resources between the private sector and/or
government and local communities (Ojwang 2000).
These relationships are characterised by processes of
negotiation where the roles and responsibilities as
well as the distribution of benefits are clearly spelt
out. Therefore community-company partnerships
have been promoted as a shift away from the less-
popular top-down intervention strategies that
alienated rural communities from the management
of natural resources and undermined their
livelihoods (Katerere 1999). Unlike these previous
interventions, partnerships promote pluralism in
natural resource management, focus  on strengthening
the decision-making capacities of rural communities,
and recognise and enhance their rights and access to
local resources.
The fragile land situation in South Africa is also
influencing the move toward partnerships. The
current land debate has already implicated existing
private companies as claims are made on some parts
of their plantations. Partnerships that involve
outsourcing from individually-owned or community-
based land resources shield the forest companies
from tenure disputes, as they do not have to continue
with directly investing in the land. Since the interests
of these private companies may be compromised
through land claims, they recognise the need to
strengthen partnerships with communities in order
to maintain and improve access to raw material
supplies.
In addition, due to the previous land policies of
apartheid that denied blacks ownership of land and
often subjected them to displacement, the
communities, who recall the previous policy
practices which over generations saw them excluded
from the more fertile lands, have always viewed
forestry activities with suspicion. As a result, there
have been cases in which conflicts have been so
intense that forest resources have been destroyed.
The private companies recognise the need to forge
close relationships with communities adjacent to
their projects by involving them in forestry activities
to allow benefit flow to the communities. Through
community involvement in forestry activities, it is
presumed that conflicts would be minimised, thus
these relationships are partly viewed as a security
measure against arson and other prohibited uses of
the forest resource. Sappi acknowledges that through
integrating small-scale farmers into its projects, it is
fulfilling its social responsibility to create development
opportunities for the impoverished rural communities
adjacent to its projects. It thus views its relationship
with communities as a tool for rural development
(Ojwang 1999).
New forest partnerships: The
challenges
Most practices of resource sharing, partnerships and
joint management of natural resources indicate a
shift away from exclusive private control and
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management of these resources to more pluralistic
approaches. The underlying motivation is to create
an environment that fosters increased participation
in management and decision-making processes and,
more importantly, a fair redistribution of forest
benefits to all stakeholders. Yet, there are enormous
constraining factors that characterise the processes of
creating partnerships. As a current requirement of
the government of South Africa, on taking over the
respective state forest assets, private companies are
expected to establish alliances with communities
living adjacent to the forest resources. It is possible
that the most daunting challenge is to obtain a clear
definition of ‘community’ for the purposes of
implementing partnerships.
Who does the government define
as ‘the community’?
There is a general consensus that the term
community has a wide range of meanings, but it has
often been loosely used to denote some homogenous
entity comprising members sharing common
resources, common problems and even similar
solutions to these problems. Murphree (1999) re-
evaluates the definition of communities and
concludes that the principles of communities of
place, interest and use pose problems for common
property theory. He prefers a more functional
approach, but recognises the significance of
boundary delineation in CBNRM. Likewise, in
implementing forestry partnerships, boundary
delineation is a prerequisite for identifying mem-
bership. This is likely to be a complex process, given
that some of these resources fall in areas that were
once under traditional authorities and were later
haphazardly removed from communal ownership
and turned into woodlots by the state in complete
disregard of existing boundaries (see Figure 1).
At one level, private companies are expected to forge
alliances with individuals or groups of individuals
whose claims to the leased-out forest packages or
portions of the forest packages will be successful.
They will be recognised as rightful owners and will
also benefit through rentals paid by the company in
question to the state. However, the land will be held
in trust by the state in accordance with the binding
lease agreement. Due to the fact that in some cases
there are overlapping claims on the same forest
resource between two or more such communities,
there is a looming problem of lumping together in a
partnership individuals who may have little in
common other than land claims to the forest. This
poses a potential threat to the success of the
partnership.
It is also understood that the Department of Land
Affairs will be embarking on a nation-wide
roadshow-type identification process of land
claimants. This is expected to clarify the position of
forest land rightfully belonging to communities and
individuals formerly displaced. The speed with
which partnerships can be finalised depends on the
success of this process.
On another level, private companies are also
expected to reach out to the wider community, that
is, people living adjacent to the forests, those
interested in the resource and those communities
who derive certain benefits from the forests. What
criteria will be used to determine the ‘closeness’ of
communities to these resources to enable a fair
redistribution of benefits from the partnerships?
Until the transfer of the forest assets to the successful
bidders is finalised, the approach to these crucial
issues in implementing partnerships will remain
unclear. Different companies are believed to have
different strategies that they will employ to establish
partnerships. Rural communities are also expected
to play a significant role in deciding how they want
to define themselves and what legal structures to put
in place.
Are rural communities interested
in forest partnerships?
Research undertaken in parts of KwaZulu-Natal
reported an initial reluctance by rural communities
to engage in forest partnerships (Ojwang 1999).
Communities have always viewed afforestation
practices with suspicion because they have associated
these with past policies that led to their dispossession
and displacement. At the same time, there is a high
degree of dependence on products from plantations
and people expect these benefits to continue and
become intensified (Evans 1998a).
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Besides, communities regard the land as their own
and the forest plantations as belonging to the state.
They recall the initial boundaries before land was
expropriated, the promises of compensation and
access that were never honoured, and the lack of
negotiation that accompanied their displacement. In
the light of these perceptions, these communities
have expressed their rights to preferential local
employment, the right to benefits, the right to
determine the direction of management of the
forests, the right to be consulted in cases of possible
changes in management, and ownership of the trees
and the right to receive revenue and rentals (Evans
1998).
It is understood that such demands by communities
contributed to the poor turnout of international
investors to compete for the forest assets. Private
companies are driven by profit and will face
enormous challenges in trying to reconcile
community demands with their own objectives of
maximising profits. Successful community
collaboration with private companies is likely to be
dependent on how far they are willing to negotiate
on the redistribution of benefits and on according
communities what they perceive to be their rights.
For communities and companies who will explore
further opportunities for afforestation, the scenario
is expected to differ from the existing contract
partnerships that were based on the volume and
quality of the tree product at harvest. If afforestation
is to be done on land under communal tenure, the
value of the land is likely to be taken into account as
the community’s stake in the partnership. But can
the land resource be fairly valued to ensure equitable
redistribution of forest benefits to the communities?
What is the perception of the private companies
about value-addition in forestry to enable producers




It would be wrong to assume that every member of
the ‘community’ would be interested in taking part
in the partnerships or that private companies would
consider negotiating partnerships with whole
communities. For effective local governance of the
process, it is likely that communities will form legal
representative bodies that will be accountable to the
broader community. A communal property
association would be useful for holding communal
land while other legal structures could be explored
for purposes of managing benefit flows to the
communities. Structures that could be employed to
facilitate communal participation include Section 21
companies, community trusts, co-operatives or
interest groups (Foy et al. 1998). The choice of the
structure of governance rests with the communities
in question, but it is expected to be effective in the co-
management of the forest resource, the redistribution
of benefits, informed decision making and the ability
to carry out its activities in a transparent and
accountable way.
Conclusion
Community-company partnerships in forestry are a
growing trend facilitated by the government to
enable the active participation of local communities
in the forest industry. It is a phenomenon which is
likely to mushroom in several forest-growing
regions of South Africa. Due to the fast pace of the
restructuring exercise, the inefficient flow of
information from the government to the
communities, and their financial constraints,
communities have missed the chance to gain direct
entry into private sector forestry as owners.
Partnerships with private companies is the option
currently being tried out, yet there are potential
obstacles pertaining to implementation such as the
definition of the concept, boundary delineation and
the setting up of legal institutional structures. These
are communal processes that could be defined even
prior to the arrival of private investors so that their
entry into partnerships is based on careful planning
and clear negotiation strategies.
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LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND SUSTAINABLE
LAND-USE MANAGEMENT IN LAND
REDISTRIBUTION PROJECTS IN RURAL
KWAZULU-NATAL
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Abstract
The question of who gets access to and controls land
resources is often highly political and contested. This
paper examines the efficiency and equity consequences
of natural resource and land management institutional
practices in land redistribution projects in rural areas
in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). Case studies of
redistribution projects in KZN as well as findings
from secondary sources are used to examine the
following questions: What institutions are present to
regulate and manage the use of land resources in the
communities? What are the characteristics in terms
of membership and decision-making processes of
these institutions? What mechanisms exist to address
the needs of households and individuals in terms of
land use? How are conflicts related to land-use
management addressed? Which factors determine
the presence and effectiveness of such institutions?
What are the relationships between socio-economic
characteristics, common property management and
natural resource sustainability in these communities?
A multi-conceptual framework coalesces several
themes relating to sustainable land use management
including historical dimensions, policy frameworks,
distributional concerns as well as cultural dimensions.
Furthermore, future challenges around building
institutional capacity, appropriate indicators and
relevant training as well as information dissemination
programmes pertaining to sustainable land use
management in land reform projects are examined.
Introduction
Whoever owns land (or is perceived to own the land)
generally commands power. Land is the most
important asset that a human being can possess in
that social, cultural, economic and political clout and
power can be determined by the status that
ownership of land accords. Land reform is generally
undertaken to address political, social and economic
imperatives (Masilela 1999). The key political
objective entails changing land relations, especially
in terms of ownership and control patterns, so as to
redistribute power in South Africa. The social
redress goal is aimed at ensuring redistributive
justice. In terms of the social objectives, access to
land for residential, productive and subsistence
purposes to previously disadvantaged groups are
deemed important. The economic objectives
promote production and efficiency in terms of the
utilisation of land and labour. In this regard, a central
concern is the role of agricultural production in
enabling food security as well as industrial crop
production. In addition to these imperatives,
environmental sustainability considerations are
gaining widespread support. A major challenge
facing land reform policymakers and implementers
in South Africa is how to balance these often-
conflicting land reform imperatives.
It is important to recognise from the outset that the
relations between rural people and land are
influenced by specific historical, socio-economic and
physical environments under consideration, and are
location-specific. The nature of human activities and
their varied relationships to land differ significantly
across these contexts. Furthermore, the availability
of and uses of land resources are also influenced by
diverse situations. For the purposes of this paper, we
are mainly concerned with rural communities who
are land redistribution beneficiaries in KZN. Forces
driving land use management and changes in land
reform projects are complex. Many parameters
interact, each with its own power, temporal and
spatial dynamics.
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Figure 1: Kwazulu-Natal land redistribution projects under study
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The focus is not on land per se but the aspects of land
that are potentially useful to household and
communities such as water, place for shelter, land
quality, wood, wild foods, gardens and medicinal
plants. The major concern is whether land
redistribution projects consider and are able to
effectively integrate local institutions in the
management of land in the communities. An
additional consideration is whether existing policies
and practices of land management challenge social,
political and economic disparities that tend to
reinforce inequitable patterns of ownership,
accessibility and control.
This paper outlines pertinent findings of studies
undertaken in land redistribution projects in KZN.
First, the Kwazulu-Natal quality of life survey report
(Bob 1998) and Quality of life survey report (May et al.
2000) are used. Second, information is drawn from
the Compliance to business plans in land reform
projects study conducted for the Department of Land
Affairs (DLA) Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate
(Bob 1999). For the purposes of the Compliance to
business plans in land reform projects study, three land
reform projects in KZN were chosen as part of a
national research endeavour. Land use planning,
implementation and management were key aspects
raised in the research undertaken. Fieldwork
conducted in Ekuthuleni as part of an intensive study
aimed at examining gender and land reform is also
used. Additionally, findings are drawn from research
that is currently being conducted in Thembelihle
pertaining to community conflicts in land
redistribution projects. The specific land
redistribution projects are denoted in Figure 1.
Fieldwork in the form of interviews and
participatory techniques such as resource mapping
and Venn diagrams with different stakeholders were
conducted in the various research endeavours in
KZN. Although a number of issues raised in the
studies underscore sustainable land management and
institutional concerns, the scope of this paper
permits the examination of only a few aspects.
Some definitional clarifications
According to Stromh et al. (1994), land use involves
the human activities that are directly related to land,
making use of its natural resources or having an
impact on it. It is important that other facets in
addition to biophysical conditions are included to
fully understand land-use dynamics in poor rural
communities. Political, institutional and cultural
considerations are significant in shaping land-use
strategies.
The most widely used definition of sustainable
development is ‘development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED
1987). Sustainability is often viewed as integrating
and balancing ecological, social, economic (both
issues of productivity and viability) and political
interests. The term ‘sustainable development’ and its
related ‘sustainable natural resource management’
and ‘sustainable land management’ (SLM) are
receiving increasing attention in the development,
research and academic arenas. Herweg et al. (1999:26)
assert:
SLM seeks to harmonise the often conflicting
objectives of intensified economic and social
development, while maintaining and enhancing
the ecological and global life support functions of
land resources.
According to Pieri (1997), there is need to move
away from concepts and prescriptive approaches to
an integrated approach to the physical planning as
well as the social and institutional dimensions of land
management. Sustainable land-use management
provides improved options for productive ventures
as well as longer term social, economic and
environmental sustainability considerations.
Goetz (1995) states that institutions need to be
understood as sets of formal and informal rules
which shape social perceptions of people’s needs and
roles, while organisations administer these rules and
respond to needs. Institutions and organisations can
differ in terms of physical arrangements, management
and leadership styles, ideological positions and the
purpose for its existence. These manifestations of
institutional attributes often reflect strong biases.
This paper will demonstrate some of these




The majority of people in land redistribution
projects in KZN remain dependent on some level of
subsistence agricultural production, reliance on
outside remittances such as pensions, limited
employment opportunities and access to natural
resources such as fuelwood, water, medicinal plants
and wild foods (Bob 1998; May et al. 2000). Land
concentration which has characterised many of the
projects in KZN implies that a growing number of
rural families have to share decreasing land resources.
Additionally, declining living conditions which
reflect the lack of income-generating opportunities
and the inability to implement and sustain viable
agricultural projects mean that households become
increasingly reliant on the natural resource base for
wild foods, fuelwood and water. Furthermore,
subsistence production tends to be extended to
marginal, low agricultural potential land. These are
illustrated in Figure 2.
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The Compliance to business plans study (Bob 1999)
raises concerns pertaining to whether business plans
truly reflect realistic goals and conditions of
communities or whether they merely serve the
purpose of legitimising the transfer of land. Another
issue is whether projects are being threatened
because communities fail to implement the business
plans. A great deal of resources, especially finance
and person-power, have been invested in the
development of business plans for land reform
projects in the hope that the projects will be viable
socially, environmentally and economically.
The White Paper on South African Land Policy
(DLA 1997) states that land reform needs to be
conducted in an environmentally sustainable
manner and that land transfer must be associated
with acceptable levels of environmental impact.
Turner (1997) and Watson (1998) assert that
environmental considerations in the implementation
of land reform have thus far been incidental rather
than integral to the process. Watson (1998:1)
suggests:
There is concern that the failure to integrate
environmental considerations in the land
reform process will prevent beneficiaries from
‘escaping the poverty trap’ and have very serious
detrimental environmental repercussions.
The results of the environmental impact assessments
conducted by Watson (1998) in redistribution
projects in KZN indicate that, to a large extent, the
long-term viability of land reform projects will be
threatened. Although the communities exhibited a
wealth of indigenous knowledge about their
environment, many practices mitigated against
sustainable environmental usage. This can directly
be attributed to the poverty levels of the
communities and their lack of access to sufficient
natural resources.
Furthermore, the research has clearly illustrated that
in some instances the communities have been settled
on fragile land that is susceptible to erosion, is of low
arable quality, have already been overgrazed (bush
encroachment has already started), with poorly
sited, constructed and maintained surface roads and
footpaths. Watson’s (1998) findings support Turner’s
(1997) assertion:
…there can be little doubt that unacceptable risks
are being taken in many current redistribution
projects. The common instances where the
number of ‘beneficiaries’ is increased in order to
make up the number of R15 000 grants (now
R16 000) needed to buy the land show the way in
which ownership and settlement motives take
precedence over questions of environmental (or
economic) sustainability.
This contention still remains relevant today.
Results from the studies conducted in various land
redistribution projects indicate that perceptions of
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natural resources differ considerably among
community members, community organisations as
well as outside stakeholders such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), planning
consultants and DLA officials. A major reason for
these differences is often associated with whether the
particular individual or group is focusing on short-
term costs and benefits or on long-term social and
ecological imperatives.
Managing sustainable land-use practices needs to
incorporate a focus on the human component – the
users of the land. This includes managing the way
information is disseminated, the issue of leadership
and representation, the handling of conflicts (both
intra-community and inter-community) as well as
sustaining community involvement and participation
in decision making. It is worth noting that, although
land redistribution projects are often referred to as
communities, these are often artificially constructed
with diverse interests and needs that are often
contradictory and competitive (Turner 1997). For
the purposes of this paper, land redistribution
projects are often referred to as communities and
denote specific geographical locations ascribable to a
particular group (in this case the redistributed land
and the beneficiaries). However, due consideration is
given to social differentiation and conflicts within
the community.
Institutional structures
Specific institutions that have received particular
attention for their roles in land management in
redistribution projects include communal property
associations (CPAs) or community trusts,
community-based organisations such as land and
water committees, traditional structures such as the
chieftaincy, NGOs and government departments
such as DLA, the Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry as well as the Department of Agriculture.
CPAs or trusts are the legal entities that manage
redistribution projects. Together with land
management committees, they are responsible for
land-use arrangements and practices as well as
mobilising and organising for the delivery of services
to the projects. These institutions play differing roles
in management of land resources. Their roles often
vary from place to place and there is some confusion
about which institution takes responsibility for what.
Generally, the institutional framework present in
redistribution projects in KZN tends to focus on
documenting rules and procedures relating to how
land should be used. This includes aspects such as
carrying capacity, water rights, fuelwood collection
points and demarcation of grazing areas. However,
very often these procedures are ignored. This is
linked to rural livelihood decisions made in poor
households which have very few options available to
them. However, this can also in part be attributed to
the lack of clarity and the ability of the legal entities
and other relevant organisations to enforce
regulations pertaining to sustainable land-use
practices.
The Venn diagrams (Figures 3 and 4) compiled in
two redistribution communities in KZN are
illustrative of the dominance of males in most
community structures. The overlap of circles show
members who concurrently belong to more than
one structure. During the discussions it became clear
that a few people in the community dominate most
decision-making structures. Also evident is the fact
that there are individuals and organisations outside
the community that influence decisions within the
community. Some of the most influential structures
are DLA, NGOs, local government departments and
planning agencies. The key decision-making forum
in the community is perceived to be the land
committee. The outside groups are viewed as being
more important than the structures in the
community. The assistance expected from outside
organisations, especially government structures, is
explicitly reflected.
Goldman et al. (2000) suggest that institutions and
organisations need to be viewed as assets, as part of
the community’s social capital. In land redistribution
projects, it is important to understand that
beneficiaries do not only have needs, but also have
resources or assets that often manifest themselves in
formal and non-formal organisations as well as social
networks. Although some institutions, such as legal
entities and land committees, are the result of land
redistribution, they are in many ways an extension
and reflection of existing organisational structures as
will be discussed later in this paper.
Legal entities and other
community organisations
Legal entities are the custodians and key managers of
land redistribution projects. Their collective
decisions and action will ultimately determine the
social, economic and environmental sustainability of
land redistribution communities. As May et al.
(2000:xv) assert:
The capacity of land reform beneficiaries to
organise themselves into various forms of
management structures is a central element of
the land reform programme. Group ownership
of projects implies that the absence of
institutional capacity could easily undermine
the potential success of the programme.
The formation of legal entities guided by a
constitution and democratic principles can be
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Figure 3: Institutional relationships in Thembelihle
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viewed as implementing radical institutional change
in the countryside. Yet, despite this radical
institutional change, legal entities have remained
problematic in relation to managing land use
concerns in most of the communities under study.
What is clear is that beneficiaries remain unclear
about the nature of their land rights. Some indicate
that they have usufruct rights while others felt that
they were owners. This confusion is further
manifested in the common practice of periodically
re-allocating land, especially parcels of the
communal areas, to other users. Additionally, the
legal entities face a major problem in that their
positions are not well defined.
In terms of the creation of the legal entities,
especially the election of leaders, very few
respondents could answer with certainty how
community leaders were chosen. They felt that
better-off, male community members and
representatives from traditional structures such as
chiefs or headmen often occupy key leadership
positions. Most of the powers are invested in
representatives who are generally either chiefs or
elected males. There was also the perception that
legal entities were formed by the DLA officials. This
implies that legal entities are viewed as being created
and controlled by government.
In terms of the functioning of the legal entities, the
following national findings by May et al. (2000)
support concerns discernable in KZN projects:
Many participants have no or limited knowledge
of the management of the project and how
funds, especially land grant money, is used. This
opens opportunities for corruption and misuse
of community funds.
The most common types of conflicts pertaining
to legal entities arise between trustees or
committee members, and relate to the
distribution of income generated from projects
and the allocation and use of land.
Participation in decision making by beneficiaries
is a major cause for concern and will be discussed
in greater detail in this paper.
The role of traditional
authorities
In addition to their participation in legal structures,
traditional leaders often compete with legal entities
for prominence in some land redistribution projects,
for example, Thembelihle and Cornfields. This
conflict has become a central point of contention at
the local level. McIntosh et al. (1995) and Erskine
(1997) indicate that in some areas traditional tribal
authority management structures are being
pressurised to transform by rural communities who
are increasingly supporting democratically-elected
management structures. While some traditionally
leaders are heeding this call, others have opted to
vociferously challenge this notion.
Traditional structures and land tenure arrangements
are an important aspect of rural life in KZN which
affects the sustainable exploitation and management
of land resources. The chieftaincy as an institution
and stakeholder in land allocation, management and
control processes continues to be highly controversial.
Cousins (1996), McIntosh et al. (1995) and Levin and
Mkhabela (1997) argue that the land allocation
function is critical to traditional leaders because it is
one of the few remaining actual powers and sources
of influence they have. As Levin and Mkhabela
(1997:161) state:
Control over land allocation constitutes the
centrepiece of the coercive power of the
chieftaincy. This is not only because chiefs are
placed in a position to determine who may have
access to land for different uses, but also because
they have the formal power to refuse their
opponents entry into a given territory or to
banish them from it.
The question of land allocation and management has
become a major point of contention around land
reformation processes in KZN. In this region, as is
the case in many parts of South Africa, applications
for land under redistribution and restitution
components are often submitted via chiefs in the
communities.
The problem of conflicts between tribal authorities
and legal entities is alleviated in circumstances where
the beneficiaries are part of one tribal structure with
existing relationships that are stable.
In the Amantingwa project, for example, the
beneficiaries benefit from organised leadership that
gains the support from most households. They built
the board of their trust around their existing tribal
structure. Erskine (1997) states that traditional
community management structures, provided they
are well defined and supported in the community,
can play a pivotal role in raising environmental
issues.
However, Erskine (1997) warns that they alone may
not be able to resolve the complex present-day
problems created by the competition for land and
the over-exploitation of natural resources.
Role of NGOs and
government structures
There are differing perceptions and experiences
related to the role of external agencies in managing
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and supporting land projects. Where NGOs were
present, there were positive responses that they were
prominent in terms of facilitating grant applications.
However, there is also evidence that NGO action in
some of the communities contradicts the general
philosophy of co-operation and co-ordination. Some
responses, especially from traditional and CPA
leaders, indicates that NGOs tend to ‘take sides’ and
often perpetuate factions and conflicts in the
community. In contrast to these sentiments, women
particularly stated that NGOs supported their
interests and played a major role in their
empowerment.
The DLA is responsible for central land reform
functions. Other government departments which
are often referred to as line-function departments are
critical service providers for land reform beneficiaries.
These include the provincial Department of
Agriculture, the national Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry as well as the provincial
Department of Local Government and Housing.
Extension services are an important component in
natural resource management, especially in terms of
land use relating to production ventures. In terms of
extension services, half of the projects indicated that
an extension officer had visited their communities.
However, in most cases, the officer visited projects
once and no tangible benefits were accrued.
Furthermore, the extension officers usually spoke to
the men in the households and the communities. The
neglect of land redistribution projects by service
providers is disconcerting. This paper now examines
the extent and nature of participation in institutions.
Participation
Sustainable land use management practices are best
achieved by effective participation of local people
and organisations (Farrington & Boyd 1997). It is at
these levels that local knowledge can be harnessed
and effective policies and practices can be developed.
In development circles, the notion of participatory
development has become extremely popular.
However, Guijt and Shah (1998) warn that within
participatory development processes and projects
there are grave inequalities that can be attributed to
resources disparities, time constraints, discriminatory
practices and power dynamics. These factors
influence the activities, priorities, framework, extent
and quality of participation. One needs to remember
that the development of the land reform programme
was not a broadly participatory process. In fact,
communities, NGOs and activists raised objections
to the form and the content of the land reform
programme.
The DLA Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate’s
1998 study on participation (DLA 1998) supports
Farrington and Boyd’s (1997) observation that
participatory management under common property
arrangements such as CPAs in land reform projects is
difficult to achieve. The tendency is for a few
individuals, usually male, to dominate decision-
making processes.
In all the communities, participation was not
sustainable. Groups were enthusiastic during the
initial stages but their participation waned in later
phases. The results of beneficiary participation in
land redistribution projects in KZN indicate that
participation in specific land reform processes is
inadequate and lower than the national average
(Table 1). During discussions, the respondents said
that their ‘participation’ meant being told about
decisions. It is during the land reform processes that
decisions about resource use, allocation and
priorities are made. The lack of participation
 PROCESS KZN NATIONAL
n=12 N=70
 Settlement needs identification 8 49
 Preparation of application  25 50
 Identification of land  25 56
 Appointment of consultant  - 36
 Preparation of business plan  - 47
 Beneficiary selection  - 34
 Settlement planning  - 21
 Formulation of project rules  - 31
Table 1: Household responses in Compliance to business plan study: Participation in land redistribution
processes (%)
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suggests that the needs and aspirations of members of
the communities will be neglected since their inputs
and representation in decision-making processes in
the communities are limited. Additionally, very few
beneficiaries participated in the formation of the
legal entities which are the bodies mandated to
represent and manage the community. Also, the
election of this group is supposed to be a democratic
process with all adults within the beneficiary
households participating. Very few respondents
stated that they participated in forming and electing
members of the relevant trust or CPA. Additionally,
very few respondents stated that they took part in
capacity building and skills development initiatives.
This is despite the fact that both the DLA and local




The subject of women and land resources merits
special attention because many studies have shown
that women and men interact in different ways with
the land resource base (Deshingar 1994; Rangan
1997). Rights to resources, their interaction with
land via the work patterns and experience with land
policy and programmes are highly gendered. The
research conducted in KZN shows that within
institutions in land redistribution projects, the
representation of women with effective decision-
making capacity is uniformly inadequate. Active
participation of rural women is constrained by
cultural and social barriers as well as limited time
available due to their multiple roles and
responsibilities. In the context of rural KZN, the
multiple burdens on women are particularly acute
due to women’s economic dependence on men,
reinforced by cultural traditions and religious
practices that dictate women’s relationships and
roles in societies as well as the relationships to
resources, especially land. Extensive research show
that in comparison to men, women are generally at a
disadvantage in terms of control and access to
resources, including land (Kabadaki 1994; Rangan
1997; Small & Kompe 1991). Yet, women are key
environmental managers and consumers. Their vast
knowledge about the land they use is key to
sustainable development in rural areas.
Figures 3 and 4 clearly show that women’s presence
in key decision-making structures such as land,
agricultural and water committees is limited. This is
an important concern since during the fieldwork
female respondents often stated that they felt that
they do not have the power to make important
decisions. These remain the domain of the men.
There was a general sense that women were unable to
tackle the larger issues that face them as women
relating to issues such as access to good-quality
agricultural land for subsistence production, the
need for electricity (women spend a great deal of time
collecting fuelwood because it is not easily available),
and accessibility to building materials.
The results from the research conducted in KZN
show that women are unable to participate equally in
legal entities. Whilst CPA and trust constitutions
might make legal provision for women’s equal
participation, this fails to consider the non-legal
factors such as cultural attitudes and workloads that
prevent women’s participation. Some women are
elected committee members. However, in these
cases, gender roles are clearly evident. Women
usually occupy secretarial positions. Most of the
women attend meetings only if they are able to do so.
Moser (1993:101) outlines three reasons why women
must be incorporated fully in development
processes. These are also relevant to participatory
land use managment more generally.
Participation is an end in itself. Community
members have the right and duty to participate
in the execution of projects which profoundly
affects their lives.
Participation is a means to improve project
results. The exclusion of community members
can negatively affect the outcome of a project,
while their active involvement can often help its
success.
Participation in project activities stimulates
participation in other spheres of life. Participation
in projects has been seen as an important
mechanism to overcome apathy and lack of
confidence and it can make marginalised groups
visible in the community.
Furthermore, marginalised groups such as women
possess highly useful localised knowledge and
practical experience that is different to those who are
in power.
How are conflicts managed?
Conflicts over governance in land redistribution
projects have the potential to reach violent levels, as
is the case in Thembelihle and Cornfields in KZN.
At the very least, they pose numerous problems to
productive development and environmental
sustainability. In the projects under study, many
respondents indicated that there were aware of
community tensions. The factors that seemed to
influence tensions in the community and among the
leaders were attributed to political and social dif-
ferences as well as competing needs related to land use.
A major source of conflict in land reform projects as
identified in the Compliance to business plan study
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relates to community expectations and
implementation realities. The most important
persons and/or groups in charge of settling disputes
in the community were identified as:
the elected committee/legal entity
government officials
the chief/induna.
As illustrated earlier in this paper, the functionality
and representation of the elected committees were
questioned in some cases. Thus, it is conceivable that
the involvement of some of the groups identified
above may escalate rather than resolve conflicts.
Conversations in some communities that indicated
that elected committees were primarily responsible
for settling disputes in the community also showed
that committee members often do not feel that they
have the necessary skills or support in the
community to take on their roles.
In most of the communities the respondents stated
that there were no clear and effective procedures in
place to deal with a situation if someone in the
community has a grievance or disagrees with a
decision made by the committee. Furthermore,
there are no steps in place to discipline community
members who do not adhere to rules such as limits
on the number of cattle permitted per household.
Thus, the sustainability of some projects is
threatened because there are no procedures in place
to ensure that the specified activities and decisions
are being adhered to by all beneficiaries.
An issue for concern is that conflicts and
contestations pertaining to land use in projects are
often viewed as problems which need to be managed
or resolved. However, this is a limited and
problematic way of conceptualising conflicts. It is
important to address the underlying structural
causes of the conflicts. In the redistribution cases, the
inadequacy of the land grants, inability to provide
sufficient arable and grazing land for household and
community needs, the superficial construction of
communities, the lack of after-care support for
projects, as well as the persistence of discriminatory
practices are some underlying causes of major
conflicts.
Land tenure arrangements
The responses from KZN support national findings
(May et al. 2000) that indicate that most respondents
were not able to report a secure manner of
confirming their ownership to land. It was generally
expressed that people ‘just know’ which land is
theirs.
There are a variety of land uses discernable in
projects including residential use, grazing, subsistence
production, commercial enterprises, leaving land
fallow and community gardening. Generally the
legal entities are mandated to manage the land uses.
May et al. (2000) suggest that the current
institutional arrangements in the form of legal
entities are unlikely to be the optimal choice for land
reform enterprises since their form and function are
generally geared towards generating economically
sustainable profit enterprises (commercial ventures)
rather than subsistence-orientated livelihood projects.
The latter projects remain the major expressed need
of most beneficiary households in KZN. Thus, it
may be more appropriate to encourage the
development of alternative types of institutions that
are more responsive to differing land needs and
options.
Another major area of concern in land redistribution
projects is common pool resource management and
land sustainability. Farrington and Boyd (1997)
define common pool resources as those that
contribute to livelihoods but are not privately-
owned. These include water sources (rivers and
dams), forests and rangelands. Poorer households
and women generally in rural areas are much more
dependent on common property resources than men
of the same households. The importance of access to
public land or communal lands was mentioned by
most of the respondents. This illustrates that the
historical advantages of accessing common property
forests and other public land remains. This has
provided multiple resources to households, especially
among historically disadvantaged groups. In periods
of food insecurity, for example after a poor harvest
or loss of income-generating activity, a considerable
amount of time is spent gathering and processing
wild foods. Their access to these types of resources is
important in times of crisis and is generally essential
for poorer households.
Common pool resources in the community are
usually managed through common property
arrangements but may include open access resources
that are appropriated opportunistically. Common
property arrangements, according to Hillhorst
(1999), involves a broad variety of local stakeholders
in decision making, implementation and monitoring.
Various forms of environmental degradation such as
disappearing forests, deteriorating soil conditions
and depleting water supplies are bound to impact on
land redistribution projects. A major cause of this is
the inability to significantly challenge the
concentration of resources in the hands of a few.
Furthermore, the erosion of community resource
management systems has compounded these
problems.
A major conflict discernable in the KZN land
redistribution projects is around water resources.
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The management of both natural water resources as
well as boreholes was an often-cited problem by
many institutions and members of the community.
This is despite the fact that most projects have
established water committees.
Policy implications
A central focus in many of the land and development
debates is the integral role of policy in promoting
equality and sustainability. This is important
because the experience of land mismanagement can
be seen as a product of institutions, where it is the
outcome of institutionalised patterns of distributing
resources. The success of natural resource and land
policies, and their ability to inform practice and thus
change conditions on the ground, is largely
influenced by the capacity of institutions that are
responsive to sustainable natural resource and land
management issues.
Getting policies right is concerned with understanding
the relationships between patterns of development
management and development outcomes. From a
social perspective, it is important to highlight that
policies and institutions have not been right for poor
rural communities generally. Policies and institutions
often limit land options depending on discriminatory
practices related to gender, sexual orientation, class,
race, religion, political affiliation and ethnicity in
different contexts.
In many instances, international environmental
policy initiatives such as Agenda 21 and the Rio
Declaration have, at least in principle, been accepted
by government structures. South Africa, like a
number of other governments, has ratified
international conventions regarding the environment,
revised parts of its legal codes, passed new legislation
or set up environmental committees to acknowledge
the importance of addressing environmental issues.
However, despite these legislative and structural
steps forward, achievements towards the real
integration of environmental issues in the process of
development remains limited. Evidence from many
studies indicates that social institutions and
development organisations continue to produce
outcomes which are detrimental to the natural
resource base.
Getting land management policies right is concerned
with understanding the relationships between land
reform policies, land reform management and land
reform outcomes. There is therefore a critical need to
de-institutionalise privilege in land redistribution
structures and integrate land sustainability
imperatives.
Constraints and capacities
Several factors reinforce the problems pertaining to
institutional capacity relating to the sustainable
management of land use in redistribution projects.
These are:
perceptions and ambiguities around the role of
legal entities and traditional authorities within
the communities
larger farmers and/or more powerful members
of the community colluding with officials and
using legal entities to secure preferential access to
natural resources
strong suspicion by some members of the
communities that revenue generated from
productive ventures is not being used for the
benefit of the entire community
inefficiency of the leadership of the institutions
inter-community and intra-community conflicts
around land use.
The community representatives identified the
following types of assistance that is required to
facilitate the implementation process:
financial assistance (especially post-transfer
support)
capacity building and training in the community
access to information and services
conflict resolution mediation.
Land use and environmental assessment data are key
parameters to analyse natural resource management
strategies and conflicts in communities. Additionally,
this type of information is often used to monitor
changes in agricultural strategies as well as
consequences of changed environmental and socio-
economic conditions (Fog 1995). Availability of
such information is also crucial for the relevant
bodies to undertake informed decisions pertaining to
land-use development. Although DLA has collected
a great deal of socio-economic information on most
land redistribution projects via its quality of life
studies, the environmental indicators remain
neglected. Thus, planning and development in
communities often take place without due
consideration for the natural resource base. In the
long term, this can have serious implications for the
viability and sustainability of the projects as well as
the natural environment.
Despite these general problems, some projects are co-
operating to reduce conflicts and maintain
sustainable land practices. The potential capacity of
communities to co-operate among themselves and
jointly engage in sustainable land-use practices
remains. This is particularly discernable in projects
that are smaller, have access to income-generating
ventures and where participation in decision making




The co-operation between different departments and
structures interested in rural development is
currently weak and ineffectual. Meer (1997) supports
this contention by stating that there is little evidence
that services reflected in the KZN Department of
Agriculture’s budget are reaching the beneficiaries of
land reform.
It is imperative that land reform impacts go beyond
redistributing land to also address the question of
survival and improved standards of living of the rural
poor. Bonti-Ankomah (1997) says this requires
several government policies and programmes to be
integrated, but they are implemented in isolation
from each other and, in some cases, contradict each
other.
The roles of agencies and structures outside the
government and communities must also be
integrated, strengthened and supported. In many
instances, these structures are closer to rural
communities. They may be in a better position to
contribute towards their empowerment. Partnerships
with NGOs are important to tap into existing
experience, knowledge and skills as well as financial
and other resources. NGOs can also play a critical
role in monitoring land use as well as acting as a
pressure group.
The following basic resources for effective
institutions dealing with sustainable land use
management need to be enhanced and developed in
land redistribution projects:
Leadership: This is one of the most important
resources likely to contribute to the success of
institutional intervention in sustainable land use
management.
Financial capacity: This is necessary for
continued operation and effectiveness. The
concomitant implications are the need to raise
funds and to have expertise in financial
management.
Human resource capacity: There is a dire need for
training and development in all segments of the
beneficiary communities.
Time: The demands of everyday life tend to be
highly gendered and often compete with
involvement in institutional structures and
processes. These need to be taken into
consideration.
Information: access to information is critical to
ensure informed decisions relating to land-use
issues. Furthermore, for institutions, knowledge
about how to work with other institutions is
critical for capacity building and mobilising
resources.
Mechanisms for transparency and accountability:
Conflicts of interests over land resources are best
managed by ensuring openness and community
accountability. Figure 5, which is adapted from
Erskine (1997:8), illustrates how accountability
can be achieved.
Conclusion
Herweg et al. (1999) indicate that the sustainable use
of land resources is a precondition for sustainable
rural development. This becomes increasingly
necessary as the natural resource base becomes
Strong local organisations
(with high levels of participation and transparency)
Accountability at local
Real powers levels for sustainable management Social and
 and rights of natural resources economic benefits
Capacities (including necessary
resources and information)
Figure 5: Basic conditions for local responsibility
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increasingly degraded. This paper suggests that
developing an enabling institutional environment is
critical for sustainable land resource management in
land redistribution projects. Sustainable land-use
management in redistribution projects cannot be
achieved without the willing and effective
participation of all stakeholders, especially
community members and organisations.
Furthermore, there remains a dire need to devise
institutions and structures that are sensitive to
ecological considerations and will integrate the views
of local people with other stakeholders and support
structures. Such institutions, Humpreys (1996)
contends, will serve to scrutinise the activities of
those actors with a stake in the natural resources
available (especially in relation to sustainability
concerns) and serve to ensure the active participation
of actors from the community (ensuring that their
views are heard with equal status alongside external
interests). In essence, ‘a qualitatively new type of
institution is necessary in which all actors may
effectively participate’ (Humpreys 1996:24).
At the most general level, this study suggests that
there are contradictions in the social redress and
environmentally-sensitive policies embedded in land
reform and the actual implementation and
management of these programmes. As indicated,
policies and programmes stress the importance of
ensuring social, economic and environmental
sustainability. This is further supported by some of
the rhetoric associated with the broader programme
of agrarian reform in South Africa. The central
importance of households’ multiple survival
strategies and activities linked to the land resource
base has been highlighted in this paper. The reality,
however, is that the key issue that will enable
sustainable use of land resources must include
changing institutional structures and capacity in
relation to managing access and control over
economic and natural resources.
At a national level, the institutional problems
pertaining to land management practices highlighted
in this paper can also be linked to the absence of a
comprehensive government policy towards
sustainable land and natural resource management in
land reform projects. Additionally, there is a lack of
mechanisms to co-ordinate the activities of
institutions at the project level.
Dumanski (1997) asserts that rural communities in
most developing countries, and this applies to many
land redistribution projects in KZN, are poorly
equipped to address natural resource and land
management issues on their own. Furthermore, the
persistence of poverty often limits land users’ choice
of land-use options. Thus, unsustainable land-use
practices are not always the result of the lack of
awareness or deliberate degradation of the
environment on the part of the users. Strong
partnerships with governments, the research
community, businesses and NGOs are necessary to
address the concerns raised in this paper. It is
becoming clear that the direct involvement of
beneficiaries at all levels of decision making and
implementation pertaining to natural resource use is
required for long-term sustainability. This needs to
be supported by technical, financial and institutional
backstopping from other stakeholders. Thus,
sustainable land management is directly linked to the
effectiveness of land management institutions and
appropriate support.
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